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Abstract 
When President Jimmy Carter entered the White House, he desired a decision-making structure 
that would be collegial and provide him with a diverse range of policy options from his principal 
advisors, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. 
However, their differing outlooks coupled with a desire to control and manage U.S. foreign 
policy led to a furious and bitter battle to influence the administration’s agenda. This thesis 
analyses the relationship between Vance and Brzezinski and their struggles for the ear of the 
president.  
It was a conflict exacerbated by the institutional rivalry between the National Security 
Council and the State Department as they battled with one another to affect policy. As issues 
arose, the president’s advisors, supported by their constituencies, jostled to orchestrate the 
administration’s strategies and approach. Subsequently, tensions increased as the conflict 
between Vance, Brzezinski and their departments developed into unbridled bureaucratic warfare 
within the Carter administration.  
This study utilises the bureaucratic politics paradigm to illustrate how the influence of 
advisors and organisations can impact on presidential decision-making. While President Carter 
wanted to be the main decision maker in his administration, his insistence on a system that 
provided him with a range of advice precipitated the struggles between Vance and Brzezinski. As 
their disputes intensified, Carter was unable to effectively manage the views and advice of his 
advisors and formulate a clear strategy. As this thesis demonstrates, the bureaucratic politics 
model provides an effective framework to analyse the development and implementation of U.S. 
foreign policy.  
While historians have neglected or played down the significance of their clashes, this 
thesis argues that the rivalry between Vance, Brzezinski, and their respective departments had a 
clear and visible effect on U.S. foreign policy. The bureaucratic wars raged throughout Carter’s 
time in office, contributing to a tapestry of inconsistencies that resulted in the administration’s 
inability to create a settled foreign policy agenda.  
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Introduction 
When answering the question of when he first became aware of tensions between Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates paused. He had joined the National Security Council (NSC) from 
the CIA as Brzezinski’s special assistant in May 1977 to assist with streamlining the 
bureaucratic process around intelligence. This gave him a ringside seat to the national 
security advisor’s troubled relationship with the secretary of state. After a momentary 
stillness, Gates replied, ‘almost immediately.’1 
The acrimonious Vance-Brzezinski relationship became a hallmark of the Carter 
presidency and their struggles came to have a significant impact on U.S. foreign policy. 
Their conflict, born out of philosophical differences, as well as competing interpretations of 
the role of the United States should play in the international arena, developed into a broad 
bureaucratic war for the ear of the president. Their respective constituencies, the State 
Department and the NSC, allowed them to escalate tensions from the moment the Carter 
administration entered the White House. As the then Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
noted, ‘they were at sword’s point from day one.’2 
The 1947 National Security Act created the position of assistant to the president for 
national security affairs, or as it is commonly known, the national security advisor. Since 
then, the president’s advisors have waged numerous bureaucratic battles to control and 
influence U.S. foreign policy. The national security advisor, aided by the National Security 
Council staff, represented a challenge to the secretary of state and the State Department, the 
historical vehicle of policy development. When President John F. Kennedy entered the 
White House in January 1961, he wanted an NSC system that provided him with the 
information he needed and allowed him to be the main decision maker within the 
                                                          
1 Robert M. Gates, Telephone Interview with the author, March 17, 2016. 
2 Harold Brown, Star Spangled Security: Applying Lessons Learned Over Six Decades Safeguarding 
America (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2012), 43. 
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administration. Critical of what he perceived to be an ineffective and overbearing State 
Department bureaucracy, he appointed McGeorge Bundy as his assistant for national 
security affairs, with the brief of simplifying the NSC structure to adhere to his wish to be at 
the centre of foreign policy decision-making.3 As Bundy reduced its size, he streamlined the 
NSC system by creating various committees that responded to the president’s demands to 
quickly formulate policy. As the administration sought to develop strategies and responded 
to crises, coupled with Kennedy’s frustration with the lack of innovation emanating from 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his department, Bundy and the NSC’s influence steadily 
increased.4  
When Lyndon Johnson became president following Kennedy’s assassination, he 
retained the services of Bundy, his staff and the existing process. Rather than dismantle his 
predecessor’s system for generating policy ideas, Johnson relied heavily on Bundy, whose 
assertiveness increased as he advocated for the escalation of the U.S. presence in South 
Vietnam. Despite harbouring cordial relations with Rusk, Bundy regularly circumnavigated 
the secretary of state and department officials. By his own admission, his actions created an 
element of ‘institutional difficulty.’5 Bundy’s departure from the Johnson administration 
coincided with calls for greater co-ordination of foreign policy matters with the State 
Department as opposed to the NSC. His replacement, Walt Rostow, received the title 
‘special assistant to the president’ with no mention of ‘national security affairs’ but the 
changes were cosmetic. Johnson continued to rely on the NSC and although Rostow never 
                                                          
3 David J. Rothkopf, Running The World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the 
Architects of American Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), 84-85. 
4 John P. Burke, Honest Broker?: The National Security Advisor and Presidential Decision Making 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009), 58-59. 
5 Ivo H. Daadler and I.M. Destler, In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the National Security 
Advisers and the Presidents They Served: From JFK to George W. Bush (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2009) 41-43; Andrew Preston, The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 52. 
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eclipsed Bundy’s influence, he enjoyed an elevated position within the foreign policy 
apparatus.6  
 Upon entering the White House in 1969, President Richard Nixon’s desire to 
control all aspects of foreign policy, coupled with his distrust of the State Department, led 
him to give the NSC and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger a pre-eminent role in 
the development of policy.7 Both Nixon and Kissinger shared the view that interfering 
bureaucracies like the departments of state or defense hindered policy development and 
during the transition period, they agreed upon a system that centralised decision-making 
within the White House. On inauguration day, Nixon revealed to his cabinet that the NSC 
would ‘be the principle forum for consideration of policy issues’ and assigned full control of 
key committees to Kissinger.8 With foreign policy centralised within the White House, 
Nixon and Kissinger excluded Secretary of State William Rogers from the decision-making 
process with the national security advisor and the NSC staff taking control of policy 
development.9  
After Jimmy Carter succeeded Gerald Ford in 1977, he appointed Cyrus Vance, a 
former deputy secretary of defense and New York attorney, as secretary of state, who vowed 
to re-establish the State Department’s role as the primary office for foreign policy 
development and implementation. Carter’s pick for national security advisor, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, a Polish academic at Columbia University and foreign policy expert, believed 
the precedent set by Bundy and Kissinger entitled him to co-ordinate foreign policy within 
the confines of the White House, with the assistance of the NSC staff. When the Carter 
                                                          
6 Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, eds., Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives of the 
National Security Council (Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1988), 93. 
7 John Dumbrell and David M. Barrett, The Making of US Foreign Policy, Second Edition 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 65. 
8 Daadler and Destler, In the Shadow of the Oval Office, 57. 
9 I.M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of 
American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 203. 
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administration entered office, both departments fought for supremacy over the foreign policy 
agenda. 
This dissertation examines the relationship between Vance and Brzezinski and their 
conflicting roles as foreign policy makers. President Carter appointed both men on the 
assumption that the pair would work collegially with one another to provide a range of 
advice and policies that he could consider, however, their divergent ideologies and 
approaches laid the foundations for a bitter rivalry for control over the administration’s 
agenda. As one former official defined it, ‘the main battle of the Carter years was between 
the Columbia professor and the Wall Street lawyer.’10 The conflict also became exacerbated 
by bureaucratic tensions emanating from the institutional rivalry between the NSC and the 
State Department as they battled with one another to affect policy. Alongside the tensions 
between Vance and Brzezinski, the bureaucratic wars between to the two departments, 
produced a disjointed decision-making process that proved detrimental to the 
administration’s foreign policy agenda. 
What this dissertation aims to expose is the bureaucratic processes by which Carter 
made foreign policy, the changing nature of that process from 1977 to 1980, and 
circumstances that led to these changes. To achieve this, the dissertation investigates the 
bureaucratic wars, the ideas and machinations that underpinned the State Department and 
NSC staff, the ways in which Vance and Brzezinski manipulated their positions in the Carter 
administration, and how they took advantage of the foreign crises that plagued Carter’s 
tenure. Although he claimed credit for his attempts to redefine American foreign policy as 
the first post-Vietnam president and instituted a series of policy initiatives that resulted in 
the Panama Canal treaties, the Camp David Accords, an arms control agreement with the 
Soviet Union, a negotiated settlement on the issue of Rhodesia as well as normalised 
relations with the People’s Republic of China, his presidency became beset by a series of 
                                                          
10 Leslie H. Gelb, Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy (New 
York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 57. 
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crises around the globe. Proxy wars in the Horn of Africa, Angola and Cambodia, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, revolutions in Nicaragua and Iran, the hostage crisis as well as the 
ongoing energy challenge disrupted his agenda. Against this backdrop, the Vance-Brzezinski 
relationship hampered the administration’s ability to tackle these issues.  
Theoretical Framework: Bureaucratic Politics 
White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan wrote in his memoir that the decision-making 
structure within the administration between the president, Vance, and Brzezinski operated as 
follows: ‘Zbig would be the thinker, Cy would be the doer, and Jimmy Carter would be the 
decider.’11 After his election, President Carter chose a model of decision-making that relied 
heavily on the input of his two principal foreign policy advisors who, despite their divergent 
attitudes and worldviews, offered the president a range of advice. As a one term governor of 
Georgia, he had little exposure to foreign affairs and believed appointing conflicting 
advisors would provide an opportunity to consider a variety of ideas before he arrived at a 
conclusion. His preferred method broadly reflected the bureaucratic politics model whereby 
decisions become influenced by the input of individuals and/or departments within the 
executive branch. 
The model rose to prominence in the 1960s among political scientists and historians 
of American politics. The model was designed to understand decision-making through 
institutions and the interactions of individuals that develop personal and professional 
differences. Among the leading advocates of the bureaucratic model was Graham T. Allison 
who developed the theoretical framework in his work Essence of Decision: Explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. Allison built upon the work of political scientists Gabriel A. Almond, 
Richard E. Neustadt and Samuel P. Huntington in debating the influence of organisations on 
presidential decision-making. Almond first asserted, that national elites, rather than the 
president, help construct foreign policy agendas. Neustadt similarly, presented the idea of 
                                                          
11 Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency (New York: Putnam, 1982), 47. 
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the commander-in-chief as a ‘presidential clerk’ and contended that decision-making, rather 
than being directed solely by the president of the day, came from a variety of internal and 
external sources. Huntington, a colleague of Brzezinski’s who later served on his NSC staff, 
meanwhile argued that issues surrounding defence and national security was the result of 
collective negotiations between top administration officials rather than being singularly 
directed by the president. Like Neustadt, Huntington went as far as to question the power 
and authority of the president in relation to foreign policy and defence issues.12 
Analysing the Kennedy administration’s reaction to the missile crisis, Allison 
argued that no single actor influenced policy making, but rather a range of contributors aided 
the administration’s response. Decisions during the crisis, Allison observed, became the 
result of bargaining, a series of negotiations and debates between various officials who 
advanced their own strategies and approaches.13 The decision to blockade Cuba, ultimately 
the proposal of Robert McNamara, came about through a collective dismissal of alternative 
options such as strategic strikes and the deployment of marines. Overall, Allison asserts that 
the input of numerous political actors contributes to a final decision or policy. Morton H. 
Halperin, a foreign policy expert who served in Lyndon Johnson’s Defense Department and 
Nixon’s NSC, wrote a corroborating essay along with Allison that insisted, ‘decisions 
seldom reflect a single coherent, consistent set of calculations about national security 
interests…the “maker” of government policy is not one decision maker, but rather a 
conglomerate of large organisations and political actors.’14 
In his original text Allison forwarded two other decision-making frameworks, the 
rational actor and organisational process model. The rational actor, or Model I, which 
                                                          
12 Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1950); Richard E. 
Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership (New York: 
John Wiley, 1960); Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Problems in National 
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961). 
13 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1971), 144-145. 
14 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications,” World Politics 24 (Spring 1972): 53; Ibid, 42. 
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Allison identifies as the most common paradigm utilised by political scientists, proposes that 
decisions are the result of careful analysis of issues by policymakers. A course of action is 
reached by individuals considering a range of alternatives assessed against potential risks, 
problems and consequences as well as the goals and objectives of the government. 
Essentially, it is the selection of the ‘alternative whose consequences rank highest in the 
decision-makers’ payoff function.’15 Model I views decision-making as a simplified process 
of elimination where decisions are weighted against various factors to arrive at the most 
effective and rational course of action.  
Allison himself takes issue with the theory, noting that it is based on assumptions 
surrounding the goals, objectives and actions of national governments when reaching 
decisions. In sum, the model supposes that policymakers have all the relevant information at 
their disposal to calculate the risks and benefits, which underpin their final decisions. As 
Allison notes, an ‘explanation consists of showing what goal the government was pursuing 
when it acted and how the action was a reasonable choice, given the nation’s objective.’16 
Moreover, the rational actor model neglects the role of government organisations 
and political actors within the policy process and does not consider the vast bureaucratic 
apparatus of decision-making. Allison therefore proposes Model II, organisational process, 
where policy is not developed by individuals but rather a ‘conglomerate of semi-feudal, 
loosely allied organisations, each with a substantial life of its own.’ Because government is a 
labyrinth of departments and organisations, it requires decentralisation and careful co-
ordination when confronted with policy issues. While the rational actor interprets decisions 
as the result of careful dissemination by policymakers, organisational processes implies that 
policies are formed through government departments.17  
                                                          
15 Allison, Essence of Decision, 28-32. 
16 Ibid, 4-13. 
17 Ibid, 67. 
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Because government is so vast and issues are sometimes complex, the president 
assigns responsibly for formulating ideas to specific agencies whose expertise covers the 
policy issue. Reacting to their own standard operating procedure, Allison proposes that 
much of the groundwork is laid by government organisations and presented to the president 
who often accepts their analysis as the basis of their decision. As Allison notes, ‘government 
leaders can trim the edges of this output and can exercise some choice in combining outputs. 
But most of the behaviour is determined by previous established procedures.’18   
A key aspect that Allison neglects with the rational actor as well as the 
organisational process model, is the degree to which competition and bureaucratic conflict 
affect the policy process. As David Welch notes, he neither considers the role of assertive 
advisors, small group dynamics and inter-agency relationships.19 Allison himself 
acknowledges that Model II ‘balances the classical model’s efforts to understand 
government behaviour as choices of a unitary decision maker.’ Both models consider 
decision-making to be the result of careful analysis and co-ordination between unified actors 
and organisations. However, neither model considers that individuals or organisations may 
not act in unison and that their differing personal and institutional objectives may not 
correspond with colleagues across the executive branch.20 
While organisational process argues that the input of institutions using standard 
operating procedures generate outputs, it does not address the ‘social element’ to the policy 
process and the interaction between individuals and organisations, as decision-making is 
susceptible to input and interference across the executive branch.21 Indeed, the contribution 
of various actors often produces competition and disagreement amongst officials to affect 
policy. Bureaucratic rivalry is a common aspect of decision-making as individuals and 
                                                          
18 Ibid, 78-88. 
19 David A. Welch, “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and 
Prospect” 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 117. 
20 Allison, Essence of Decision, 144. 
21 Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, Ninth 
(Boston: Cengage Learning, 2010), 175. 
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institutions jostle with one another to encourage a course of action, which reflects their 
beliefs and/or advice. As J. Garry Clifford noted, ‘diversity and conflict permeate the policy 
process.’ This creates variable levels of conflict and competition within the executive 
branch. ‘Policy flows’ Clifford notes, ‘from an amalgam of organisations and political actors 
who differ substantially on a particular issue.’ Officials from organisations such as the 
military, the Departments of State, Defense and the CIA frequently ‘compete to advance 
their own personal and organisational interests to influence decisions.’22  
The bureaucratic politics model rose to prominence during the 1960s and 1970s, at a 
time when the supremacy of the NSC under Bundy and Kissinger underlined the increased 
influence of the committee on foreign policy. Political scientists and former diplomats have 
added their contributions to the growing literature on the growth of bureaucratic institutions 
and their impact on foreign policy decision-making. The Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s 
thrust the framework back into the public sphere while in the 2000s, in the wake of 9/11, it 
reappeared in response to the development of new institutions that came to affect 
administration policy. However, in the recent edition of Explaining the History of American 
Foreign Relations, the chapter on bureaucratic politics was removed and many of its key 
themes amalgamated into a general analysis of international relations theories to make way 
for new methodologies on American foreign affairs.23 
This study utilises the bureaucratic politics model to illustrate how decision-making 
within the Carter administration became subject to debates between Vance and the State 
Department and Brzezinski and the NSC. Whereas as other theories, such as thick 
description focus on individuals, this thesis addresses the roles of institutions and the power 
they yield to illustrate how they can utilise their bureaucratic strength to influence 
                                                          
22 J. Garry Clifford, “Bureaucratic Politics,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 
ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, Second Edition (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 93. 
23 Robert Jervis, “Theories of International Relations,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign 
Relations, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Frank Costigliola, Third Edition (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 9. 
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proceedings and ultimately policy. The example of the Carter administration demonstrates 
the value of the bureaucratic politics paradigm in understanding decision-making and policy 
development with respect to U.S. foreign policy. Carter gave Brzezinski and the NSC a role 
to formulate strategy while Vance and the State Department took on the role of 
implementing policy. However, contrary interpretations of their roles coupled with their 
different approaches towards U.S. foreign policy precipitated a struggle for control of the 
administration’s agenda. Carter’s inability to utilise the advice of his key advisors 
subsequently produced an inconsistent and at times incoherent foreign policy agenda, which 
reflected the tensions between Vance and Brzezinski but also encouraged bureaucratic 
warfare within the administration.  
This thesis also evaluates the roles of the president, as ‘the decider’ within the 
administration, in managing internal debates and questions whether the commander-in-chief 
is fully in control of foreign policy. It analyses the roles of the president’s key advisors, the 
secretary of state and the national security advisor, to consider how they influenced policy 
development and implementation with special consideration given to their ideologies, 
personalities and interpretations of their roles within the administration to understand the 
bureaucratic wars of the Carter administration. Finally, the thesis also examines the 
institutional rivalry between the State Department and the NSC to appreciate how 
bureaucratic institutions affect the policy process and foreign policy more generally. The 
growing declassification of documents, coupled with the increasing number of oral history 
testimonies from former administration members, reveal the extent to which the State 
Department and the NSC influenced U.S. foreign policy during the Carter presidency. 
However, the current historiography has somewhat ignored that development. Whereas the 
secondary literature has tended to focus on individuals within the administration, the 
bureaucratic structure remains neglected. As this thesis explains, the internal apparatus of 
the Carter administration had a significant impact on the development of policy and response 
to numerous crises that arose during this period.  
11 
 
In Essence of Decision, Allison argued that because foreign policy is a broad field, it 
became necessary for decision-making to be decentralised from the White House. With 
increasingly assertive bureaucracies attempting to manage and influence decision-making, 
successive presidents needed to engage with the rival interests of individuals and 
organisations and bargain with them to enact a desired agenda. Allison’s analysis reflects the 
conclusions of Neustadt, who argued, ‘yet nobody and nothing helps a president to see, save 
as he helps himself.’24 The president’s power is reliant on the officer holder’s ability to 
utilise key officials and departments to enforce and execute their agenda or decisions. When 
foreign policy issues arise, the president of the day co-ordinates responses with the various 
actors, which involves a degree of bargaining and negotiation between key players. ‘In status 
and formal power the president is chief’ Allison wrote, ‘but his authority guarantees only an 
extensive clerkship. If the president is to rule, he must squeeze from these formal powers a 
full array of bargaining advantages.’25 As a result, the president introduces officials and 
institutions into the decision-making process more regularly to successfully implement a 
policy or a decision and achieve a consensus within the administration. 
The role of the president within the bureaucratic model continues to provoke 
considerable debate amongst scholars, specifically the lack of presidential control over 
government policy. Jerel A. Rosati for example concurred with Allison’s original assessment 
of the role of the president who is ‘merely one participant although his influence may be the 
most powerful.’26 Halperin along with former diplomat Priscilla A. Clapp and former Under 
Secretary of State Arnold Kanter argued that it is a necessity of the modern presidency to 
negotiate with various officials and bureaucracies to consolidate a fixed approach, agenda or 
decision to reaffirm the president’s authority. ‘Presidential power’ they wrote, ‘must be 
carefully husbanded and used shrewdly if the president is to go beyond his role as clerk in 
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terms of his ability to influence events.’27 The growth of bureaucratic institutions led some 
to conclude that the influence of other players had weakened the president’s power to initiate 
their desired agendas. Douglas Yates and Eva Etzioni-Halevy’s work in the 1980s contended 
that decisions reflect their intervention in policy making.28 
Others took issue with the perceived role of the president within the bureaucratic 
politics framework. Robert J. Art for example disputed the influence of bureaucracies on 
decision-making. ‘Do they mean that bureaucracies largely determine our foreign policy 
through their ability to select the information presented to top political leaders and through 
the control they exert over the details of implementing policy?’ he wrote. For Art, the 
bureaucratic politics model fails to adequately address this issue.29 Dan Caldwell meanwhile 
remarked on Allison’s failure to address the role of the commander-in-chief and noted that 
although bureaucratic political struggles to influence policy exist, ultimately the president 
remains the sole authority within the U.S. government: 
The president determines whether his advisors are allowed to continue serving him. 
Cabinet members and presidential advisors serve at the pleasure of the president. 
Furthermore, the president is the only American official with a national 
constituency; as such, he stands above the members of the Cabinet and 
governmental bureaucracy all of whom are his de jure and de facto subordinates.30 
David A. Welch contends that the president remains the key source of power and 
influence in government. He argued that Allison and others de-emphasised the role of the 
president within the bureaucratic politics structure. In his critique of Allison’s theory with 
respect to the Cuban Missile Crisis he noted, ‘the “pulling and hauling” that went on took 
the form of normal debate in which players argued for and against various options; the name 
of the game was persuasion, and the only player who had to be persuaded was the 
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president.’31 Jonathon Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond rhetorically pose the question, 
‘why would a president bargain with their executive branch officials?’ particularly when he 
appointed them in the first instance.32 Revisionists, such as Eben J. Christensen and Steven 
B. Redd concur with the notion that despite the potential debates and wrangling that 
develop, the president is the ultimate decision maker. As they noted, ‘the famous case of 
Abraham Lincoln's statement to his cabinet – “Gentlemen, the vote is 11 to 1 and the 1 has 
it”’33 As a result, a lack of consensus amongst scholars on the role of the president within the 
structure of the bureaucratic politics model is highly significant. This thesis seeks to address 
the role of the president within the framework by analysing Jimmy Carter’s role as ‘the 
decider’ within his administration and draws two conclusions.  
Carter embraced a decision-making system that relied heavily on the divergent 
views of Vance, Brzezinski and their respective departments. As Thomas Preston and Paul 
t’Hart noted in their study, presidents who lack experience opt for a system that provides 
them with a wide-range of advice and information to guide them towards a final decision. 
Policy development within the administration mirrored Carter’s conscious desire to receive a 
variety of ideas from his closest advisors, which indicates presidential control over the 
internal apparatus of the decision-making structure. However, as the bureaucratic struggles 
escalated Carter proved unable to create a clear and consistent approach. Preston and t’Hart 
argue that presidents who require extra information and deliberate with advisors, become 
indecisive. This, the authors contend, leads to conflict between advisors and ‘bureaucratic 
confrontation.’34 Carter became increasingly torn between the ideas and views of his two key 
advisors, which contributed to the bureaucratic tensions, and ultimately led to an 
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increasingly inconsistent foreign policy message. While the role of the president within the 
bureaucratic politics framework divides academics, this dissertation demonstrates how 
Carter’s attempts to construct a system with him as the ‘decider’ fuelled competition and 
unnecessary bureaucratic warfare.   
Proponents of the model also highlight how the different character traits of the 
players at heart of government often fuels personal rivalry. As Clifford noted, ‘in its 
emphasis on individual values and tugging and hauling by key players, bureaucratic politics 
makes personality and cognitive process crucial to understanding who wins and why.’ When 
policy divisions emerge, personality differences become magnified as individuals compete 
to make their voices heard and their approaches accepted.35 Differences become exacerbated 
by the individual’s interests and interpretations of their role within government. Allison and 
Halperin observe that ‘a player’s stand depends on his personal interests and his conception 
of his role.’ Therefore, if the issue is of significance to the individual and is within the 
realms of their sphere of influence, this leads to greater involvement in the policy process.36 
This is particularly prescient not only when analysing the ideologies and backgrounds of 
Vance and Brzezinski but also their interpretations of their positions within the 
administration.   
Given the divergent personalities and philosophies of Vance and Brzezinski, conflict 
between them evolved early on. The national security advisor confirmed this in his memoirs, 
‘the deepest differences between Vance and me were philosophical. Our differing 
backgrounds had produced substantially different conceptions of how the world works and 
consequently a different estimate of the proper balance between power and principle in our 
age.’37 As chapter two illustrates, the respective backgrounds of the two individuals had a 
significant impact on their worldviews, which shaped their philosophies upon entering the 
                                                          
35 Clifford, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 101-102 
36 Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 48 
37 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-
1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), 43. 
15 
 
administration. The national security advisor’s upbringing, displaced firstly by the Nazi 
invasion of Poland and the Soviet occupation thereafter, coupled with his academic research 
convinced him of the need for the United States to be assertive in the international arena. 
Vance meanwhile rose through the ranks of the foreign policy establishment in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, to become a respected diplomat and authority on international affairs. 
Brzezinski however viewed the secretary of state as a member of the ‘once dominant WASP 
elite’ paralysed by the Vietnam war and unable to take decisive action when required.38 
Vance’s views, shaped by his experiences in government after he underwent a re-
evaluation of his worldview, contrasted with Brzezinski’s. He believed the conduct of U.S. 
foreign policy should look beyond the Cold War, while Brzezinski put special emphasis on 
the superpower relationship at the centre of his ideological outlook. Brzezinski’s advocacy 
of a more assertive approach to foreign policy issues, particularly in relation to the Soviet 
Union, and his willingness to utilise American military strength contrasted with Vance’s 
cautious diplomatic style, which underscored patient negotiations and de-emphasised 
military alternatives. 
Their ideological differences became exacerbated by their differing interpretations 
of their role. Brzezinski, an ambitious and driven individual, believed Carter wanted to be an 
‘activist’ president and he desired a close role to help him initiate his policy objectives. The 
position of national security advisor gave him the opportunity to co-ordinate closely with 
Carter within the confines of the White House.39 Brzezinski not only craved the title of 
‘thinker’ role within the administration but also ‘doer.’ As time passed, he took on a more 
proactive role, utilising his close personal and professional relationship with the president to 
affect decisions. Furthermore, Brzezinski proved to be an aggressive bureaucratic operator to 
promote the policies and strategies he advocated. Cyrus Vance on the other hand, adopted a 
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more reserved approach. As former Assistant Secretary of State Leslie H. Gelb described 
their styles: ‘While Mr. Vance played by Marquis of Queensbury rules, it might be said Mr. 
Brzezinski was more of a streetfighter.’40 
Vance did not object to Brzezinski’s role. Given the president personally selected 
him as his national security advisor, he did not have the right to protest his appointment.41 
He believed however that the secretary of state should act as the nation’s chief diplomat, 
while he viewed his department as the traditional architects of U.S. foreign policy. 
Conscious of how Kissinger denigrated the department and Secretary of State Rogers, he 
entered office with the intention of reaffirming their authority. He felt that his position and 
his department’s status, gave him sufficient power with the president and acted as a shield 
against any attempts by Brzezinski to undermine his influence. However, as Brzezinski took 
on a more public role in the development of U.S. foreign policy, Vance protested and later 
recorded in his memoirs, ‘I felt very strongly that there could only be two spokesmen, the 
president and the secretary of state.’42 
Vance refused to directly engage in bureaucratic warfare with Brzezinski or the NSC 
and discouraged his staff from doing so. He believed the system within the administration 
could only succeed if he obtained a direct, unobstructed line to President Carter and a forum 
to relay his views to the other members of the administration.43 While Vance’s position 
reflected, what Gelb described as the ‘Marquis of Queensberry’ rules of fair play, it led to 
charges of naivety from his own staff who argued his refusal to combat Brzezinski’s 
influence contributed to his declining authority within the administration. As State 
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Department spokesperson Hodding Carter III reflected, ‘he refused to play as tough as his 
enemies and that was to cost a lot. You really can’t play that game in Washington.’44 
President Carter appointed both Vance and Brzezinski in the hope that their 
divergent views would provide a range of options when it came to decision-making. The 
system needed to rely on collegiality between his two closest advisors however given their 
backgrounds, personalities and conceptions of their roles, a positive and cooperative 
environment within his administration proved to be unattainable. As the bureaucratic model 
emphasises, personality differences and contrary conceptions of roles enhance the level of 
interference within the executive branch. The example of the Carter administration therefore 
illustrates, the extent to which bureaucratic competition can escalate and influence decision-
making. As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown observed, ‘what President Carter may have 
missed during his selection process is that if the policy views of people differ and their 
personalities don’t mesh, their policy differences become magnified. Add personal rivalry 
and things go over the edge.’45 
As Allison and Halperin note in their analysis of the bureaucratic politics model, 
‘members of an organisation, particularly career officials, come to believe that the health of 
their organisation is vital to the national interest. The health of the organisation, in turn, is 
seen to depend on maintaining influence, fulfilling its mission, and securing the necessary 
capabilities.’ Furthermore, when the authority of an organisation is challenged, it often 
provokes concern about the status of the relevant department.46 During the Carter 
administration, the State Department under Vance became increasingly agitated by the 
influence of Brzezinski and the NSC and interpreted it as a direct threat to their position. The 
NSC staff meanwhile used the mandate afforded to them to affect policy through Brzezinski 
more forcefully. As Preston and t’Hart expand, ‘in their pursuit of power and preferred 
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policies, officeholders treat their departments or bureau as instruments of their ambition.’47 
Subsequently, officials in both departments advanced their own agendas in contrast to the 
others and engaged in various struggles to influence decision-making and the 
administration’s overall approach. 
Scholars however have neglected, to a certain extent, the NSC-State rivalry, and 
have not yet examined the inter-agency wars through the lens of the bureaucratic politics 
model. This dissertation attempts to demonstrate how the influence of the two departments 
affected policy making within the administration. The creation of a decision-making structure 
within the administration strengthened the role of the NSC at the expense of the State 
Department at an early stage, which fuelled the bureaucratic wars of the Carter 
administration. As Ralph S. Brower and Mitchel Y. Abolafia observe in their study on 
bureaucratic politics hierarchy, ‘the overwhelming constraint of position among bureaucratic 
lower participants is relative powerlessness due to the effects of hierarchy.’48 
With respect to bureaucratic politics, this study seeks to illustrate how the influence 
of officials and bureaus below the main arena of decision-making affect foreign policy in its 
development and implementation. It contends that the policy process become subjected to 
conflicting voices from below as well as those from above. Whereas Allison and others 
confined decision-making to top ranking officials, and did not fully address the role of 
various bureaucracies and lower-level diplomats, this thesis demonstrates the ability of 
individuals in both the State Department and the NSC to affect foreign policy. This study 
contends that potential policy disagreements at a lower-level causes serious ramifications at 
higher levels of the executive branch. 
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Historiography 
With the exception of James Winfield Lumberg’s PhD thesis ‘Conflicts Between Cyrus 
Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski: A Cause of Inconsistent American Foreign Policy During 
the Carter Administration’, no other individual study of the Vance-Brzezinski rivalry has 
been produced. Lumberg’s study focused more on the results of the conflicts between Vance 
and Brzezinski, and relied heavily on secondary literature as well as the memoirs the key 
players of the time.49 Furthermore, he did not enjoy the benefit of utilising recently 
declassified primary materials or oral history testimony to aid his findings. Individual 
biographies and articles on Vance and Brzezinski have detailed key aspects of their lives, 
careers and ideologies but scholars have neglected the increasing volume of newly 
declassified materials that sheds considerable light on their relationship.  
David S. McLellan profiled Vance in 1985 and like Lumberg, relied on memoirs and 
the secondary literature. He argued that Vance and Carter shared many of the same beliefs 
and agreed on a variety of policy initiatives but events contributed to Brzezinski’s growing 
influence and forced Carter to accept to his way of thinking.50 A somewhat basic argument, 
McLellan neglects several key aspects such as Brzezinski’s internal bureaucratic 
manoeuvring, the history of NSC-State rivalry, and the president’s declining relationship 
with Vance that contributed to the shift towards the national security advisor.  
A significant amount of time passed before more scholars addressed the life of 
Vance and his role within the Carter administration. His death in 2002 prompted new 
research. Melchiore J. Laucella’s article, published in 2004 examines the evolution of his 
views, from a supporter of containment of the Soviet Union in the 1960s to an advocate of 
co-operation in the 1970s, which ultimately led him into conflict with the more hawkish 
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Brzezinski.51 Mary DuBois Sexton expanded on Laucella’s article with her own 2009 thesis. 
Sexton analyses Vance’s time as secretary of state and concludes that his resignation was the 
result of his declining influence in the eyes of the president. Sexton states that the thesis, 
‘will identify and explore the Vance-Brzezinski clashes over key foreign policies, it will 
maintain that battles involving principle and power were fundamentally disputes between 
Vance and Carter.’52 While her focus on the Vance-Carter relationship is informative, the 
thesis underappreciates Vance’s disputes with Brzezinski as a cause of the administration’s 
inconsistent approach.  
Brzezinski meanwhile generated more scholarly analysis than Vance over the years 
due to his continued public profile and influence on U.S. foreign policy until his death in 
2017. Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos first focused on Brzezinski’s role as national security 
advisor as a comparative study with Henry Kissinger and contrasts the ways both men 
operated as national security advisors, assessing their world views and influence in 
government. His study is important for two reasons in that it not only focuses on his time in 
the Carter administration but it also studies how his political views developed and influenced 
his outlook.53 Steven Jay Campbell addressed key elements of Brzezinski’s belief system in 
his 2003 PhD thesis and observed how his views developed throughout his early life, up to 
and including his time as national security advisor. He concludes that privately he remained 
a ‘hawk’ but gradually escalated his demands for assertive action to counter Soviet 
aggression after the administration’s first year in office.54   
                                                          
51 Melchiore J. Laucella, “A Cognitive-Psychodynamic Perspective to Understanding Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance’s Worldview,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 2 (June 2004): 227–271. 
52 Mary DuBois Sexton, “The Wages of Principle and Power: Cyrus R. Vance and the Making of 
Foreign Policy in the Carter Administration” (PhD Thesis, Georgetown University, 2009), 17. 
53 Gerry Argyris Andrinaopoulos, Kissinger and Brzezinski: The NSC and the Struggle for Control of 
US National Security Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991). 
54 Steven Jay Campbell, “Brzezinski’s Image of the USSR: Inferring Foreign Policy Beliefs From 
Multiple Sources Over Time” (PhD Thesis, University of South Carolina, 2003); See also, Kevin 
Embick, “The Triumph of Containment: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter and the Demise of 
Détente” (Masters Thesis, Florida Atlantic University, 2008). 
21 
 
Brzezinski’s career received further attention through the works of Patrick Vaughan, 
Andrzej Lubowski and Charles Gati’s edited collection of essays on the former national 
security advisor. Vaughan’s studies provide an overview of his early life and career prior to 
entering the Carter administration before proceeding to discuss his views in relation to the 
Soviet Union.55 Lubowski’s biography is relatively short but paints Brzezinski as an astute 
strategic thinker. As the title suggests, it focuses heavily on Brzezinski’s attitude towards the 
Soviet Union, describing how his views developed and influenced the policies he pursued in 
government. On the Vance-Brzezinski relationship, Lubowski does not provide readers with 
any new angles and de-emphasises the level of disagreement between the two.56  
Similarly, Gati’s work is broadly positive towards Brzezinski with four out of the 
six contributions from former NSC colleagues. The book charts Brzezinski’s beliefs and 
career both before and after his spell in government. References to his relationship with 
Vance come from David J. Rothkopf who records Brzezinski’s activities in the NSC. He 
draws upon several examples to illustrate his ascendency within the administration to 
become Carter’s key advisor but falls short of providing an extensive analysis of the 
bureaucratic wars of the Carter administration.57 While the work on both Vance and 
Brzezinski provides an analysis of both their careers and beliefs, so far scholars have not 
addressed their relationship directly. A key aspect of this study, is the role their respective 
ideologies played in their disagreements and the secondary literature on Vance and 
Brzezinski is useful in identifying elements of his world views. This study utilises a wealth 
of primary material as well as secondary literature to provide a fresh and original perspective 
on the careers of both men during the Carter administration.  
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With a gap in the literature covering Vance and Brzezinski, the growing 
historiography on the Carter administration has helped illuminate key aspects of their 
relationship. Because of their standing, Vance and Brzezinski have received ample analysis 
in the secondary literature within the wider context of the Carter presidency. An analysis of 
the historiography reveals considerable debate and disagreement amongst scholars over their 
influence on U.S. foreign policy during their time in government.  
Critics of the Carter administration, such as Scott Kaufman, suggest the president’s 
inability to manage the Vance-Brzezinski relationship adversely affected U.S. foreign policy 
during their term in office.58 However, within the critical school of thought, some scholars 
downplay the influence of their disputes. Betty Glad for example, concurs with Kaufman on 
Carter’s deficiencies and inability to successfully co-ordinate foreign policy objectives. 
Although she acknowledges the feuds between the president’s advisors, crucially, she 
suggests its impact was negligible as Carter was ‘the man who made the final call on all 
policy matters.’59 
Historians sympathetic to the Carter presidency, find favour with Glad’s assessment 
of the Vance-Brzezinski relationship. While the friction between them was present, events in 
the second half of Carter’s term in office had more of an impact on his thinking. For Jerel A. 
Rosati, Carter underwent a transformation from ‘liberal idealism to realpolitik’ because of 
the global events taking place at the time, rather than the contrasting views between his 
advisors.60 Robert A. Strong argues that commentators, ‘exaggerated the differences between 
the national security advisor and the secretary of state, often finding conflict in instances 
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where it simply did not exist.’ He also suggests that to focus on Vance and Brzezinski, 
‘glosses over important continuities in Carter’s world view and approach to American 
foreign policy.’61 
 Nevertheless, the relationship is important. Vance and Brzezinski served as the two 
senior advisors to Carter, and led the two largest government bodies responsible for foreign 
policy. This thesis presents the disputes between the president’s advisors as present and 
having a clear imprint on the policies and actions of the Carter administration. An in-depth 
review of the literature reveals, a clear divergence within both schools of thought on the 
influence of the Vance-Brzezinski relationship but also highlights the position of this study 
in the historiography and offers an alternate perspective that addresses key issues 
surrounding the scholarly debates. 
In doing so, it acknowledges and highlights Carter’s deficiencies, as outlined by 
critics, as well as the significant impact of world events on the president’s actions forwarded 
by sympathetic scholars. Crucially, at the heart of both arguments, this thesis proposes, lies 
the Vance-Brzezinski relationship. The combination of Carter’s weaknesses and world 
events heightened tensions between Vance and Brzezinski but also triggered the bureaucratic 
wars of the Carter administration. Moreover, by examining Brzezinski, Vance, and Carter as 
the thinker, doer, and decider, we can observe the dynamics of administrative decision-
making in foreign policy, thereby underlining the original contribution to the historiography 
provided by this study.  
In his memoirs, President Carter claimed that press reports of their differences at the 
time were either ‘inaccurate or exaggerated’ and ‘precipitated by an honest difference of 
opinion.’62 For those sympathetic to his presidency, this analysis became the accepted 
narrative. Released shortly before Carter left the White House in 1980, Betty Glad made no 
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reference to their relationship in her work and only referred to Brzezinski only eight times. 
Despite the extensive research into the president’s early life and his beliefs, the lack of 
attention to his feuding advisors is a glaring omission. Glad does conclude, however, that 
Carter, more adept at campaigning, lacked the necessary leadership skills required to 
govern.63 Her portrayal of Carter as a president unable to marry his moral principles with the 
ability to lead is a common theme within the historiography of the president and his 
administration.  
Scholars have argued sympathetically that Carter’s agenda, which emphasised 
human rights and peaceful diplomatic negotiation was side-lined because of world events 
taking place at the time, most notably revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, coupled with Soviet 
activities in the Middle East, Africa and the Caribbean, as well as the hostage crisis. Vance 
and Brzezinski, divided over how to tackle these issues, both argued in favour of their 
respective approaches but scholars denigrated the effect of their contrasting advice on the 
president. Jerel A. Rosati argues that while they agreed that for the most of the 
administration’s first year, events in Africa and the Persian Gulf swayed their approach.64 
Moreover, Carter’s authority within the administration remained consistent. Erwin Hargrove 
stated that although divisions existed between his advisors, Carter continued to be the chief 
architect of the administration’s strategy.65 
Kenneth Morris observed that Carter lacked a central thesis with respect to foreign 
policy and while he agonised over individual decisions, tensions within his administration 
never affected his broader outlook. ‘It is difficult to understand’ he wrote ‘how 
disagreements between Vance and Brzezinski would have created serious conflicts within 
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Carter’s broader foreign policy perspective.’66 Morris’ point is supported by David Skidmore 
who argues that the shift in Carter’s approach did not result from pressure Brzezinski. 
Instead, Skidmore states that ‘while Brzezinski undoubtedly worked to hasten this shift, he 
should be seen as less the source of policy change than its fortunate beneficiary. Those who 
exaggerate the significance of the Vance/Brzezinski conflict confuse cause with effect.’67 
Other historians acknowledge that the difficulties between Vance and Brzezinski 
were present within the administration and that Carter failed to effectively manage the views 
of his two senior advisors. Both Gaddis Smith and John Dumbrell argue in their respective 
works that the divergent views of the pair contributed to the administration’s inability to 
fashion a clear agenda. Smith argues that Carter ‘thought he could pick ideas now from one, 
now from the other, taking the best of each’ but lacked the capacity, will and experience to 
do so.68 Dumbrell meanwhile addresses aspects of the bureaucratic and ideological roots of 
their rivalry and concludes, ‘at the highest level, effective presidential adjudication of the 
Vance-Brzezinski conflict was lacking.’ But Dumbrell and Smith follow the narrative of 
others and suggest that Carter’s priorities shifted because of events after 1978, which 
benefited Brzezinski. Like Skidmore, they view Brzezinski as a beneficiary of the shift 
rather than architect.69  
While scholars sympathetic to Carter differ over the extent and impact of the Vance-
Brzezinski relationship, the likes of Dumbrell, Strong and Smith are united in their 
conclusion that world events, more than the relationship between Carter’s advisors, effected 
the administration’s foreign policy agenda. This view is sharply countered by critics of 
Carter who highlight his inability to fashion a clear strategy and indecisiveness when faced 
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with international crises, contributed to the administration’s failings. Many argue that the 
president became torn between the ideas and policies offered by Vance and Brzezinski, 
unable to authoritatively follow the advice of either. But while critics have identified some 
of the foundations of the Vance-Brzezinski dispute, aspects of their findings require further 
investigation.  
Donald S. Spencer and Burton I. Kaufman were succinct in their assessment of 
Carter, labelling his performance as amateurish and mediocre, unable to deal with the crises 
he faced during his presidency and harness the differences between his two key advisors. 
However, a wider analysis of how their disputes affected policy is lacking in both works.70 
Yael S. Aronoff argued in her article that Carter underwent a transformation during his time 
in office from a liberal to a hardened assertive foreign policy by 1980 and identifies the 
influences of both Vance and Brzezinski as integral to his shift in policy and approach. 
Aranoff’s work however focuses more on the impact of world events on Carter’s world view 
and does not discuss how Vance and Brzezinski used their positions to affect policy.71  
Andrew Katz meanwhile in his article made no reference to the Vance-Brzezinski split in 
contributing to the ‘contradictions’ of Carter’s agenda.72 
Burton I. Kaufman produced a revised edition of his 1993 work, with Scott 
Kaufman, who also released his own study in 2008. Both authors argue that historians 
downplayed the existence and influence of the relationship. They argue that Carter engaged 
in a balancing act between his departments and his advisors, which led Scott Kaufman to 
advance his theory of ‘paper clipping.’73 He asserts that Carter, unable to decide between the 
policies of Vance and Brzezinski, attempted to merge their respective into policies and 
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speeches. This fuelled confusion and heightened the feeling of competition between his 
advisors.74 Beyond ‘paper clipping’ Kaufman’s study is more descriptive of the roles of 
Vance and Brzezinski and does not analyse their manoeuvrings with respect to certain 
foreign policy events.  
According to Kaufman, Spencer and Aranoff, the disputes between Vance and 
Brzezinski were precipitated by a difference of opinion however their studies focus more on 
Carter then his warring advisors. Despite his attempts to balance the views and policies of 
his advisors, the president was unable to decisively choose between them, which contributed 
to the administration’s failure to forge a clear and consistent foreign policy agenda. 
However, this assessment neglects Vance and Brzezinski’s activity within the 
administration. Certainly, Carter’s failings are a key aspect of this study however analysing 
the roles of his advisors is crucial to understanding the foreign policy process and how their 
disputes had a visible impact on policy.  
Vance and Brzezinski differed on a variety of issues but, significantly, they both 
desired to control policy development and implementation. Brzezinski aggressively 
advanced his own ideas at the expense of the policies and approaches of Vance, which 
became an important factor in the internal wrangling within the administration. To critics 
like Itai Nartzizenfield Sneh, the national security advisor pursued an agenda that did not 
resemble the principles that Carter stood for and Vance promoted. The chapter in which he 
makes his claim is subtitled ‘Brzezinski and the NSC undermine Carter’s ideals.’75 Timothy 
Maga meanwhile described the secretary of state as a ‘kindly bureaucrat’ inferior to 
Brzezinski’s ideas and approaches. Maga however provides very little explanation as to why 
this happened to be the case.76 
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Although only a brief summation, Sneh and Maga’s assessment reflects the view of 
several historians that the relationship between Vance and Brzezinski was more than a 
difference of opinion but also a struggle to control the foreign policy process. Two former 
State Department officials during the Carter administration, Leslie H. Gelb and Anthony 
Lake with I.M. Destler, suggested that Carter shifted away from the policies and approaches 
of Vance toward Brzezinski, due to the national security advisor’s growing assertiveness, 
which attracted the president to his ideas and policies.77 John Prados and former NSC staffer 
Christopher Shoemaker argue that Carter came to trust Brzezinski to manage foreign policy 
more than Vance and the State Department as the NSC proved to be more adept at dealing 
with issues as they arose and allowed him to gain control of foreign policy.78 
However, these works neglect the president’s relationship with his advisors. A key 
aspect of this thesis, is the extent to which Carter’s bond with Brzezinski influenced the 
national security advisor’s standing within the administration, which is often overlooked in 
the historiography. As this thesis demonstrates, it was a crucial element in understanding 
how relations between the president, the national security advisor and the secretary of state 
developed. Douglas Brinkley and Peter Bourne suggest that, although Carter and Vance 
shared similar ideologies, the president and Brzezinski’s close personal rapport created a 
strong working relationship. Coupled with his and Vance’s differing backgrounds, the 
president was naturally more aligned to Brzezinski then the secretary of state.79 Bourne, the 
president’s physician, writes that Carter’s background led him to rely heavily on the advice 
of close confidents that included Brzezinski as opposed to Vance, who he considered a 
Washington insider.80 Although Brinkley and Bourne’s broader evaluation of the 
administration endorses sympathetic historians like Dumbrell, Smith and Skidmore, they 
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nevertheless briefly expose an underreported aspect of the relationship between Carter, 
Vance and Brzezinski, which this thesis seeks to analyse further.  
The bureaucratic arrangements within the Carter administration have also been cited 
as factor in the disputes between Vance and Brzezinski. Raymond A. Moore suggests that 
the ‘seeds of later difficulties between Vance and Brzezinski were planted early on’ through 
the creation of a bureaucratic system that favoured the national security advisor.81 Barry 
Rubin similarly intimates that in addition to world events ‘Brzezinski’s bureaucratic skill 
also helped him come out on top, leading one state official to charge the national security 
advisor “never won on substance.”’82 Kevin Mulchay concurred on the bureaucratic 
advantages afforded to Brzezinski but also stressed the authority of the secretary of state had 
weakened upon entering the administration due to Henry Kissinger’s dominance of foreign 
policy during the Nixon and Ford administration. While Vance attempted to re-assert his and 
his department’s authority, he proved unable to do so due to Brzezinski’s predominance over 
foreign affairs.83  
John Prados and Jean A. Garrison also noted that Brzezinski influenced policy as he 
controlled certain bureaucratic procedures through various committees and building up his 
staff to challenge the State Department.84 I.M Destler meanwhile re-visited the Vance-
Brzezinski relationship in his work with Ivo Daalder and echoed the views of others that 
centralisation in the Carter White House served only to exaggerate tensions between Vance 
and Brzezinski, with the latter coming out on top in the policy wars as a result.85 In the same 
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year, John P. Burke provided his own study on the NSC. Although Burke did not devote a 
full chapter to Brzezinski, he did briefly address his role and argued that he manipulated the 
internal dynamics of the administration to promote his own policies and approaches.86  
The current historiography identifies aspects of the bureaucratic apparatus within the 
administration and how Brzezinski utilised his position to undermine Vance and promote his 
own ideas to court Carter’s favour. While the works of Moore, Rubin, Prados and others 
identify the bureaucratic sources of the conflict between Vance and Brzezinski, they 
overlook the president’s relationship with Brzezinski as a factor in explaining his elevated 
status within the administration and how he eventually side-lined Vance. By engaging with 
the secondary literature, this thesis argues that due to their close relationship, Brzezinski was 
granted bureaucratic advantages and autonomy within the administration by Carter to 
develop policies and approaches. Consequently, his disputes with Vance escalated early on 
and while Carter attempted to balance the views of his advisors, he ultimately became 
unable to manage their differences.  
Numerous studies, which focus on individual policies or events that occurred during 
the Carter presidency, highlight the conflict between Vance and Brzezinski. An analysis of 
the literature on individual case studies reveals the areas of conflict as well as co-operation 
between the two adversaries. The current historiography not only informs this study, it also 
represents an opportunity to add a new perspective to the literature. Although the breakdown 
in relations between Vance and Brzezinski is cited as a factor in the administration’s 
formation of policies and responses to world events, some scholars have ignored or 
underreported the impact of their disputes on specific issues. A detailed assessment of their 
attitudes and approaches to various topics adds greater understanding of the development of 
policy under the Carter administration as well as their position on specific policies and 
events in the international arena.  
                                                          
86 Burke, Honest Broker? 
31 
 
The issue that divided them above all proved to be U.S.-Soviet relations and the 
administration’s approach to the Cold War. The literature on the Cold War adversaries is 
extensive and with respect to the Carter administration, many accounts reveal the disparities 
in policies and approaches between Vance and Brzezinski vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. These 
differences featured prominently in respect to individual issues, for example arms control 
and human rights, or within particular regions such as the Persian Gulf and Africa.87 
The Carter-Brezhnev project in the early to mid-1990s ignited scholarly interest in 
the administration’s Soviet policy. The collection benefited from newly released 
documentation as well as the oral history projects conducted at the time and led Odd Arne 
Westad to produce an analysis of US-Soviet relations during the Carter administration. 
Westad’s work contains a selection of essays from scholars and academics that analyse the 
fall of détente. However, an extensive analysis of Vance and Brzezinski’s roles is lacking.88 
Former NSC special assistant Robert M. Gates meanwhile published his own account of the 
period, a year before Westad’s work, and argued that that the differences between Vance and 
Brzezinski were sharpest with respect to the Soviet Union.89  
In the 2000s, Jussi M. Hanhimäki gave close attention to the tensions between 
Vance and Brzezinski and argues that the struggles between the two contributed to a sense of 
confusion around the administration’s cold war policy however he does not elaborate further 
and the chapters become somewhat of a chronological account thereafter.90 Melvyn P. 
Leffler and Barbara Zanchetta reached similar conclusions in their respective studies. Both 
suggest the ‘switch’ in Carter’s approach vis-à-vis the Soviet Union mirrored the differing 
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perspectives and approaches of Vance and Brzezinski.91 Brian J. Auten argues otherwise. He 
suggests that more complex strategic defence reasons motivated Carter’s shift in approach 
towards the Soviet Union by the end of his presidency. While the influence of Brzezinski in 
the administration cannot be ignored, it did not occur because of the Vance-Brzezinski 
split.92 Daniel J. Sargent also acknowledges tensions within the administration but notes the 
administration struggled with domestic and international difficulties that also account for the 
change in focus of their approach.93 
In respect to individual cases associated with the administration’s policies to the 
Soviet Union, SALT II negotiations proved to be significant. Viewed as a means of 
promoting cordial relations between the two superpowers, the arms control agreements 
became subjected to the differing perspectives of Vance and Brzezinski. Strobe Talbott 
produced his account of the SALT negotiations on the eve of the administration’s departure 
from office but his analysis of the divisions between the president’s advisors and their 
departments do not benefit from the declassification of primary documents.94 Similarly, 
William G. Hyland published a brief account of the early SALT II negotiations. Hyland, a 
former NSC staffer, provides an inside assessment of the early approach to the Soviets in 
March 1977 and of the various issues that existed. However, the study lacks significant 
insight after the author’s departure from the administration in October 1977.95 William W. 
Newman meanwhile uses the example of SALT negotiations to note the bureaucratic 
tensions that existed within the administration between Vance and Brzezinski on arms 
control. In particular, he outlined how Brzezinski utilised the Special Co-Ordination 
Committee (SCC) to influence the administration’s position as well as his recruitment of 
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allies within the cabinet to advise Carter to accept his ‘deep cuts’ approach as opposed to 
Vance’s proposal of more modest reductions.96  
Other issues, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, received notable attention 
from scholars in recent years but often placed within the wider context of U.S.-Soviet 
relations with a lack of analysis on the approaches of Vance and Brzezinski.97 While Africa 
policy in the administration’s first year saw relative unity between Vance and Brzezinski, 
the following year saw tensions ignited between the president’s key advisors over how the 
United States should respond to the Ogaden War in the Horn of Africa and the conflict in the 
Shaba region of Angola. While Brzezinski does provide an account of the crisis in the Horn 
of Africa, Carter and Vance omitted this period from their memoirs and all three failed to 
mention events in the Shaba.  
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the administration’s approach to the Cold War in 
Africa received attention through the general works of David A. Korn, Morris H. Morley, 
Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Robert G. Patman and George Wright.98 R. Benneson DeJanes 
meanwhile devoted a chapter to the administration’s approach to Africa in Rosenbaum and 
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Ugrinsky’s collection in which she contrasts the regionalist view of Africa as represented by 
Vance and the State Department against Brzezinski and the NSC’s globalist approach and 
uses the case of the crisis in the Horn of Africa to detail some of the tensions that existed.99 
More extensive studies of their approach to the Cold War in Africa did not arrive 
until after 2000.100 Donna R. Jackson wrote extensively on the Carter administration’s 
approach towards the crisis in the Horn of Africa between 2007 and 2010 through her book 
and articles. Utilising newly released primary documents as well as oral histories, Jackson’s 
studies illuminate the discord between Vance and Brzezinski over their interpretations of the 
crisis as well as their proposed responses.101 Louise Woodroofe expanded on Jackson’s work 
and demonstrates effectively how their rival positions produced a contradictory response 
from the United States. Coupled together, Jackson and Woodroofe’s contributions illustrate 
the degree of conflict between the advisors on the issue of the Horn of Africa as well as their 
wider perceptions of U.S. foreign policy.102 
The administration’s response to the Shaba II invasion, still has not received an 
individual examination but did feature in two studies by Piero Gleijeses, as well as William 
M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh who examined Cuban intervention in Africa and 
Angola.103 Nancy Mitchell did address both the Shaba II invasion and the Ogaden War, in 
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her exhaustive 2016 account with the author asserting that Vance and Brzezinski’s 
contrasting views of détente and approaches to the Soviet heavily influenced the 
administration’s response to these crises.104 Given the lack of attention given to the proxy 
wars in Africa in the memoirs of principal players, the contributions are invaluable in 
identifying elements of the Vance-Brzezinski rivalry within the administration’s approach to 
Africa. They help recognise aspects of their ideologies in relation to key events as well as 
policies such as democratic advancement and human rights. 
The administration’s Cold War policy became influenced by Carter’s emphasis on 
human rights. In respect to other issues, it did not create intense divisions between Vance 
and Brzezinski but the implementation of the policy caused friction within the bureaucracy. 
Joshua Muravchik highlights resistance from elements of the State Department bureaucracy, 
as a factor in the issues Carter’s human rights agenda faced.105 While Vance nor Brzezinski 
were directly involved in the formation of the policy however, the president’s advisor did 
disagree on the implementation of human rights in certain cases. For example, Vance 
opposed a violent crackdown in Iran and a military takeover in Nicaragua while Brzezinski 
argued in favour of both. The secretary of state, keen to avoid complications in SALT 
negotiations, asked for the administration to resist criticising Soviet human rights abuses but 
Brzezinski and Carter chastised them. David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker outline several 
disagreements in respect to human rights in their article.106 Ultimately their differences were 
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less about whether the policy should be adopted but more about in what instances it should 
be applied too.107 
Arab-Israeli peace became one of the few areas of collaboration and cordial relations 
between Vance-Brzezinski and their respective departments in their pursuit of an accord 
between Israel and Egypt. It is an important case study in analysing why co-operation rather 
than conflict existed within the administration as opposed to other areas of foreign policy. 
There are several reasons for this. As the historiography observes, Carter took a clear 
interest in Arab-Israeli affairs and resolved to negotiate an agreement to secure peace in the 
region. Vance and Brzezinski both subscribed to the president’s wishes and worked closely 
with one another in that endeavour. Also, the bureaucracy below the principals functioned 
effectively. The key players, NSC staffer William B. Quandt and Assistant Secretary of 
State Alfred L. Atherton and Harold H. Saunders co-operated with another to lay the 
foundations for what became the Camp David accords.  
Most scholars agree that the roots of their co-operation on Arab-Israeli issues lay in 
an agreement on the principles of a peace accord as well as bureaucratic harmony between 
the principals and their departments. Quandt, the NSC staffer responsible for Arab-Israeli 
affairs, detailed this in his memoir.108 More recently, Jørgen Jensehaugen analysed the 
ideological roots of the administration’s position, which stemmed from a report composed 
by the Brookings Institute. The report, which featured from contributions from Brzezinski, 
Quandt as well as future State Department officials, became broadly accepted by the 
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administration and, as Jensehaugen argues, the outline for how to proceed with 
negotiations.109 Darren J. McDonald and Daniel Strieff in their articles analyse the personal 
backgrounds and beliefs of both men in relation to Arab-Israeli issues.110 
The administration’s attempts to normalise relations with the People’s Republic of 
China also became a victim of the bureaucratic wars of the Carter administration. Differing 
interpretations between the principals and their departments over the exact timing and nature 
of establishing diplomatic relations created bureaucratic friction. The episode featured in the 
works of Robert S. Ross and Jim Mann who both contributed to the historiography with their 
general accounts of U.S.-Sino relations, which encompasses the period of normalisation.111 
The most explosive account of the period came from Patrick Tyler, firstly in an article that 
became a chapter in his general history on U.S.-Sino relations since World War Two. Tyler 
details the bureaucratic disharmony that emanated in reaction to Brzezinski’s attempts to 
normalise relations, particularly from State Department officials.112 Tyler’s article concurs 
with other authors who covered the period, such as Jean A. Garrison who asserts that 
normalisation occurred because of the bureaucratic manoeuvrings of Brzezinski at the 
expense of Vance and the State Department and his increasingly assertive role within the 
administration.113  
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The individual roles of Vance and Brzezinski in relation to normalisation received 
attention from Breck Walker, Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker in their 
respective works. Walker addresses Vance in his article, which analyses his role in the 
normalisation talks and argues that scholars degraded Vance’s input in negotiations after 
Brzezinski’s visit to China in 1978 and portrayed him as an ineffective operator. Walker 
instead contends that Vance played a crucial role and contributed positively thereafter. In 
doing so, he somewhat downplays the level of bureaucratic disharmony that emanated from 
normalisation, particularly involving lower-level State Department officials.114 Cohen and 
Tucker meanwhile documented the national security advisor’s desire to establish diplomatic 
relations in their chapter in Charles Gati’s’s collection. Despite a brief summation of his role 
in the talks, it nevertheless identifies his rationale for forcefully arguing in favour of 
establishing relations and its wider impact on policy.115 The historiography on normalisation 
is important in not only identifying a major shift in policy but also within the internal 
dynamics of the administration as Brzezinski sought to take on the role of the ‘doer’ by 
negotiating directly with the Chinese in addition to his position as ‘the thinker.’  
The 1979 revolution in Iran and hostage crisis became a major flashpoint in the 
disputes between Vance and Brzezinski and came to have a significant impact on the 
administration. The potential loss of a Cold War ally divided the president’s advisors, as did 
attempts to rescue the American diplomatic staff. The revolution and hostage crisis, 
dissected regularly by scholars over the years, offers a range of perspectives on how the 
tensions between Vance and Brzezinski developed. In the years following the revolution and 
hostage crisis, a number of works attempted to tackle the administration’s response to both 
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events. Gary Sick, a former NSC staffer, outlined some of the disputes that emerged during 
both events in the form of an insider account.116  
Former State Department officials Warren Christopher and Paul H. Kreisberg 
produced an edited collection of essays on the administration’s approach however the 
Vance-Brzezinski dynamic did not receive significant attention.117 Barry M. Rubin, Pierre 
Salinger, Michael Leeden, William H Lewis and James Bill produced studies on the 
administration’s attempts to save the Shah of Iran and negotiate the safe return of the 
hostages. Rubin and Salinger however failed to address the internal division within the 
administration while Leeden and Lewis as well as James Bill criticised the administration’s 
handling of the crisis. Bill condemns Brzezinski but sympathises with the efforts of Vance 
and others in the State Department to overcome the interference of the national security 
advisor in influencing policy.118 
Alexander Moens addressed the roles of Vance, Brzezinski and others in his article 
and argues that their conflicting approaches towards the revolution gave the president a 
dilemma but he also argues that the latter’s interference in the crisis complicated the issue. 
Moreover, it left Carter unable to come to a clear decision on how best to save the Shah and 
protect American interests in Iran.119 David Patrick Houghton published a valuable text that 
contains one of the few interviews conducted with Vance on hostage crisis. While not 
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addressing the dispute directly, within his work, Houghton investigates how the pair 
attempted to forge their own approaches to both the revolution and hostage crisis.120 David 
Harris meanwhile produced an exhaustive account of the period but lacked critical analysis 
of decisions taken while Jean-Charles Brotons addressed the role of U.S. officials during 
both crises. However, his account lacks sufficient analysis of the arguments and internal 
manoeuvrings at the time while some players failed to get sufficient attention.121 David 
Farber and Mark Bowden meanwhile concentrated on the administration’s reaction to the 
hostage crisis as well as the role of the president’s advisors in affecting decision-making.122 
While the Iranian revolution receives frequent attention from scholars, similar, 
almost identical events in Nicaragua have not produced a wealth of studies. The fall of the 
dictator Anastacio Somoza in 1979 led to the rise of the leftist insurgent group the 
Sandinistas and divided the former president’s advisors in much the same way as the Shah’s 
fall had done. Curiously however, neither Carter, Brzezinski or Vance provide an account of 
Somoza’s downfall in their memoirs. Two former administration officials, Robert A. Pastor 
from the NSC and Anthony Lake from the State Department produced their own accounts of 
the revolution. Both studies analyse the internal debates within the administration and detail 
the level of disagreement that emanated between Vance, Brzezinski and their departments 
over the administration’s approach to Somoza’s crumbling regime.123 General overviews of 
U.S. policy towards Nicaragua came from Morris H. Morley, Robert Kagan and William M. 
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LeoGrande.124 Mauricio Solaún and William Michael Schmidli addressed the U.S. 
intervention in Nicaragua directly in their works. However, an extensive analysis, utilising 
the primary documents available, on Vance and Brzezinski’s roles in the fall of Somoza is 
still lacking.125 
Methodology 
Building upon the secondary literature, this study utilises a wealth of archival material on the 
Carter presidency to help construct some of the key arguments in this thesis. Memorandums, 
policy papers, speech drafts shed considerable light on the attitudes and approaches within 
the administration. The main source of archival material, the Jimmy Carter Presidential 
Library in Atlanta, Georgia, provided a huge array of documents. Many of the materials, 
meticulously arranged and catalogued from Brzezinski and his department provide a clear 
account of how the NSC functioned under the national security advisor. The National 
Archives at College Park and the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) account for 
documents connected to the State Department. 
The personal files of Cyrus Vance, held at the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale 
University, provided a valuable glimpse into his private thoughts when he entered the 
administration. The policy papers forwarded to Carter, compared to documents composed by 
Brzezinski and the NSC held at the Carter library, reveal the divergences between the 
president’s advisors on what approach the administration needed to take upon entering 
office. They illustrate how Vance wanted the State Department to play an important role in 
policy development and implementation. Conversely, the communications between 
Brzezinski and the president held at the Carter library reveal how his and the NSC’s 
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priorities differed. This demonstrates how foundations of the rivalry existed before they 
entered office. Moreover, the documents contain both individual’s private thoughts and 
feelings towards one another as well as their grievances and Carter’s reaction to them.  
The primary documents at these archives have limitations, however. Official papers 
do not always present a clear picture of decisions reached or record the disputes between 
individuals and organisations. For example, many of the memorandums of conversations 
(MEMCONS) recorded during the Carter administration’s time in office surmise points 
made by various individuals or detail the formal minutes of meetings but few documents 
provide word-for-word transcripts. There is also an issue around the declassification status 
of documents that record deliberations in detail. While a considerable number of materials 
from the Carter years have been declassified and made public, many related to key events, 
remain unreleased preventing further analysis of the debates and discussions within the 
administration. Throughout the course of the research, I submitted Freedom of Information 
requests, but not all of these requests were handled in a timely enough fashion, and while 
this might, in theory, leave a gap in the research, the full body of the ‘known’ record is 
contained within this project.  
While the documents provide useful evidence, at times they leave an unclear picture 
of events. Even former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
conceded, ‘what is written in diplomatic documents never bears much relation to reality.’126 
This led some scholars of the bureaucratic politics model to dispute their value and instead 
endorse witness testimony as an effective avenue of research. In his analysis of bureaucratic 
politics model, J. Garry Clifford briefly discussed the drawbacks of collecting evidence to 
support the application of the theory and noted ‘given the pitfalls of getting access to recent 
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government documents, analysts of bureaucratic politics relied heavily on personal 
interviews.’127 
To flesh out and uncover any undocumented narrative, anecdotes, and evidence of 
the bureaucratic rivalry, I conducted interviews with Carter administration officials and 
utilised oral histories conducted by researchers before me. As Russell L. Riley notes, in his 
analysis of the practice of oral history in relation to the Clinton presidential history project, 
‘there are silences in any written record - oral history interviews can fill those silences.’128 
This study utilises oral histories and interviews to understand the feelings, motivations and 
impressions of those who served in the Carter administration and witnessed the disputes 
between Vance, Brzezinski and their departments first hand. Oral histories conducted with 
cabinet members of the Carter administration, including the president and Brzezinski, at the 
Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and the Carter library, provide 
a significant insight into the administration’s foreign policy agenda at a high level. Similarly, 
the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library interviewed Vance and Brzezinski in the late 
1960s, and both offered an insight into their backgrounds and experiences during their first 
ventures into government. The oral history collection by the Association for Diplomatic 
Studies and Training yields a considerable archive of interviews with former diplomats, 
which includes lower-level members of the Carter administration while the recollections 
collated by the Carter-Brezhnev project conference and the Foundation of Iranian Studies 
provide accounts on specific foreign policy issues.  
Many of the oral histories conducted by the aforementioned institutions, although 
informative to this study, provide a somewhat general overview as in many cases the 
questions do not specifically address the Vance-Brzezinski relationship. To bridge this gap, 
seven oral histories interviews were conducted for this thesis with former members of the 
NSC staff and former officials from the State Department. While oral histories are restricted 
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to specific topics not relevant to this study, the interviewees were specifically questioned on 
the effect of the Vance-Brzezinski relationship on the foreign policy of the administration.  
The individuals interviewed were selected specifically to present a fair and balanced 
presentation of the time with four individuals (Assistant Secretary of State for Political and 
Military Affairs Leslie H. Gelb, UN Ambassador Donald F. McHenry, Assistant Secretary 
of State for Public Affairs W. Hodding Carter III and Iran Desk Officer Henry Precht) from 
the State Department under Vance and three (NSC staffers Gary Sick and William B. 
Quandt who were responsible for Iran and Middle East affairs and Special Assistant Robert 
M. Gates) from Brzezinski’s staff. Each individual dealt with a different issue or region 
where conflict existed between the two men, and their recollections help illustrate the point 
made by one interviewee that ‘they would disagree on almost everything.’129 
The interviews were conducted in the homes of five of the seven individuals, with 
one conducted in his office and another via telephone. The setting provided a relaxed 
environment to freely discuss their recollections of the bureaucratic wars of the Carter 
administration. To aid the interviews, research was conducted beforehand on the individuals 
to gain a better understanding of their own role in the administration with books published 
by the interviewees and prior oral histories consulted to avoid a repetition of previous stories 
and summaries of events. Moreover, the memoirs of the key players were also analysed to 
assess the extent of the relationship between the interviewee and either Vance or Brzezinski 
while the secondary literature was consulted to evaluate their roles within the administration. 
This all fed into the final list of question posed during the interviews.  
The initial questions focussed on the circumstances, which led to the individual’s 
appointment in their respective roles and allowed them to address their initial impressions of 
Vance or Brzezinski before they entered office and if they forged a personal relationship 
before or after their appointments. Crucially, all interviewed worked closely with their 
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superior on a variety of issues and developed a strong professional and, in some cases, 
personal relationship and discussed key events, policies and approaches with them, which 
gave them particularly significant knowledge of the feelings and motivations of their bosses 
throughout their time in the administration.  
The interviews then proceeded to addresses the bureaucratic apparatus of the 
administration with questions focused on the internal organisations of both the NSC and the 
State Department. Interviewees were asked about their thoughts on the efficiency of both 
departments and how that influenced their positions within the administration and approach 
to foreign policy. For example, the three interviewees from the NSC all spoke of the 
bureaucratic advantages afforded to them by Brzezinski and how he utilised the 
arrangements within the administration to advance his policies and approaches, which 
elevated their status within the administration. The former State Department officials 
meanwhile shared their frustrations with Brzezinski and his behaviour towards Vance during 
the administration’s time in office and what they considered to be his underhand tactics. All 
interviewees offered examples and their own perspectives on the difficulties encountered by 
each department in the bureaucratic wars and detailed the effect on policy.  
The questions then focused on the main subjects the interviewee dealt with during 
their time in office. As each specialised in a policy area or region of the world, it allowed for 
a discussion on a range of foreign policy subjects that faced the administration. The 
interviewees provided a summary of their area of expertise, before discussing the 
perspectives of Vance and Brzezinski on that issue and how their views came to form their 
approaches. This proceeded to a discussion on the conflicts that arose between the principals 
as well as addressing how and why the tensions between them festered on the issue in 
question. At the end of each interview, each interviewee summarised their thoughts and 
recollections on their experiences of the Vance-Brzezinski relationship.  
The interviews typically lasted between an hour and an hour and half, with all 
confirming the existence of the conflict between Vance and Brzezinski, which challenges the 
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view of Carter and Strong that tensions between them were ‘exaggerated’ but they also 
offered interpretations as to why the conflict between them escalated and manifested itself 
within the administration. One interviewee was later consulted on an issue that arose from 
the archival material collected and happily answered several follow up questions.  
The oral histories proved to be important in informing this study and a valuable 
source of research. As noted, in some instances, transcripts of meetings remain classified or 
no notes taken at all. Here the testimonies of individuals present provide a summary of the 
mood and tone of specific deliberations, in addition to the details and the items discussed. 
For example, interviews with three individuals from the State Department, all relayed the 
same story of a meeting of department officials at the White House with President Carter 
that took place during the final days of the Iranian revolution. The president accused 
someone from the department of leaking information to the press, which prompted a furious 
response from those present. It became an infamous encounter for the attendees but with no 
transcript or notes of the meeting to call upon, the recollections of those present help piece 
together the discussions as well as gauging the mind-sets of witnesses. Other examples were 
drawn from the oral histories conducted and the value of their recollections in helping to 
provide details of meetings such as the one noted featured frequently throughout this study.  
Oftentimes, the personal insights of individuals do not make into memoirs and are 
seldom recorded in written documents. In the case of Vance, oral histories help account for a 
lack of material from him. The former secretary of state was not known for making his 
personal feelings known in memos or other documents while his memoir is fairly neutral and 
at times underplays his interactions with Brzezinski. Some events meanwhile remain 
unrecorded and his perspectives on those issues are unknown. However, when analysing 
testimony of former colleagues, on occasion, he expressed his views on specific issues and 
his frustration with the internal politics of the administration caused by his tempestuous 
relationship with the national security advisor. The same is also true for many members of 
the administration, who did not record their personal judgements in written documents but 
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relayed their thoughts in private conservations. The recollections of those present at key 
events and witnessed exchanges between individuals is crucial to help unravel the thoughts 
and motivations of the key players.  
Issues with oral history interviews do exist however and questions over the 
interviewee’s biases as well as the accuracy of the stories relayed need to be taken in 
consideration. However, this study does not rely solely on the recollections of officials but 
rather utilises witness testimony in conjunction with archival documents, memoirs and 
secondary literature to detail the causes of the struggles between Vance and Brzezinski and 
help assess its impact on decision-making and policy formation. The recollections of 
officials, in addition to other sources, provides further evidence to draw upon and assist in 
piecing together the story of the bureaucratic wars of the Carter administration.  
Chapter Outline 
Chapter One provides a biographical outline of the three key individuals featured in the 
thesis: Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Jimmy Carter. The chapter analyses their 
respective backgrounds, which shaped their worldviews and influenced their priorities. As 
the chapter notes, the experiences of both Vance and Brzezinski, in and out of government, 
had a lasting impact on their approaches to U.S. foreign policy and shaped their positions 
upon entering the administration. Lastly, the chapter considers why Carter approached the 
pair to serve on his team despite warnings the pair would clash with one another.  
Chapter Two analyses the bureaucratic structure of the Carter administration. The 
centralisation of foreign policy during the Nixon/Ford years increased the influence of the 
NSC staff at the expense of the secretary of state and the State Department. When Vance and 
Brzezinski entered their respective posts, the two departments were already engaged in an 
institutional rivalry to influence the foreign policy process and agenda. This chapter 
considers how the bureaucratic arrangements in the administration contributed to the distrust 
that existed from day one between Vance, Brzezinski and their departments.  
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Chapter Three examines the first year of the Carter presidency when relations 
between Vance and Brzezinski were relatively collegial with the exception of arms control 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. As the chapter outlines, Vance gained the upper hand in 
the struggles after the Soviets vehement rejection of ‘deep cuts’ in March 1977. This setback 
forced the president to moderate his stance toward the Soviet Union, in relation to arms 
control as well as human rights, which benefited the secretary of state and the State 
Department. Thereafter, Vance and Brzezinski and their departments collaborated 
successfully with one another on Africa policy, the Panama Canal Treaties and on the 
Middle East. The latter case study highlighted how cordial relations existed between the 
departments and their principals. However as noted, it was a rare exception. The chapter 
analyses why the Camp David Accords, proved to be a successful case of collaboration 
between the two departments and their principals as opposed to future events.  
Chapter Four then focuses on the administration’s second year in office, which 
became a crucial one for the Carter presidency and the Vance-Brzezinski feud. 1978 marked 
the turning point in relations between Vance and Brzezinski with the national security 
advisor gradually gaining the upper hand. The chapter considers how Brzezinski used 
bureaucratic advantages to underline what he perceived as Soviet adventurism in the Horn of 
Africa and how he attempted to persuade Carter to implement the policy of linkage. The 
chapter examines the national security advisor’s attempts to use Soviet and Cuban 
intervention in the Horn of Africa and Shaba Province to encourage a more assertive foreign 
policy. It also analyses the administration’s attempts to normalise diplomatic relations with 
the People’s Republic of China, a historic but also pivotal moment in the Carter presidency 
that exacerbated tensions between his advisors and their departments.  
Chapter Five explores how the revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua divided the two 
principals and their departments. Their differing approaches to resolving the crises and 
preserving U.S. interests in both nations caused consternation between the two men and 
affected the administration’s response to both crises. This chapter also examines Vance’s 
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position within the administration and how his influence gradually declined throughout 
1979, particularly after he confirmed his intention to leave his post after the 1980 
presidential election. Concurrently, Brzezinski’s position steadily increased as the 
president’s advisory circle narrowed. Lastly, the chapter discusses the impact of the Soviet 
brigade in Cuba fiasco. This led to a re-evaluation of U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union. 
Whereas previously, Carter sided with Vance in his belief that they ought to maintain cordial 
relations with the Soviets and negotiate in areas of co-operation, such as arms control, 
Brzezinski encouraged a more assertive foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviets.  
The penultimate chapter analyses the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. Both events contributed to Vance’s resignation in April 1980. The chapter 
argues that Vance’s position became untenable as Brzezinski emerged as the architect of the 
administration’s foreign policy. The bureaucratic wars over their response to the hostage 
crisis persisted but it placed Vance and his department on the defensive as they sought to 
prevent a military response or a rescue operation. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
meanwhile saw, what Vance described as, the collapse of the ‘tenuous balance between 
visceral anti-Sovietism and an attempt to regulate dangerous competition.’ He saw his more 
accommodating approach abandoned in favour of Brzezinski’s.130 
The thesis concludes by surmising the previous chapters and addresses the key 
themes of the study. It assesses how the bureaucratic organisation of the administration 
contributed to the competition between Vance, Brzezinski and their departments with 
respect to relevant case studies as well as analysing how the rivalry between them came to 
impact on the administration’s goals and objectives.  
Conclusion 
As the review of the current historiography of the administration reveals, the relationship 
features consistently in various works but there is much debate amongst scholars as to the 
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level of disagreement between Vance, Brzezinski and their respective departments during 
the Carter presidency. Moreover, there is a considerable lack of unity over how much 
influence they had on foreign policy, which has led some to neglect the relationship as a key 
aspect of the administration’s failings. By addressing the Vance-Brzezinski relationship 
directly, this thesis intends to argue that the administration’s problems with respect to 
foreign policy were a result of the disputes between Vance and Brzezinski. This study seeks 
to expand on the work of others but also provide fresh input into certain areas previously 
unexplored by other scholars, by addressing the ideological and bureaucratic roots of the 
conflict. In sum, it demonstrates how the relationship came to dramatically alter the 
administration’s priorities, policies and approaches from day one and eventually contributed 
to an inconsistent and at times incoherent foreign policy agenda.   
Using the bureaucratic politics model framework, this thesis will illustrate how 
competition between key individuals and institutions affect the policy process as well as its 
outcomes. While it had been Carter’s intention to implement a system based on collegiality, 
it ultimately gave way to bureaucratic warfare. The Vance-Brzezinski divide demonstrates 
how competing ideologies and bureaucratic tensions significantly impact on an 
administration’s approach. As the thesis highlights, the institutional rivalry between the State 
Department and the NSC steadily increased as their principals grappled for control of the 
foreign policy agenda. Coupled with the president’s inability to manage the divergent views 
of his advisors, as well as their personalities, the administration’s foreign policy fell victim 
to the ideological and bureaucratic disputes between Vance and Brzezinski.  
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Chapter One 
The Peanut Farmer, the Columbia Professor and the Wall Street Lawyer 
On election night 1976, Cyrus R. Vance and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski watched events unfold 
at the home of a mutual acquaintance as it became clear that Jimmy Carter had won the race 
for the White House. As they celebrated together, they also contemplated what the future 
would hold for them. Immediately following on from his victory, there was speculation that 
the president-elect would ask Vance to serve as secretary of state while Brzezinski would be 
appointed national security advisor. However, their proposed appointments were met with 
widespread scepticism within some quarters regarding their ability to serve collegially with 
one another.1 Even Carter’s chief political strategist Hamilton Jordan remarked, ‘if after the 
election, you find a Cy Vance as Secretary of State, and Zbigniew Brzezinski as head of 
national security, then I would say we failed. And I’d quit.’2 Nevertheless, both were 
appointed to serve in Carter’s administration and while Jordan did not quit, his comments 
foreshadowed the disagreements that would later arise between the president’s principal 
foreign policy advisors.  
The conflicts between Vance and Brzezinski developed from their divergent 
perspectives regarding U.S. foreign policy. Shaped by events in their early lives and careers, 
they spent time formulating their worldviews and approaches to international affairs, which 
ultimately contrasted with one another and affected their positions during the 
administration’s time in office. This chapter analyses the backgrounds and personalities of 
Vance and Brzezinski to understand how their experiences impacted on their outlooks and 
priorities with respect to U.S. foreign policy upon entering the administration. Moreover, 
this chapter examines Vance and Brzezinski’s relationship with Carter. While both 
supported him, it was the Polish academic who cultivated a close personal and professional 
rapport with the future president. While Vance supplemented his campaign, he never 
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enjoyed the same level of intimacy as Brzezinski, who became Carter’s chief foreign policy 
advisor on his ascent to the White House. 
Jimmy Carter 
When James Earl Carter Jr. announced his intention to seek the Democratic Party 
nomination for president in 1974, his public recognition stood at just 2%. When he told his 
mother that he was running for president she remarked, ‘president of what?’3 Whilst it 
seemed inexplicable that a little known one term governor from Georgia could propel 
himself to the White House, a stagnant economy, rising unemployment, the Watergate 
Scandal and the subsequent resignation of President Richard Nixon as well as the Vietnam 
War left the American public weary and craving change. Carter’s idealistic campaign sought 
to repair the wounds of the past decade and restore pride in the American spirit once again. 
As running mate Walter Mondale put it, ‘Carter offered an antidote to a long, poisonous 
period in American politics.’4 
Carter grew up in the humble surroundings of Plains, Georgia where his father, Earl, 
ran a grocery store and operated a peanut farm while his mother, Lillian, became a trained 
nurse.5 As a young man, he aspired to serve his country by joining the navy and he earned a 
place at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland in 1942. Carter excelled at the 
academy and specialised in naval engineering under the guidance of Admiral Hyman 
Rickover. His education at the academy and the influence of Rickover taught Carter to view 
problems through a systematic method of investigation. He came to believe that greater 
education and detailed analysis of any given situation could lead to a solution, a trait he 
carried throughout his political career.6 
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When his father died in 1953, Carter quit the academy and returned to Plains to take 
over the family peanut farm. Along with wife Rosalyn, they turned the fortunes of the farm 
around after it came under pressure following Earl Carter’s passing. During this time, he 
ingratiated himself within Plains society, actively participating in various community causes 
with the long-term goal of running for political office. In 1962, on his thirty-eighth birthday, 
he decided to stand for the Georgia State Senate.7 Coming from a family of democrats, 
Carter succeed in his race after he put up a rigorous legal challenge against perceived 
electoral fraud by his opponent. During his two terms in the state legislature, he devoted 
considerable time and effort to reading bills as he sought to pass education reforms, promote 
racial equality and gradually end segregation in Georgia.8 
In 1966, Carter sought the Democratic Party nomination for governor of Georgia but 
suffered defeat at the hands of segregationist Lester Maddox.9 Dejected by his defeat, he 
became disenchanted with politics and slid into a depression. He turned to his sister Ruth, a 
successful Christen evangelical and Baptist councillor, for guidance.10 Religion played a key 
role in Carter’s life. The family belonged to the Plains Baptist Church where his father had 
been a Sunday school teacher while his mother volunteered as a nurse at local missionaries. 
Carter acknowledged in the wake of his defeat, and through his conversations with Ruth, 
that his commitment to God and his faith had been somewhat superficial. He underwent a 
deeply profound religious experience that saw him re-devote himself to God and his faith 
but it also reinvigorated his political ambitions.11 
Inspired by his rebirth and undeterred by his failure to win the nomination in 1966, 
Carter embarked on a second campaign to stand for Governor in 1970, only this time he 
                                                          
7 Morris, Jimmy Carter, 122-123. 
8 E. Stanly Godbold Jr., “From Plains to Atlanta,” in A Companion to Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy 
Carter, ed. Scott Kaufman (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 66. 
9 Sneh, The Future Almost Arrived, 38-39. 
10 Jimmy Carter, A Full Life: Reflections at Ninety (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), 92; E. 
Stanly Godbold. Jr., Jimmy and Rosalyn Carter: The Georgia Years, 1924-1974 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 129. 
11 Randall Balmer, Redeemer: The Life of Jimmy Carter (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 25-27. 
54 
 
succeeded. After his victory, he immediately drew national attention when he declared the 
era of racial segregation to be over in his inaugural address in January 1971. He increased 
the representation of African Americans within the Georgia state government over the 
course of his term, which brought him national publicity and he featured on the cover of 
Time magazine. This gave him much needed national exposure as he gave serious 
consideration to the possibility of seeking the Democratic Party nomination for president in 
1976.12  
By 1974, the Watergate scandal, economic woes, the Vietnam War and the conduct 
of U.S. foreign policy abroad, contributed to a growing cynicism amongst the American 
public with confidence in the presidency at a record low.13 Friends and supporters 
encouraged Carter to stand, pointing out his position as an ‘outsider’ coupled with a positive 
campaign would entice voters and strengthen his chance of success.14 Carter agreed and 
decided to run. He believed the events of the previous decade had generated a desire for 
change and he promised to restore confidence and faith in the political system once again. 
He vowed not to lie to the American people and pledged to form an open, honest, 
representative government, ‘as good as the people.’15 
Carter’s positive campaign to re-establish trust in the United States with fresh ideas 
appealed to democrats from the left and right.16 On the campaign trail, he projected himself 
as an ordinary American as he engaged with voters on a face-to-face basis, as opposed to 
bland public rallies. He travelled fifty-thousand miles, through thirty-seven states, meeting 
party members and delegates ahead of the first Democratic primary in Iowa in January 
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1976.17 His folksy style endeared him to voters and the media as he cultivated an image of a 
‘Washington outsider’ untainted from the fateful decisions and political scandals of the 
previous decade. ‘I have been accused of being an outsider’ he declared in a campaign 
advert, ‘and I plead guilty.’18 He attacked decision makers in the capital but at the same time 
vowed to revive the American spirit and promised a compassionate government that 
responded to the everyday needs of ordinary citizens.19   
On international affairs, he spoke of restoring values and morality into the conduct 
of U.S. foreign policy. Since World War Two, U.S. foreign policy was tailored to establish 
the United States as the vanguard of a ‘just and stable international order’ to counter what 
policymakers viewed as the overriding threat to world peace and American national security, 
Soviet and communist expansionism. Containing that threat through economic, political and 
military means became central to the post-war consensus and U.S. strategy in international 
affairs.20 
However, U.S. involvement in the conflict in Southeast Asia in the 1960s had a 
dramatic effect on the psyche on the American public and its politicians. The war led to a 
fundamental review of how the United States conducted itself in the international arena, with 
some questioning aspects of the post-war consensus. The U.S. had been drawn into Vietnam 
because of their commitment to prevent the worldwide spread of communism but the 
conduct of U.S. activity had been deemed reckless and disproportionate while the scale and 
cost of the war shocked Americans back home. In total, the war claimed fifty-eight thousand 
American soldiers, with a further seventy-four thousand seriously wounded.21 While the 
commitment to containing the spread of communism and Soviet expansionism remained key 
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amongst policymakers, a feeling that U.S. actions in the international arena needed to 
change pervaded.  
When President Ford entered the White House following the resignation of Richard 
Nixon, he acknowledged the changing mood of the nation, when declared that the 
experiences of Vietnam and Watergate had made the United States ‘stronger and wiser as a 
nation.’22 Within months of becoming president however, the new realities of conducting 
foreign policy in the post-Vietnam era became evident. In 1975, American covert funding 
for Front for the National Liberation of Angola (F.N.L.A.) in their struggles against the 
Soviet and Cuban backed National Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) was unearthed and 
exposed. Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attempted to justify U.S. involvement 
as an attempt to offset Soviet-Cuban aggression and communist expansion in Africa and 
requested additional funding.23 But an assertive Congress and sceptical public, less inclined 
to subscribe to the rationale of the post-war consensus, reacted negatively. Many feared the 
U.S. being drawn into another conflict far from home under the caveat of containing 
communism. When the issue of funding for the FNLA went before the Senate in December 
1975 and the House in January 1976, the package was unanimously rejected.24  
The feeling amongst many politicians and the public in the 1970s was that America 
could no longer get involved in a long, costly and bloody conflict with the objective of 
containing communism.25 Carter agreed with this sentiment. Although he had supported the 
Vietnam War, his son Jack served during the conflict, the management of foreign policy 
during these years appalled him, as it had not exhibited the ideals the United States stood 
for.26 The commitment to the post-war consensus to prevent the spread of communism, had 
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led the United States to embark on a series of misguided foreign policy objectives. Previous 
administrations had prioritised containment through power politics over morality and paying 
special consideration to issues and concerns in the developing world.27  
Carter encapsulated his feelings, in a pre-election memoir, Why Not The Best? and 
noted that American actions, particularly in Vietnam and Cambodia but also through CIA 
covert activities, had ‘not exemplified any commitment to moral principles.’ Restoring a 
sense of morality in foreign policy, meant embracing the values, which defined the United 
States. As he wrote, ‘a nation’s domestic and foreign policy actions should be derived from 
the same standards of ethics, honesty and morality which are the characteristics of the 
individual citizens of the nation.’28 For Carter, the protection and advancement of human 
rights and ethical diplomacy exemplified the moral characteristics of the United States. He 
later said, ‘America did not invent human rights…human rights invented America.’29 It was 
a personal commitment, born out of his religious beliefs and experiences of segregation in 
the South but also a recognition of the increasing public concern for human suffrage and the 
growing sense of interdependence in the developing world.30 He believed the U.S. had a 
duty to offer moral leadership and human rights presented the opportunity to restore 
prestige, respect and trust in American foreign policy at home and abroad.31 
Carter’s campaign received an extra boost when early favourite, Senator Edward 
‘Ted’ Kennedy, still tainted by the Chappaquiddick incident, declined to run while others 
delayed announcing their candidacy.32 Thus, he pulled off a surprising triumph in the Iowa 
caucus to establish himself as the front runner in the race. He followed up his success with 
victory in the New Hampshire primary before crucial wins in Florida and Illinois. As other 
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candidates dropped out of the race, Carter went on to secure the support of states in the 
South as well as the North. Despite strong challenges toward the end of the race from 
Senator Frank Church, Representative Mo Udall and California Governor Jerry Brown, by 
the time delegates met at the Democratic Convention in July 1976, Carter had secured the 
nomination.33 
Meanwhile, President Gerald Ford had overcome a difficult challenge from former 
Governor of California Ronald Reagan in his quest to win the Republican presidential 
nomination but trailed Carter in the polls. Economic issues, the fallout from the Vietnam 
War, the spectre of Watergate and his decision to exonerate former President Richard Nixon 
from prosecution tarnished Ford’s campaign. During a speech in Michigan, protestors 
interrupted his speech and unfurled a banner that read, ‘don’t pardon Ford for letting Nixon 
off.’ On the campaign trail, he struggled to connect to ordinary voters. As one strategist told 
Ford, ‘Mr President, as a campaigner, you’re no fucking good!’ Coupled with the incident in 
Michigan, his advisors changed strategy and decided to utilise his position as an incumbent, 
working president. Instead of campaigning amongst the public like Carter, Ford operated 
from within the confines of the White House.34 As television networks devoted equal time to 
both candidates on the campaign trail, Ford’s team exploited loopholes that allowed him to 
claim extra coverage by signing bills and meeting foreign leaders in the Rose Garden. The 
strategy made him look presidential and avoided any other unfortunate encounters as it ate 
into Carter’s lead in the polls.35 
At the same time, Carter did himself considerable damage when he agreed to be 
interviewed for Playboy magazine with questions related to his faith and family. During the 
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interview, he made a monumental error when he professed, ‘I have committed adultery in 
my heart many times.’ He also used risqué language such as ‘screw’ and ‘shack up’ which 
offended conservative voters drawn to his religious convictions.36 Critics mocked him and 
questioned his judgement while Ford and his campaign team seized upon the blunder to 
court evangelical voters. Supporters declared, ‘Jimmy Carter wears religion on his sleeve but 
Jerry Ford wears it in his heart.’37 The interview, published on the eve of the first televised 
debate, and the first between two presidential candidates since 1960, attracted unnecessary 
controversy to Carter’s campaign. ‘The honeymoon was over’ declared speechwriter Patrick 
Anderson as Carter floundered during the debate to hand Ford a small victory as he levelled 
in the polls.38  
The turning point in Carter’s campaign as well as the 1976 election came when he 
faced Ford in the second debate in San Francisco, which focused on foreign policy. A 
confident and assured display by Carter arrested his slide in the polls and halted Ford’s fight 
back.39 In the final debate, which took the form of an open forum, neither candidate gained a 
significant advantage but polls gave Carter the edge. Over the final weeks of the campaign, 
the pendulum swung between them but when Americans went to the polls on 2 November, 
1976, they elected Jimmy Carter as President of the United States. He won the popular vote 
and defeated Ford by securing 297 Electoral College votes to his rival’s 240.40 
Even though domestic issues took precedence in opinion polls for the first time since 
1948, in preparation for his bid for the White House, Carter decided to advance his own 
knowledge of international affairs as, by his own admission, he had limited exposure to 
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foreign policy issues.41 His advisor Peter Bourne later said, Carter ‘had clear views about 
very little else than human rights.’42 This led him to join the newly founded think tank, the 
Trilateral Commission in 1973. The group brought together figures from the world of 
politics, business and academia and gave Carter the opportunity to engage with the major 
foreign policy issues of the day. It also brought him into contact with the Polish academic 
Zbigniew Brzezinski.43 The pair quickly impressed one other, leading the presidential 
hopeful to ask the Columbia professor to serve as a foreign policy advisor on his campaign. 
Although he initially viewed Carter’s campaign with scepticism, Brzezinski duly accepted 
his invitation and as they sought to navigate their way to the presidency, their relationship 
flourished. Carter later remarked, ‘next to members of my family, Zbig would be my 
favourite sea mate on a long-distance trip; we might argue but I would never be bored.’44 
Zbigniew Brzezinski 
Born in Warsaw, Poland in 1928, Brzezinski’s worldview was shaped by events during his 
childhood as he witnessed the demise of his homeland, firstly to the Nazi invasion of 1939 
and then the Soviet occupation following the cessation of hostilities at the end of World War 
Two. The son of a Polish diplomat, Tadeusz, who held posts in France, Germany, Ukraine 
and finally Canada, the Brzezinski family settled in Montréal.45 The war aroused 
Brzezinski’s interest in world affairs as his homeland battled against the German offensive. 
‘I followed the war with passion, intense interest…I was especially fascinated by what was 
happening in Poland’ he recalled. When the war in Europe came to an end, the young 
Brzezinski joined in with the festivities but with trepidation over Poland’s future. He later 
                                                          
41 Melanson, American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War, 88; Carter, A Full Life, 105. 
42 Peter Bourne quoted in Morris, Jimmy Carter, 55. 
43 Glad, An Outsider in the White House, 25. 
44 Carter, Keeping Faith, 54  
45 Lubowski, Zbig, 11-12. 
61 
 
said, ‘curiously in that paroxysm of joy I felt essentially sadness. I felt that Poland was again 
occupied, and while I anticipated a celebration...I did not have feelings of joy.’46 
It also ignited his academic interest in Soviet studies. After he graduated from 
McGill University, Brzezinski headed to the U.S. and obtained his PhD in Soviet studies 
from Harvard in 1953 where he became a research fellow and then a research associate at the 
Russian Research Center. Unlike his colleague and occasional rival, Henry Kissinger, he did 
not receive a permanent position and instead took up a post at Columbia University.47 
Brzezinski made the transition from academia to politics when met John F. Kennedy in 
1957. When the Massachusetts senator entered the race for the White House in 1960, 
Brzezinski volunteered to help his campaign and was drafted onto his foreign policy 
advisory team. After Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, Brzezinski became an unofficial 
advisor to his successor Lyndon B. Johnson who appointed him to the State Department 
policy planning committee in 1966, as he developed a reputation as a ‘rising star’ within the 
Democratic Party establishment.48  
His time in the State Department was a frustrating experience for Brzezinski. He 
observed that neither the president nor Secretary of State Dean Rusk utilised the committee 
effectively. Brzezinski and his colleagues did not have access to sensitive materials, found 
themselves out of the loop on various issues and powerless to affect policy. He also found 
himself unable to get past Rusk or Under Secretary W. Averell Harriman.49 He later wrote, 
‘the policy process during Secretary Rusk’s tenure of office was probably more divorced 
from vital decisions than at any point since the establishment of the policy planning council.’ 
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Moreover, ‘the secretary showed a marked disinclination to engage in any searching 
discussions concerning the larger issues of foreign policy.’50 On occasions, Brzezinski 
bypassed the bureaucracy via personal contacts close to the president. He recalled, ‘I had no 
hesitation in phoning up people in the White House and bootlegging memos to the White 
House.’ Infuriated with the bureaucratic process and inability to influence policy and with 
no sign of a promotion, Brzezinski decided to leave government in 1967 and returned to 
academia.51  
Throughout his career in academia and spells in government, Brzezinski gained a 
reputation as a hawk and ardent anti-Soviet. His polish heritage facilitated an intense dislike 
of Soviet actions. His father had helped fight off Lenin’s forces during the Poland-Soviet 
War of 1920 and during the 1930s when posted as diplomat in the Ukraine, he experienced 
the brutality of the Soviet regime at close quarters, as they executed millions of ‘enemies of 
the people.’ Tadeusz later relayed stories of mass arrests and murders to his son, who 
acknowledged that they made a considerable impression on his view of the Soviets at a 
young age. Moreover, following talks between the allies at Tehran and Yalta in 1945, Poland 
duly became a Soviet satellite state. Brzezinski later called the allies accession to Stalin’s 
demands as, ‘a major historical blot on the record of Anglo-American leadership’ as he 
became increasingly concerned for the welfare of his fellow Poles. 52   
Thereafter, Brzezinski’s views became heavily shaped by his anti-communist 
sentiment but he passionately believed that the United States had the moral authority to 
challenge that threat. When he received U.S. citizenship in 1957, he later reflected, ‘I felt 
that America had the greater capacity for influencing world affairs for the good, and thus 
helping to fashion a more just international system that would therefore also help Poland.’53  
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Brzezinski’s views on how the United States should counter communist expansion 
became encapsulated in his academic writing as he became a prolific author on the Soviet 
Union. In 1956, Brzezinski’s published his first books, The Permanent Purge: Politics in 
Soviet Totalitarianism and Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, co-authored with Carl 
J. Friedrich. Both works coincided with Soviet crackdowns in Poland and Hungary in 1956, 
which drew international condemnation.54 Brzezinski argued that purges and crackdowns, 
used to preserve political and economic interests, were commonplace in a totalitarian state 
such as the Soviet Union and thus, he did not expect the Soviets to mellow in the face of 
worldwide criticism.55 
His work evolved to discuss U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He had a 
long-held belief that the USSR was at the root of international conflict, threatening global 
stability. He argued that the U.S. needed to act as a force for good to counter the Soviets.56 
This led him to advance the strategy of ‘peaceful engagement’ towards Eastern Europe. 
Previous approaches had failed, he suggested, but underlying nationalistic tensions in the 
Eastern bloc, handed the United States the opportunity to exploit the situation and weaken 
Soviet influence. He contended that the U.S. should improve relations with Soviet satellite 
states to initiate a gradual shift from communist domination toward political self-
determination.57 The idea gained favour with President Kennedy, who declared in 1962 that 
the U.S. needed to be prepared to ‘seize the initiative’ when opportunities to improve 
relations with countries in the East arose.58 
Like many at the time Brzezinski subscribed to the post-war consensus and 
throughout his time in government, he adopted a hard-line approach on the foreign policy 
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issues of the day. During the Cuban missile crisis for example, he advocated targeted air 
strikes of missile sites on the island.59 He supported the American effort in Vietnam and 
argued that unless the U.S. countered communist forces in Southeast Asia, the loss would 
have profound consequences for the region with China becoming an increasingly formidable 
threat.60  
Whereas his future foe, Cyrus Vance, re-evaluated his views in response to the 
Vietnam War, Brzezinski’s central thesis that the key principle of U.S. foreign policy was to 
counter the threat of communism and Soviet adventurism remained unmoved. In the 1970s, 
he was critical of attempts by Nixon and Kissinger to harbour cordial relations with the 
Soviet Union. Détente, Brzezinski declared, was not a check on Soviet behaviour and 
instead legitimised their activity in some parts of the world. Because the Soviets still had 
grand designs on world domination, Nixon and Kissinger, Brzezinski argued, had been too 
accommodating to Moscow.61  
In 1970, he wrote Between Two Ages to underscore the importance of technological 
changes in the world and re-enforce his strategy of peaceful engagement, particularly in 
developing nations. Shortly thereafter, he travelled to Japan and upon his return he wrote 
The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change in Japan, which focused on the trilateral 
relationship between the United States, Europe and Japan.62 Brzezinski became inspired to 
set up the Trilateral Commission, a foreign policy think tank, in 1973 with the aid of Chase 
Manhattan chief executive David Rockefeller. Membership of the committee included 
individuals from North America, Europe and Asia with figures from the world of business, 
politics and academia all represented.63  Both Brzezinski and Rockefeller agreed, in the post-
Vietnam era, the U.S. needed to tailor its foreign policy to respond to the needs of the 
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developing world to counter Soviet expansionism. By highlighting economic and political 
co-operation amongst nations, Brzezinski and Rockefeller sought to encourage a new 
approach to international affairs that gave the U.S. an opportunity to assert its influence 
across the globe.64 
In the wake of the Vietnam War and the growing sense of interdependence across 
the globe, Brzezinski argued that, to harness technocratic change, foreign policy needed to 
be conducted through the mutual co-operation of nation states. He viewed such a move as 
intrinsic in challenging the Soviet position in world affairs. He underlined the importance of 
human rights and democratic advancement, to differentiate the U.S. from the Soviets. 
Because of their totalitarian nature, the human rights agenda ‘put the Soviet Union 
ideologically on the defensive.’ In other areas however, he never relented in his desire to see 
the U.S. challenge the Soviets and their military strength when necessary.65 It was this 
outlook that Brzezinski developed in the 1970s when he first encountered Jimmy Carter.  
In 1971, Rockefeller became aware of the Georgia governor through his national 
exposure and during lunch Carter made a favourable impression. Several years later, 
Rockefeller recommended him for membership of the commission. Brzezinski had no 
qualms about inviting Carter to join, given they shared the same values and objectives about 
improved relations with the Far East.66 Carter quickly ingratiated himself into the 
commission, became a regular contributor at meetings and took part in discussions. He also 
began to nurture a close working relationship with Brzezinski as the pair communicated 
frequently on trilateral matters. The Georgia Governor made a positive impression on his 
future national security advisor while Carter defined himself as ‘an eager student’ of 
Brzezinski’s.67 Not long after Brzezinski invited him to join the commission, he learned of 
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Carter’s presidential ambitions despite only being recognised by 2% of the population. 
Brzezinski, lukewarm to Carter’s fledgling campaign, did not see him as a credible candidate 
but his opinion shifted during a Trilateral Commission meeting in Japan in the summer of 
1975 when he confidently engaged with reporters on foreign policy issues. Encouraged by 
Carter not only as a candidate but also as a person, he relayed his thoughts to his wife Emilie 
who replied, ‘if you like him and believe in him, don’t wait for developments, come out and 
support him.’68 
Brzezinski believed Carter had the ability to be a tough president but he also judged 
him to be an honest and sincere individual. ‘I saw in him decency and humanness, and I also 
felt that there was a great deal of steel underneath…the feeling that I was dealing with a man 
of genuine conviction was important in shaping my own personal commitment to Jimmy 
Carter’ he later recalled. Coupled with their shared views about the need for the U.S. to be a 
more co-operative power in the world, he accepted Carter’s invitation to join his campaign 
and Brzezinski became his chief foreign policy advisor.69  
According to speechwriter Patrick Anderson, Brzezinski closely aligned himself 
with Carter. ‘He always knew where Jimmy was sitting and always elbowed his way very 
close to the throne’ Anderson recalled. His demeanour, as well as his views, made him an 
unpopular member of Carter’s foreign policy advisory team but they developed a personal 
rapport with one another that no other member of the foreign policy team could replicate.70 
Crucially, Carter trusted Brzezinski to provide him with the strategies, policies and advice he 
needed to prove he was a credible candidate and win the race for the White House. While 
others offered support, ultimately it was Brzezinski who Carter frequently turned to on 
foreign policy matters. As Hamilton Jordan later reflected, ‘it was only natural for Jimmy 
Carter to tell his staff, “check this with Zbig.”’71 
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After he joined Carter’s campaign, Brzezinski provided him with regular briefings 
on the foreign policy issues of the day, forwarded policy papers and drafted speeches. In 
December 1975, Carter asked him to produce a ‘basic speech/statement on foreign affairs.’ 
The resultant framework encompassed many of the philosophies of the Trilateral 
Commission, with a special emphasis on mutual co-operation between advanced nations and 
the third world but Brzezinski also linked these pledges with elements of his anti-Soviet 
rhetoric. ‘Détente, of course, is desirable but it ought to be reciprocal’ he told Carter. With 
fellow commission member Richard N. Gardner, Brzezinski elaborated further and stressed 
the need to counter Soviet activity in the developing world by underscoring the importance 
of human rights. He also encouraged a more comprehensive strategic arms limitation deal 
(SALT) with the Soviet Union and urged him to court the People’s Republic of China if 
elected president.72 
The policies and approaches became incorporated into a major foreign policy speech 
Carter delivered in June 1976. The speech, combined many of the early key themes of the 
campaign, such as the need to embrace a foreign policy based on morality, through co-
operation, human rights, democratic advancement and economic assistance, but also 
contained elements of Brzezinski’s own hard-line views on U.S.-Soviet relations.73 He also 
encouraged Carter to criticise ‘the lone ranger’ style of diplomacy practised by Henry 
Kissinger. The hostile remarks made by Carter, infuriated the secretary of state, particularly 
as they came from his old Harvard nemesis, Brzezinski. This prompted Kissinger biographer 
Walter Isaacson to remark, ‘hearing Brzezinski’s snide words slung at him each day, not 
with a slightly embittered Polish accent but a smiling Georgia accent, drove Kissinger to 
near distraction.’74 Brzezinski noted during this time, that he and Carter became much closer 
                                                          
72 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 7. 
73 James T. Wooten, “Carter Pledges an Open Foreign Policy,” The New York Times, 24 June, 1976, 
1. 
74 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013), 696-702. 
68 
 
as they worked on the speech. He wrote in his journal, ‘have a good working relationship – 
he is calm, pleasant and to the point.’75 
Brzezinski’s major contribution to the campaign came on the eve of the second 
presidential debate in San Francisco, which focused on foreign policy. After Ford wore away 
Carter’s lead in the polls, the pair were in a dead heat as they prepared to face each other. 
The debate offered Carter an opportunity to prove his credentials and score a significant 
victory over Ford. A frequent criticism levelled at the Ford administration centred on détente 
and their management of the superpower relationship, in particular, their decision to sign the 
Helsinki Accords in 1975. The Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 
intended to ratify post-World War Two borders in Europe and improve co-operation 
between the Soviet bloc and the West. Attended by thirty-five world leaders, the subsequent 
discussions led to a series of agreements that formed the basis of the accords. The first 
basket committed all signatories to respect the post-World War two borders in Europe, the 
second focused on increased co-operation on economic, social and political matters while 
the third called for an adherence to humanitarian issues and human rights. Critics from both 
sides of the political divide in the U.S. attacked the agreements, labelling Helsinki as another 
Yalta and accusing the administration of handing Eastern Europe to the Soviets. Eastern 
Europeans decedents living in the United States also registered their uneasiness with the 
agreement.76 
The inclusion of the third basket of the accord became a toxic issue for Ford during 
the presidential campaign. Kissinger supported its inclusion, if only to appease West 
European allies and critics at home who accused him and the administration of being 
heartless. Ultimately, he viewed it to be a minor aspect of the accord.77 However the 
administration’s commitment to the third basket came into question in March 1976 when a 
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press report quoted Kissinger aide Helmut Sonnenfeldt as suggesting the U.S. accepted 
Soviet control over Eastern European states as official policy. He told State Department 
officials, ‘it must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between 
the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one.’ To critics of détente, 
Sonnenfeldt’s words indicated that the administration ignored human rights in Eastern 
Europe to enable further co-operation and avoid conflict with the Soviet Union. The report 
produced a barrage of criticism towards Ford and Kissinger throughout 1976 and became a 
key subject in the build up to the second presidential debate.78  
Brzezinski sensed an opportunity to combine his anti-Soviet rhetoric and concern for 
his Polish homeland, with Carter’s emphasis on morality and human rights to score a victory 
against Ford.79 Brzezinski supported the accords, specifically the third basket. He argued 
that it allowed the West to recognise human rights considerations within the Soviet Union 
and across Eastern Europe and encourage adherence to them.80 He believed the furore that 
surrounded the so-called ‘Sonnenfeldt doctrine’ gave Carter the chance to attack the Ford 
administration’s lack of concern for human rights and acquiescence to the Soviets. He wrote 
to Carter, ‘you could then follow by stressing that you would seek to deal more directly with 
the East European states, rejecting the notion that Eastern Europe is a Soviet sphere of 
influence and that all arrangements for Eastern Europe have to be cleared or channelled 
through Moscow.’ He advised Carter to address the Helsinki agreement in the debate to 
underline Ford’s deficiencies in handling the Soviets and other foreign policy issues around 
the globe. ‘In general,’ he told Carter, ‘I should think that a major purpose of the debate on 
foreign policy would be to leave the public with a clear impression that Ford has provided 
no leadership.’81 
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When the debate began, Carter immediately went on the offensive in his opening 
remarks and returned to key themes of his campaign. He declared, ‘our country is not strong 
anymore; we’re not respected anymore…we’ve lost, in our foreign policy, the character of 
the American people.’ He proceeded to highlight Ford’s lack of success in the international 
arena and criticised his and Nixon’s support for brutal dictatorships across the world and 
lack of adherence to human rights concerns.82 Shortly thereafter, as Brzezinski predicted, the 
debate proceeded to address the Helsinki Accords and the ‘Sonnenfeldt doctrine’ when 
moderator Max Frankel questioned Ford on the United States’ relationship with the Soviet 
Union. The president then committed, what Time magazine later described as, ‘the blooper 
heard round the world.’83 
When Frankel quizzed Ford on the issue, the president boldly declared, ‘there is no 
Soviet domination of Eastern Europe…Each of these countries (Poland, Yugoslavia, and 
Romania) is independent, autonomous; it has its own territorial integrity. And the United 
States does not concede that those countries are under domination of the Soviet Union.’ 
After Frankel gave Ford the opportunity to reiterate his answer, the president responded, ‘I 
don't believe…the Yugoslavians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don't 
believe that the Romanians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don't 
believe that the Poles consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union.’ Carter 
immediately pounced on Ford’s error, ‘I would like to see Mr. Ford convince the Polish 
Americans and the Czech Americans and the Hungarian Americans in this country that those 
countries don’t live under the domination and supervision of the Soviet Union behind the 
Iron Curtain.’84 Brzezinski’s contribution proved to be significant as Ford’s error cost him 
significant votes in states where Americans with ties to Eastern Europe resided.85 
                                                          
82 “Second Presidential Campaign Debate,” 6 October, 1976, The American Presidency Project. 
83 Mark J. Rozell, The Press and the Ford Presidency (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1992), 147. 
84 “Second Presidential Campaign Debate.” 
85 Bourne, Jimmy Carter, 352. 
71 
 
Brzezinski’s standing with the president, led Carter to appoint him as national 
security advisor. He provided valuable advice and expertise during the race to the White 
House and demonstrated confidence and personal loyalty to Carter. He believed Carter could 
successfully marry his commitment to a moral foreign policy with his own tough anti-Soviet 
rhetoric. Moreover, as the president-elect began the process of forming his government, 
Carter realised he needed Brzezinski alongside him to help him develop and implement 
ideas from the White House. An understanding between the two that the Polish academic 
would occupy a role seemingly developed and whilst he did not make any direct overtures, 
he coveted the position of national security advisor. When Carter formally approached 
Brzezinski, he told him ‘I knew some months ago, that you were my choice.’86 Crucially, 
like Kissinger, Brzezinski was appointed before Carter selected his secretary of state or other 
senior foreign policy officials, a clear indication that the president-elect viewed the national 
security designate as a key, if not the principal, foreign policy advisor in his administration.  
Cyrus Vance 
During his time as a member of the trilateral commission, Carter encountered a number of 
individuals who later served in his administration such as Vice-President Walter Mondale, 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, UN Ambassador Andrew Young, Secretary of the 
Treasury Michael Blumenthal and Wall Street lawyer and former deputy secretary of 
defense, Cyrus Roberts Vance.87 The pair only met twice, according to Vance, and when 
Carter approached him to serve on his campaign team, he initially declined and supported 
his friend Sargent Shriver in the Democratic primaries. When Shriver dropped out of the 
race, Carter personally contacted him and asked for his help on his campaign. Vance 
carefully analysed Carter’s positions and spoke with friends about his suitability as a 
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presidential candidate. Unlike Carter, Vance, very much a Washington insider, who 
gravitated amongst establishment circles but his experiences in government had a profound 
effect on his worldview as he questioned key features of U.S. foreign policy and sought to 
encourage a new approach to international affairs. This corresponded with Carter’s emphasis 
on restoring morality to U.S. foreign policy and Vance concluded that he stood a good 
chance of winning and he duly supported his campaign.88 
Vance was born in Clarksburg, West Virginia on 27 March, 1917, but his family 
relocated to New York when he was just five. After his father passed away, Vance and his 
elder brother John turned to their uncle, Wall Street lawyer and 1924 Democratic 
presidential candidate, John W. Davis for guidance. Davis proved to be a significant 
influence on Vance during his youth and his Sunday morning interrogations of his nephew 
on the major cases of the day inspired the young Cyrus to pursue a career in the legal 
profession and latterly into politics.89 After he attended Kent School in Connecticut, Vance 
went to study at Yale in 1935 where he graduated from law school in 1942. After 
graduation, he enlisted in the U.S. Navy and saw action in the Pacific during World War 
Two.90 
Upon his return to civilian life, Vance passed the New York bar and joined the Wall 
Street law firm, Simpson, Thacher and Bartlett in 1947 and eventually made partner. His 
training as a young attorney in civil litigation cases as well as the education he received from 
his uncle prepared Vance for a career in politics. His law firm also encouraged his 
involvement in political affairs and supported his application to join the Council on Foreign 
Relations in 1957.91 In the same year, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson recruited 
Vance and his law partner Edward Weisl as special counsel on the Preparedness 
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Investigation Committee, set up after the launch of the Soviet Satellite Sputnik to analyse its 
impact on U.S. national security. This began a close professional and personal relationship 
between himself and Johnson.92 
When John F. Kennedy was elected president in 1960, Vance had already built a 
close network of connections associated with the president-elect. He first met Kennedy in 
1942 at the wedding of mutual acquaintance, Stanley Resor, and after he received the 
Democratic nomination for president, Vance joined his campaign as an advisor on defence 
policy as well as helping with fundraising events.93 After Kennedy’s election, the newly 
selected Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara appointed Vance, on the recommendation 
of Vice-President Lyndon Johnson, to the post of general counsel for the department.94 
During his eighteen months in that position, in addition to helping McNamara 
initiate internal reforms of the department, he received the unenviable task of negotiating the 
release of Cuban exiles, captured during the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961. Kennedy then 
selected Vance as secretary of the army, again on the recommendation of Johnson. After the 
president’s assassination, the departure of Roswell Gilpatric in January 1964 created an 
opening for Vance as Deputy Secretary of Defense to McNamara. Vance served the 
administration loyally until the summer of 1967.95 Despite his departure, Vance found his 
skills and expertise frequently called upon personally by Johnson, who later described him 
as a ‘rare breed who puts service to his country above concern for himself.’ An hour before 
he left office, Johnson awarded Vance the Presidential Medal of Freedom.96 
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After leaving public service, Vance returned to New York to practice law and it was 
during this time that he re-evaluated his outlook on U.S. foreign policy. At the core of 
Vance’s philosophy was a belief that the United States should not allow the East-West 
dynamic to govern their overall objectives. While he viewed relations with their Cold War 
rival as important, Vance believed U.S. intervention should be focused on harnessing 
changes in the developing world rather than rather than viewing events through the narrow 
prism of the Cold War. Moreover, the use of U.S. military power should be used only as a 
final resort, while he also underscored the importance of patient, diplomatic mediation to 
resolving international disputes.97 To former colleagues who served with him during the 
Johnson years and was appointed as assistant secretary of state in the Carter administration, 
these views represented a significant shift in his outlook. ‘He was very much of a middle of 
the road Cold War guy’ Leslie Gelb recalled, ‘after he had spent all those years in New York 
from the time he left the Johnson administration to the time when he came with Jimmy 
Carter his views had changed.’98  
When he entered the Pentagon in 1961, his views mirrored that of the foreign policy 
establishment, in the belief that the overriding threat to the United States and the global 
community was Soviet and communist expansionism.99 Vance endorsed the policy of 
containment toward Soviet, Chinese and Cuban aggression by utilising American political, 
economic and, at times, military strength when necessary. However, his exposure to various 
world events and incidents during the 1960s shook the foundations of his worldview. By the 
time he came to serve in the Carter administration, his views had undergone a fundamental 
re-evaluation.  
When a coup d’état plunged the Central American state of the Dominican Republic 
into a civil war, Vance supported President Johnson’s decision, for fear of a ‘another Cuba’, 
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to deploy American forces to control the situation and subvert a hostile takeover. Vance, 
along with National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, travelled to Puerto Rico for talks 
with former Dominican President Juan Bosh about forming a new anti-communist 
government once hostilities subsided. Vance’s exposure to the conflict however ignited 
doubts within him about the perceived communist threat. ‘In the early stages I think there 
was a general feeling in Washington that there was a substantial communist presence and 
that they were in fact taking over, and that this did have the seeds of another Cuba’ he later 
reflected, ‘but I think as time went on and more information became available, people 
realised that this perhaps was not the fact.’100 
At the same time as Vance’s mission to the Dominican, the Johnson administration 
became further engaged in the conflict in Vietnam. Like many in the administration, he 
supported the escalation of their support for South Vietnam on the basis that it prevented the 
spread of communism and their involvement was a necessary means of achieving peace.101 
He stated in May 1965, ‘I think the action we are taking indicates our firmness to resist 
aggression where this is required.’102 North Vietnam, he believed, under duress from the 
Soviet Union and China, had imposed ‘unwanted rule’ on a ‘sovereign nation’ and the 
United States had a moral right to become more actively involved. He supported the 
bombing campaigns of North Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin incident and in 1967, when 
questioned on whether the United States should use force to achieve their aims, he replied, 
‘unequivocally yes.’103 
But after a series of long, unsuccessful aerial bombardments and ground offensives 
resulted in heavy causalities, public opinion turned against the war and so did Vance. 
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Despite his public comments, his position gravitated toward favouring a gradual de-
escalation of American involvement and a peaceful resolution. He later said that he did not 
believe their initial involvement was ‘based on evil motives’ but he accepted the U.S. had 
become engaged in a quagmire.104 The war shook Vance on a personal level, and he 
confessed years later that he still had difficulty discussing Vietnam during interviews.105  
McNamara shared his deputy’s emotional distress at the conflict. Under a picture of 
himself and Vance in his book he wrote, ‘Cy Vance and I were both depressed as we began 
to contemplate the awesome decisions that lay ahead.’106 His disenchantment with the war 
effort, coupled with a severe back injury and a desire to return to the private sector to finance 
his children’s college tuition fees, prompted him to resign from his position in 1967.107 A 
month later, Johnson convened a group of former government officials, including Vance, 
known as ‘the wise men’, a group of foreign policy and military luminaries who convinced 
the president to begin the process of disentangling the United States from the conflict.108  
For Vance, the rationale for U.S. intervention in Vietnam had been based on a 
misguided interpretation of the conflict as an East-West proxy war. ‘We did not sufficiently 
understand the North Vietnamese, nor what motivated them; and I think that this is one of 
the great problems that faced us and the whole conduct of the war in Vietnam’ he 
reflected.109 It also convinced Vance to break from the post-war consensus with U.S. foreign 
policy less focused on the East-West dynamic. ‘All through the 1960s and early 1970s, new 
forces and actors appeared in areas of the world that had been on the periphery’ he recalled, 
‘it required a broader American conception of U.S. security interests and of the scope of our 
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foreign policy than merely the U.S.-Soviet or the East-West geopolitical competition.’110 
Vietnam had been an example of how the fixation on U.S.-Soviet relations and the policy of 
containment, had led to the flawed and erroneous use of American military power. To avoid 
such trauma again, Vance believed the U.S. needed to refocus its priorities in the 
international arena and not allow relations with the Soviet Union to dominate their overall 
foreign policy objectives while appreciating the limits of American power.111   
The Vietnam War also led Vance to doubt the effectiveness of U.S. intervention in 
regional conflicts. As he observed, ‘I think we erred in not realising that we could not create 
Western-type institutions in other nations with different cultures.’112 But Vietnam was not 
the only example during his time in government that convinced Vance of the potential 
negative impact of American interference. During the Panamanian flag riots of January 
1964, Johnson dispatched Vance to ‘determine the facts.’ A wave of violence that emanated 
after Panamanian students attempted to raise their national flag over the canal had left four 
American soldiers and twenty-four Panamanians dead, while the government severed 
diplomatic ties with the U.S.113 Having seen the extreme level of anti-American sentiment 
amongst the Panamanians during his visit, Vance found sympathy with their cause and came 
to the view the continued occupation of the canal as modern-day colonialism. Upon his 
return, he advised Johnson to begin negotiations to transfer control of the canal back to the 
Panamanians.114 The cases of Vietnam and Panama as well as the Dominican led Vance to 
question the merits of Western intervention but ultimately, he concluded that the U.S. could 
not impose its values upon others through force or coercion. 
Events abroad certainly influenced Vance’s views regarding the undesirability of the 
use of force in resolving conflicts but issues at home also informed his outlook. As secretary 
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of the army, he oversaw the Kennedy administration’s approach to the Ole Miss riots of 
1962, after tensions escalated following the admission of African American student James 
Meredith to study at the University of Mississippi 115 In 1967, he oversaw the federal 
response to the Detroit Riots and in the aftermath, Vance delivered a scathing assessment on 
the conduct of the national guard troops and called on authorities to show greater restraint to 
prevent needless loss of life. He later reflected, ‘I personally feel that it’s better to save a life 
than to shoot a fourteen-year-old kid who’s taking a loaf of bread.’116 Whereas these cases 
convinced him of the limitations of military intervention and the use of force, other incidents 
during the Johnson administration persuaded him of the value of mediation in resolving 
crises as he fashioned a reputation as a diplomatic trouble shooter. 
Vance acquired valuable experience during the Panama flag riots and the Dominican 
crisis as an emissary of the president and after he left government, Johnson recalled him to 
act as a mediator with Greece and Turkey over the issue of Cyprus in November 1967 and 
negotiate the release of the USS Pueblo after it had been captured by North Korea in January 
1968.117 When President Johnson announced in March 1968 that the U.S. would begin 
ceasefire negotiations and peace talks with North Vietnam, he appointed Vance as deputy to 
chief negotiator of the American delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, W. Averill 
Harriman.118 Having witnessed the misguided use of force at both home and abroad, the 
experience of Paris and others convinced Vance of the merits of patient negotiation and 
meditation to resolve disputes. 
In the years after he left government, he spent time re-defining his worldview. He 
came to believe that the United States had become too narrowly focused on the Cold War 
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conflict with the Soviet Union. U.S. foreign policy, he argued, needed to adapt to the 
changing world with a greater appreciation of the complexities in the developing world and 
focus on promoting democratic causes and human suffrage. As a result, he sought new 
avenues to promote his newfound philosophy. With its emphasis on increased co-operation 
and dialogue between the U.S., Europe and Japan, Vance decided to join the Trilateral 
Commission in 1975.119 
During this time, he encountered Jimmy Carter, who he first met in 1971. Vance 
records in his memoir that he and Carter only met on several occasions and the pair were no 
more than ‘casual acquaintances.’ But like Carter, he wanted to restore a sense of morality in 
U.S. foreign policy. As he noted, ‘a nation that saw itself as a ‘beacon on the hill’ for the rest 
of mankind could not content itself with power politics alone.’ The U.S. needed to embrace 
a new approach to international affairs that emphasised values as well as the need for co-
operation to resolve issues across the world.120 He later said of Carter, ‘my first impression 
was that here is a man that I liked, a man I could do business with, and a man whom I would 
like to work for’ and he decided to support his campaign.121 
Vance’s decision to join Carter’s advisory team, brought him into regular contact 
with Brzezinski. Although they had both been members of the Council on Foreign Relations 
as well as the Trilateral Commission, the pair did not know each other well.122 Carter’s 
advisory team consisted of a range of individuals from the foreign policy establishment, 
such as veterans W. Averell Harriman and Paul Nitze and future colleagues Harold Brown 
and Paul Warnke.123 Despite the variety of individuals within the group, Vance acted only 
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‘as one of many advisors’ in donating policy papers, memos and articles to Carter but never 
enjoyed the same level of influence as Brzezinski.124 
When Brzezinski and Carter discussed potential appointments, the president-elect 
expressed a desire for a ‘secure and strong’ individual as secretary of state. For the position, 
they considered three candidates, Vance, former Under Secretary of State and UN 
Ambassador George Ball and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke. All three 
had contributed to the campaign but also had considerable experience as former members of 
the Johnson administration. When Carter and Brzezinski met to discuss the frontrunners, 
they quickly dismissed Warnke, deemed ‘too soft’ on the Soviet Union.125 Carter indicated a 
preference for Ball because he had, ‘spoken up when nobody else in government did about 
what was wrong with the Vietnam War' and ‘had the courage to question aspects of 
America's attachment to Israel.’126 
Brzezinski however argued against Ball. His comments on Israel made him a 
controversial choice, as he had criticised their conduct in the Middle East and encouraged 
their withdrawal from territories occupied since the 1967 war. His position enraged 
supporters of Israel in the U.S., who petitioned against his appointment as secretary of state 
after he was linked to the post. Brzezinski also saw him as an active secretary of state whose 
participation in the policy process would ultimately lead to friction with himself. His 
abrasive style sharply contrasted with the more manageable Vance.127 They both saw the 
potential to work effectively with Vance as part of a team as opposed to the other main 
contenders for the post. To Brzezinski and Carter, his patient, methodical approach coupled 
with his prior experience and skills as a diplomatic negotiator made Vance an attractive 
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alternative whose nomination, unlike Ball or Warnke’s, would be well received at both home 
and abroad.128 
Carter invited Vance to Plains, Georgia, where the pair discussed a range of foreign 
policy issues. They shared many of the same views and priorities for U.S. foreign policy 
regarding relations with the Soviet Union, a new arms limitation deal, human rights, 
democratic advancement in the developing world, an Arab-Israeli peace accord, 
normalisation of relations with China and a peaceful transfer of the Panama Canal. 
Moreover, they held similar philosophies regarding the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. 
Vance’s experiences of government had radically altered his worldview, as he de-
emphasised the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union and urged greater co-operation on 
other international issues. The Vietnam War as well as other conflicts, convinced him, as 
they did Carter, of the need to restore morality in the practice of U.S. foreign policy. Both, 
agreed that the new administration’s approach to international affairs ought to be based on 
compassion with a special emphasis on diplomatic, peaceful negotiation and a principled 
agenda. Later that evening Carter asked Vance to be his secretary of state and he duly 
accepted.129 
Conclusion 
During their discussions in Plains, Carter told Vance that he intended to appoint Brzezinski 
to the post of national security advisor. Vance did not object. He later reflected, ‘I felt I did 
not know Zbig sufficiently well to be able to say to him, “this obviously cannot work”.’130 
But while they shared the same priorities, their divergent perspectives set them apart. In their 
early careers, both Vance and Brzezinski shared the view that the overriding priority of U.S. 
foreign policy was the containment of communism and Soviet, Cuban and Chinese 
expansionism. While Brzezinski never wavered from his strong anti-communist and Soviet 
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beliefs, Vance’s views shifted as a result of foreign policy crises in the 1960s, particularly 
the Vietnam War. His interpretation of the conflict as an East-West battle to prevent the 
spread of communism in Southeast Asia, mirrored that of many Americans, but his exposure 
to events as deputy secretary of defense forced him to question that outlook. Witnessing the 
heavy American losses, the tactics of the North Vietnamese and the failure of the Western 
institutions in South Vietnam, he re-evaluated his perspectives. Vance believed the U.S. had 
misread North Vietnamese motivations, which contributed to their inability to combat the 
enemy. Moreover, the American attempts to install a western style system on a nation by 
force, was erroneous. Vance concluded that Western intervention needed to be limited and 
more nuanced. It required an appreciation of cultural and regional differences to facilitate 
peaceful solutions.  
The conflict in Southeast Asia as well as American intervention in Africa and South 
America had led to considerable bloodshed and harm, which had created a negative image of 
the U.S. His experience of erroneous foreign policy objectives and the misguided use of 
force at home, convinced Vance of the need to use restraint to resolve crises, while his 
employment as a diplomatic envoy underscored the importance of mediation and diplomatic 
negotiation to achieve peace. Like Carter, he believed that by implementing a strategy that 
acknowledged the growing sense of interdependence in the developing world, the U.S. could 
rebuild its image as a ‘beacon on the hill’ for the rest of the world.131    
Like Vance, Brzezinski did re-consider his worldview and priorities for U.S. foreign 
policy. He also appreciated changes in the developing world and believed the U.S. could 
work with its international partners to embrace socio-economic and geopolitical shifts across 
the globe. It was this underlying belief that led to the creation of the Trilateral Commission. 
However, Brzezinski never wavered from his deep-rooted belief that the central objective to 
U.S. foreign policy was to challenge Soviet expansionism and throughout his career he 
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underlined the importance of American strength to counter that threat. His view of the 
Vietnam War as a just reaction to prevent the spread of communism never changed. He 
spoke out against détente and condemned attempts by Nixon, Ford and Kissinger to harbour 
good relations with the Soviet Union in the 1970s.  
By the time Vance and Brzezinski were appointed to serve in the Carter 
administration, their divergent outlooks and approaches to American foreign policy were 
evident. Vance, the patient diplomat underscored the importance of limited U.S. intervention 
in regional crises and diplomatic mediation and the need for the United States to act as a 
force for good to rebuild their reputation in the developing world. While he still considered 
their Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union, to be a significant threat, he believed they 
should avoid allowing the conflict to be the primary focus of their foreign policy objectives. 
Brzezinski’s deep, philosophical, revulsion of communism and the actions of the Soviet 
Union motivated his outlook on U.S. foreign policy. While he shared Vance and Carter’s 
view that the United States should devote time to building relationships and harnessing 
changes in the developing world, he believed it a necessary tool in the East-West struggle. 
Furthermore, he did not rule out the use of American military power to achieve their goals in 
the international arena. Their divergent outlooks marked Vance and Brzezinski apart from 
one another and as time progressed, their philosophical differences became magnified as the 
administration attempted to develop policies and react to crises across the world. 
Carter meanwhile appreciated the outlooks of both men. As he had no fixed 
ideology of his own, he found support through the Trilateral Commission, which he 
described as ‘classes in foreign policy.’ It provided him with the necessary knowledge and 
expertise to help formulate his positions during the campaign and beyond.132 After his 
victory, he appointed a number of members of the commission to his administration but 
unlike many of those who served, Brzezinski supported Carter’s campaign from its infancy 
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and devoted considerable time, energy and expertise into his successful run to the White 
House. He played a critical role in formulating policy throughout while his advice to Carter 
on the eve of the critical foreign policy debate against Ford, swung the election in his favour. 
Furthermore, they developed a close personal rapport as Carter trusted the Polish academic 
to provide him with the knowledge that would aide decision-making. 
Vance played only a minor role in Carter’s ascent to the presidency and did not 
cultivate a close relationship with him. Even after his appointment as secretary of state, he 
recalled a sense of ‘growing rapport’ with the president-elect but also confessed, ‘I cannot 
claim that any special bond of closeness sprang up between us.’133 Carter valued his input 
but while they shared the same philosophy regarding the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, he 
brought Vance into the administration because he saw him as a safe pair of hands who 
would faithfully implement the policies and approaches of the administration’s foreign 
policy.  
Vance did not protest the appointment of Brzezinski to the administration. Although 
he held doubts about his ability to work with the national security advisor, he recognised that 
the president wished him to serve in that position. He later noted that, ‘he would not have 
been and was not my first choice, but he was clearly the president’s first choice.’134 But their 
contrasting relationships and standing with Carter also influenced their position upon 
entering the government in January 1977. Unbeknown to Vance, Carter intended to use 
Brzezinski in an active and assertive role and he handed him a pre-eminent position in the 
administration, that reduced the secretary of state’s ability to influence the foreign policy 
agenda.  
This duly affected the balance of the administration, with Brzezinski as the chief 
architect of foreign policy. When the president-elect formalised the decision-making 
structure within the administration, it handed a considerable bureaucratic advantage to the 
                                                          
133 Vance, Hard Choices, 33. 
134 Vance, “Carter’s Foreign Policy,” 142. 
85 
 
national security advisor and set in motion the struggles between Vance and Brzezinski that 
became a defining feature of the Carter presidency. Coupled with their divergent ideologies 
and differing status in the eyes of Carter, it precipitated the conflict between the president’s 
advisors. As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown later remarked, ‘they were at sword’s point 
from day one.’135 
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Chapter Two 
The Decision-Making Structure: ‘A Recipe for Struggles.’ 
When the Carter administration entered office on 20 January, 1977, speculation within 
newspaper reports suggested the president’s two chief foreign policy advisors, Vance and 
Brzezinski were on course to clash with one another. A few days prior to Carter’s 
inauguration, Bernard Gwertzman wrote, ‘the common belief among those who watch 
foreign affairs closely in Washington is that because he is dynamic and wide ranging Mr 
Brzezinski will eventually begin to encroach on Cyrus R. Vance’s preserve as Mr Carter’s 
No. 1 foreign policy advisor.’1 Victor Zorza speculated that Brzezinski would ‘out Kissinger 
Kissinger’ in a repeat of the former national security advisor’s conduct toward former 
Secretary of State William Rogers who he regularly undermined and outmanoeuvred. Zorza 
even suggested Brzezinski could succeed Vance and move to the State Department, like 
Kissinger, if Carter won a second term in office.2 Brzezinski meanwhile sought to play down 
any potential conflict between the two, as Murray Marder noted, ‘no other office in the 
Carter administration is being established with comparable declarations about what it will 
not do.’3 The Boston Globe meanwhile suggested that, ‘a sense of competition could develop 
simply by their presence in the administration.’4 
The potential for conflict between Carter’s two principal advisors arose on 
inauguration day when Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown viewed the new 
foreign policy apparatus. This chapter investigates how the bureaucratic arrangements within 
the administration aggravated the conflict between Vance and Brzezinski, looking 
specifically at the decision-making structure drawn up on the eve of Carter’s inauguration. 
The system handed a considerable bureaucratic advantage to Brzezinski and the NSC, while 
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Vance and the State Department’s ability to affect the foreign policy process was severely 
weakened. 
Other factors hindered Vance and his department’s efforts to counter the pre-
eminent position of Brzezinski and the NSC. Constraints on the secretary’s time prevented 
him from fully engaging in the policy process while his disinclination towards developing 
strategies and effectively communicate the administration’s position and policies with the 
press did not endear him to Carter. All the while, Brzezinski proved himself adept at 
providing the president with the advice and assistance he craved, as he increased his 
influence over the foreign policy agenda. He continued to fashion a close personal and 
working relationship with Carter but he also utilised a range of bureaucratic tools to exert 
considerable power within the administration to solidify his position as the president’s chief 
foreign policy advisor.  
Moreover, the perceived ineffectiveness of the State Department bureaucracy to 
develop ideas and strategies contrasted with the NSC, whose streamlined hierarchical 
structure, provided the president with a range of options to aide policy development. This 
further enhanced Brzezinski and the NSC’s reputation within the Carter administration. 
Coupled with their competing ideologies and differing interpretations of their roles, the 
organisation of the foreign policy process only served to exacerbate disagreements between 
Vance and Brzezinski and fuelled the sense of competition between them and their 
departments. As this chapter illustrates, the bureaucratic wars that engulfed the Carter 
administration developed from day one.  
A Strong President Assisted by a Dominant White House? 
During the Nixon years, presidential decision-making became highly centralised as the White 
House dominated both domestic and foreign policy. Three key players wielded considerable 
power and influence within the Nixon White House over the development and 
implementation of strategies, Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, Domestic Affairs advisor John 
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Ehrlichman and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. The combination of the three 
was a direct result of Nixon’s desire to ‘build a wall against unsolicited advice’ to formulate 
and dictate policy without interference.5 
When he entered office, Nixon had intended on decentralising policy development 
in relation to domestic affairs. However, motivated by a quest for solitude as well as a 
distrust of his ineffective cabinet and the federal bureaucracy, after only a year in office 
Nixon re-concentrated power within the White House.6 Central to this was his all-powerful 
Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, who controlled various aspects of the president’s agenda. 
Haldeman, a loyal ally of Nixon’s, was assigned the task of managing the president’s time 
and the flow of information to the Oval Office. Cabinet members and officials who wished 
to see the president, had to go through Haldeman, while memos and policy papers were 
screened by the chief of staff. Ultimately it was Haldeman’s decision as to what information 
could be passed on as he imposed Nixon’s will on the executive branch. The president 
frequently dictated his ideas to Haldeman, who in turn communicated his wishes to cabinet 
members and officials. As Nixon biographer Richard Reeves noted, ‘Haldeman memos were 
the president’s preferred medium of communication.’ He also took on the tasks Nixon did 
not want to undertake such as disciplining and firing officials, which led Haldeman to quip, 
‘every president needs a son of a bitch, and I’m Nixon’s.’7  
In terms of domestic policy, John Ehrlichman was appointed chair of the Domestic 
Council, where he controlled and co-ordinated the policy process from the White House in 
co-ordination with Haldeman.8 Foreign policy meanwhile fell exclusively under the domain 
of Kissinger, who played a major role in the development and implementation of foreign 
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policy at the expense of the State Department and Secretary of State William Rogers. When 
he came into office in 1969 Nixon saw himself as a foreign policy president and distrustful 
of interfering bureaucracies, wanted to control foreign policy from the White House. During 
the transition period, he summoned Kissinger, who had provided occasional advice and 
support to his campaign, to discuss how his administration would operate. Both Kissinger 
and Nixon agreed upon centralising policy and strengthening the power of the NSC to 
restrict the influence of the Departments of State and Defense. To this end, Nixon appointed 
Kissinger as his national security advisor and instructed him to devise a system that would 
guarantee control over the foreign policy process.9  
With the aid of advisor Morton Halperin, Kissinger devised, and Nixon agreed to, 
the implementation of ‘The Reorganisation of the National Security Council’ document, 
which outlined the foreign policy process. The paper confirmed to cabinet members the 
centralisation of foreign policy within the White House and the pre-eminent status of the 
NSC to control and manage policy development.10 It gave Kissinger chairmanship of key 
NSC sub-committees to review medium to long term foreign policy objectives and handle 
crisis management, intelligence and defence issues.11 As chairman of those committees, he 
had the ability to set the agenda of deliberations and control discussions while their findings 
were delivered to Nixon by Kissinger. Coupled with the fact that ideas from other advisors 
had to go through him, the system allowed Kissinger to review what information and ideas 
were presented to the president, and which were not.12  
Working closely with the president from the oval office, the national security 
advisor exerted unparalleled authority over the design and execution of foreign policy and 
effectively stripped other departments of influence.13 Although they never cultivated a close 
personal friendship, and at times relations became fractious, Kissinger, like Haldeman and 
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Ehrlichman, shielded Nixon from unwanted advice and provided him with the support and 
ideas the president required to make decisions. Moreover, with a lack of access to Nixon and 
membership of key committees restricted to lower-level officials and deputy secretaries, 
officials had few avenues to affect policy. With Nixon and Kissinger formulating strategies 
in the White House, NSC meetings, the only forum for Rogers and Secretary of Defense 
Melvin Laird to present their views, became a formality. As one former official noted ‘it was 
a very clever way of keeping the secretaries from participating in the decision-making 
process until it reached the National Security Council, by which time the president had 
pretty well made up his mind.’ Moreover, as time progressed, Nixon ordered a reduction in 
the number of NSC meetings and told Haldeman that he would ‘make decisions privately 
with K (Kissinger).’14  
In 1973, Kissinger’s dominance over the foreign policy process was confirmed when 
he replaced Rogers as secretary of state, combining the role with the position of national 
security advisor.15 This coincided with the downfall of the Nixon administration due to the 
Watergate scandal. Haldeman and Ehrlichman both resigned from the administration in 1973 
and were later convicted for their actions while Nixon faced an futile fight to save his 
presidency. 16 The Watergate scandal and Nixon’s resignation in 1974 brought to light the 
excessive concentration and abuse of power at the heart of the White House and led to a 
collapse in public trust of government and its institutions.17 It was in this atmosphere that 
Gerald Ford made a concerted effort to move away from the Nixon style and restore 
confidence in the U.S. government. To do this, Ford vowed to restore cabinet government as 
a means of differentiating himself from Nixon and creating a sense that his administration 
was open, honest and transparent. Moreover, Ford and his transition team believed 
Watergate had partly been the result of an overly assertive chief of staff and White House 
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aides who isolated the president and excluded cabinet members from the policy process.18 
Ford opted for a system that encouraged cabinet members and advisors to come to him 
directly with their ideas rather than navigate through a chief of staff, which reflected a 
‘spokes of the wheel’ concept he had utilised as House minority leader. It would allow 
officials to have unrestricted access Ford to formulate and present their ideas and 
strategies.19   
However, the system quickly developed into a tug a tug of war for the president’s 
favour. At the heart of the infighting was, Robert T. Hartmann, a close friend and aide of 
Ford’s, who attempted to control the president’s affairs and direct the administration’s 
agenda. This brought him into conflict with Nixon holdover, Chief of Staff Alexander 
Haig.20 Hartman considered himself an able ally of the president as opposed to the power-
hungry chief of staff, leading the former to remark, ‘fuck Haig. I work for the president.’ 
When Ford replaced Haig shortly after becoming president, his replacement Donald 
Rumsfeld, similarly ambitious with presidential aspirations, was viewed with suspicion by 
cabinet members and officials. Hartman disliked Rumsfeld as much as Haig and frequently 
challenged his influence over the president as the infighting became public knowledge.21 
Cabinet members, initially energised by Ford’s pledge to restore their authority 
became exasperated by the lack of direction from the White House emanating from the 
conflicts between the president’s advisors. Many began developing their own policies and 
initiatives with little or no consultation with the White House or the president.22 Secretary of 
State Kissinger meanwhile was asked by Ford to relinquish the role of national security 
advisor but his dominance over foreign policy continued. His replacement Brent Scowcroft, 
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who had served as Kissinger’s deputy, was a collegial and co-operative influence within the 
administration, which instilled an element of continuity in the foreign policy process.23  
Like many Americans, Jimmy Carter was shocked by the Watergate scandal and the 
conduct of the Nixon administration, which he dubbed ‘the imperial presidency’ with 
decisions made ‘from an ivory tower.’24 He recognised the difficulties caused by 
overassertive advisors and vowed to create a more open government with cabinet members 
and advisors having unrestricted channels to him. He wanted them to deal directly with him, 
evoking the ‘spokes of the wheel’ concept that Ford had adopted upon becoming president.25 
Carter believed, as Ford had, that the system would prevent individuals from wielding 
considerable influence within the White House and at the same time give cabinet members 
and officials an unobstructed avenue to advance their views. To this end, he decided against 
appointing a chief of staff. As close advisor Hamilton Jordan noted, he was signalling a clear 
break from the previous administrations and remarked, ‘I don’t think you’ll have a 
Haldeman or Ehrlichman in the Carter administration.’26   
The system also satisfied Carter’s intellectual desire to have advice and information 
provided to him whereby he could methodically study and analyse issues. His cabinet 
members and advisors were therefore encouraged to submit their opinions directly to him, 
while the president intended to use the cabinet as a forum to test his own ideas.27 But others 
cautioned against his general approach, arguing that it created the potential for difficulties 
with advisors exploiting the system to advance their ideas and agenda. Ford’s final Chief of 
Staff Richard ‘Dick’ Cheney called upon on his own experience and warned members of 
Carter’s transition team, that the system the president-elect wished to adopt, was 
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unworkable.28 The concept may have presented cabinet members and officials the 
opportunity to lobby directly to influence policy but without an effective structure it would 
allow bureaucratic politics and power battles to fester and divert the president’s time and 
attention. When Cheney left his post, he gave Hamilton Jordan, Carter’s close advisor, a 
note that read ‘Dear Ham, beware the spokes of the wheel.’29  
The structure also applied to the practice of foreign affairs where it presented 
potential difficulties for the administration. Kissinger’s unprecedented control drew 
considerable criticism, not least from Carter who, during the election campaign, criticised 
his ‘lone ranger’ style and undue influence within the White House. Carter wanted to avoid 
the situation that developed under Nixon and Ford and did not want an overly assertive 
advisor dominating foreign policy.30 However, given his inexperience and lack of 
knowledge on foreign affairs, he needed to develop a system that gave him on the job tuition 
on the issues of the day and provide him with the necessary details to inform decisions, 
ultimately allowing him to ‘be the one who pulled the pieces together.’31 When he and 
Brzezinski discussed the setup of the administration as well as the style of decision-making 
the president wished to adopt, they embraced the system adopted by President Kennedy, 
‘with a relatively secure and strong secretary of state (Rusk)’ augmented by ‘an equally 
confident and energetic White House (Bundy).’32 
Given that they had cultivated a close personal and working relationship, Brzezinski 
craved a position that gave him the ability to co-ordinate foreign policy with the president 
and he coveted the position of national security advisor. He later commented, ‘it was the key 
job. It involved the integration of the top inputs from State, Defense, and CIA.’ As Carter 
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wanted to have full control over foreign affairs to design and implement decisions directly 
from the White House this placed extra emphasis on the role. ‘Above all’ he noted, ‘it meant 
that you were close to a president whom I knew would be an activist. And, therefore, being 
close to him and working with him was centrally important.’33 Moreover, Carter’s 
preference for a ‘secure and strong’ secretary of state, led to Vance’s appointment. His 
experience and diplomatic expertise coupled with his co-operative nature made him a 
suitable alternative to other contenders for the post. While Brzezinski developed policies and 
strategies for the president in the White House to choose from, Vance would faithfully 
execute the administration’s foreign policy. As Carter’s advisor and future Chief of Staff 
Hamilton Jordan surmised, ‘Zbig would be the thinker, Cy would be the doer, and Jimmy 
Carter would be the decider.’34  
Brzezinski however suspected that the president-elect perhaps favoured a 
Nixon/Kissinger model with a, ‘strong president (Nixon) assisted by a dominant White 
House (Kissinger)’ aiding the development of policy and helping the president come to a 
decision. Given that Carter had criticised the way Kissinger operated during the Nixon/Ford 
years, Brzezinski believed, ‘he would find it awkward to admit it.’35 Vance meanwhile, not 
privy to discussions on the makeup of the administration, told Carter ‘the policy leadership 
role should be assigned to the secretary of state.’ Whilst he did not object to Brzezinski’s 
appointment, he believed that he should be the president’s key foreign policy advisor but 
because Carter wished to be actively involved in the decision-making process, the 
centralisation of foreign policy was inevitable.36 Even Brzezinski later recalled, if a president 
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desires to be closely involved in the finite details of policy development, then the national 
security advisor is an obvious ‘bureaucratic beneficiary.’37  
The formalisation of the decision-making process confirmed Brzezinski’s analysis. 
While Carter expressed a desire to move away from the style of the Nixon years, the 
formalised system the president settled on reflected a structure that centralised foreign policy 
within the White House and placed considerable influence in the hands of his national 
security advisor. Tellingly, it was Brzezinski who, like Kissinger, had been appointed to the 
administration before the secretary of state and who the president tasked with designing the 
foreign policy decision-making structure.  
Presidential Directive Two (PD/NSC-2) 
As Carter prepared to enter office, he asked Brzezinski to design a new formal process for 
foreign policy decision-making. Brzezinski, in conjunction with his deputy David Aaron and 
assistant Karl Inderfurth, set about creating a simpler and more effective NSC system that 
reflected the president’s desire to receive a range of alternatives before he made an informed 
decision. The original system drawn up by Brzezinski and Aaron consisted of seven 
interagency committees with the national security advisor chairing at least three, relating to 
covert operations, arms control and crisis management with the other four committees 
chaired by the secretaries of state, defense, treasury and the CIA.38 Carter criticised the 
system as too convoluted and retorted to Brzezinski in a memo, ‘Zbig, I prefer a more 
drastic change…please drive for maximum simplicity.’39 At that point, Carter and 
Brzezinski worked together and devised a simpler policy making mechanism and presented 
a scaled down version of what had originally been proposed at a pre-inauguration meeting in 
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Georgia. It would be a simpler system but it handed a significant bureaucratic advantage to 
Brzezinski over Vance. 
 The new NSC system, outlined in Presidential Directive Two (PD/NSC-2) created 
two foreign policy making committees, the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special 
Coordination Committee (SCC). When the NSC identified a policy issue to evaluate, they 
issued a Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) to investigate. Depending on the subject 
matter, the assignment fell under the domain of either the PRC or the SCC. Once both 
committees finalised their studies, they submitted their findings for discussion, which later 
formed the basis of a presidential directive. The PRC dealt with specific, long-term foreign 
policy and defence issues with the committee chaired by whoever was deemed responsible 
for the item of discussion. Usually, either Vance, Harold Brown or Stansfield Turner, the 
Director of the CIA (DCIA).40 However, it was at Brzezinski and Carter’s discretion as to 
which topic was assigned to the PRC or SCC, who chaired the review and who the attendees 
would be. They could also reassign a topic to the SCC if they so wished.41 
The SCC handled more immediate foreign policy and defence issues, specifically 
the three core issues that Brzezinski wanted to control when he put forward his initial to 
design: handling sensitive intelligence, arms control and crisis management.42 While the 
PRC oversaw issues that fell under the domain of the departments of State, Defense, or the 
CIA, the SCC dealt with ‘cross cutting’ issues that required the input of various departments. 
While the subject matter determined who chaired PRC meetings, Brzezinski permanently 
presided over meetings of the SCC. The national security advisor viewed his role as a 
‘natural arbiter’ between department heads to prevent competition between for control of 
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certain issues but his appointment as chair of the SCC put him in an unprecedented 
position.43 
By overseeing crisis management Brzezinski placed himself at the heart of 
communications for dealing with crises. He reiterated that Carter’s desire to be closely 
involved with foreign policy issues and his proximity to the president meant that having him 
co-ordinate responses to crises was vital. He pointed to the fact that ‘essential 
communications’ were based within the White House, which made him ideally placed to 
help direct the administration’s strategy.44 Furthermore, what constituted a crisis depended 
on the interpretation of those within the White House, specifically the president and 
Brzezinski.45 
As chair of the SCC, Brzezinski provided a record of their meetings to the president 
but he did not circulate his summaries to other members of the committee beforehand. The 
reports, based on the national security advisor’s own notes, provided an analysis of the issue 
and the debates that took place. The debriefs thus reflected his own interpretation of 
discussions and if the committee failed to reach a satisfactory conclusion then Brzezinski 
sent a summary with his own recommendations. The PRC’s studies also filtered through his 
office before they made their way to the president, with a covering memo that contained his 
own assessment of the group’s work.46  
Moreover, while the PRC contained representatives from across the executive 
branch, PD/NSC-2 restricted membership of the SCC to the principal departmental heads or 
their deputies. Who participated below the principals was at the discretion of the SCC’s 
chair, Brzezinski. As such, lower-level officials who disagreed with the national security 
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advisor found themselves excluded from discussions.47 Consequently, Brzezinski could 
control proceedings, determine who attended and deliver his findings to the president. It 
allowed him to shape the debate and advance his own ideas and approaches without 
overwhelming resistance. 
Brzezinski also handed his own department and staff considerable influence within 
the process. His deputy David Aaron chaired a sub-committee of the SCC known as the 
‘mini SCC’ composed of NSC staffers, undersecretaries and deputies who assisted the main 
group’s body of work.48 The PRC similarly received support from lower-level officials 
across the executive branch but the NSC laid the foundations for the committee’s reviews. It 
was Brzezinski’s staff who undertook prior research and provided briefing books, papers and 
articles that formed the basis of discussions. Additionally, NSC staffers assumed the role of 
drafting agendas while a representative from Brzezinski’s department acted as note taker 
during deliberations, recorded the minutes of the meeting and provided a summary. 
Afterwards, they assumed responsibility for dissecting the committee’s conclusions and 
drafting a PRM to Brzezinski.49 
Figure 1: Carter Administration NSC Decision-Making Process 
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Brzezinski claimed that he acted merely as Carter’s ‘surrogate’ and in accordance 
with the president’s wish for a system that provided him with quick advice and policies.50 
However, the system he helped design handed him a significant bureaucratic advantage 
within the administration. As he said in his own words, the creation of the SCC gave him 
opportunity ‘to shape the agenda’ and ‘influence the outcome of our deliberations.’ 
Moreover, Brzezinski recognised the implications of the system on his role. He wrote in his 
journal, ‘this will enable me on my return to Washington to draft or actually redraft my 
proposals on the NSC, to send them down for his (Carter’s) approval, and thereby establish 
the basis for a system that I can use effectively.’51 However, the power assigned to him 
through PD/NSC-2 gave him significant control of the policy process and the ability to 
influence the president and affect the course and nature of the administration’s agenda. It 
also proved to be highly significant in the bureaucratic wars between himself, Vance and the 
State Department. 
Vance vs Brzezinski 
The announcement of the system agitated Vance, disappointed by the lack of consultation 
before Carter signed off it but also concerned about the distribution of power within the 
structure. Because Brzezinski held the authority to interpret discussions at SCC meetings 
and feedback recommendations without prior consultation, Vance felt he exerted too much 
influence over the outcome of deliberations. He took issue with the national security 
advisor’s chairmanship of two of the three responsibilities assigned to him, crisis 
management and arms control, two critical issues for the administration. In his memoirs, he 
bemoaned what he believed to be inaccurate and misleading summaries provided by 
Brzezinski and he expressed regret at not raising objections further with Carter. Vance 
believed however that given Carter’s endorsement of the system, he did not have the 
authority to question his judgement and reluctantly accepted the structure.52 Nevertheless, he 
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interpreted the system as an elevation of Brzezinski and the NSC’s power and influence 
within the administration while it also weakened his and his department’s ability to affect 
the foreign policy agenda. 
The system also created the potential for bureaucratic politics to develop within the 
administration. The appointments of Vance and Brzezinski as well as Secretary of Defense 
Harold Brown were a testament to Carter’s desire to have experienced personalities in his 
administration providing him with expert guidance.53 However the balance between being 
the decision maker but also receiving wide ranging and diverse advice from a team of 
advisors proved to be a precarious one for the president, particularly given the warnings in 
the press about the potential for conflict between Vance and Brzezinski. While conscious of 
the risk of clashes between the two men, Carter did not condemn their differences. He 
believed divergent opinions within his administration created an opportunity for honest and 
frank discussions between key officials, which enabled him to incorporate elements of their 
advice into his final decision.54  
For the system to be successful it needed to rely on collegiality between the key 
advisors. In the early days of the administration both Vance and Brzezinski resolved to work 
together with one another and were optimistic about the future. The national security advisor 
commented in his journal, ‘my relationship with Vance so far is excellent. He is a gentleman 
and both of us have been leaning over backwards to be accommodating.’55 Vance meanwhile 
maintained that if he were able to present his views to the president on a regular basis, he 
could overcome any difficulties he may encounter with Brzezinski. ‘As long as I can debate 
my views, I have no problem at all’ he said at the time.56 
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However, a further problem lay in the fact that neither was content with their 
respective roles. Although Brzezinski frequently rejected comparisons with Kissinger, he 
held a quiet admiration for the way he operated during both the Nixon and Ford 
administrations.57 Vance, while protective of the State Department, considered the position 
of secretary of state to be the president’s top foreign policy advisor. He wrote to Carter prior 
to the election in October 1976 and advised that that the ‘policy leadership role should be 
assigned to the secretary of state.’ Whilst he did not raise any objections to the role of the 
national security advisor and his staff, he stressed his belief that the secretary of state and his 
agency should be the key architects of the administration’s foreign policy. He told Carter, ‘I 
personally favour the option that would assign to the State Department a pre-eminent role.’58 
He regarded the role of national security advisor as merely a co-ordinator of foreign policy, 
not responsible for designing and implementing policies as this was under the domain of the 
president and the secretary of state.59 Despite the disadvantage afforded to Vance by the 
design of the NSC system, The Boston Globe pointed out, unlike William Rogers, he was 
‘unlikely to defer to anyone but the president, and he is unlikely to be forced into a spear-
carrying role by Carter.’60 
Vance gave Carter his word that he and Brzezinski could work together and after 
PD/NSC-2 had been signed off he met with both separately to iron out any issues and seek 
assurances regarding his role within the administration. He extracted several concessions 
from Carter, which initially placated him. Firstly, he received a guarantee that he acted as 
foreign policy spokesperson for the administration and the national security advisor was 
warned not to make any public statements unless instructed to do so. Secondly, while Vance 
had no objection to the president receiving advice from Brzezinski, he wanted to have the 
ability to present his own views to Carter on a regular basis without interference from 
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Brzezinski.61 That meant his paper trail would not flow through Brzezinski’s office in the 
same way it had done when Kissinger occupied the position of national security advisor and 
edited or outright stopped papers from Secretary of State Rogers reaching Nixon’s desk. 
Vance’s direct communications would bypass Brzezinski and not have any form of cover 
memo attached. Thirdly, although Carter did not want the SCC and PRC summaries 
distributed prior to being released to prevent leaks, he granted Vance the ability to review 
the findings in draft and return his thoughts before the president signed them off.62 
Although grateful to receive the assurances he asked for, some of the compromises 
Vance extracted from Carter and Brzezinski became difficult to uphold. As secretary of 
state, Vance’s schedule was significantly greater than the national security advisor’s. His 
position as the president’s chief diplomat required him to travel the globe and meet with 
foreign dignitaries on a regular basis, which meant that he spent a considerable amount of 
time away from Washington. By the end of 1977, Vance had made over forty foreign visits 
to various nations across the world.63 Overall, during his time in the administration, he spent 
at least 18% of his time (223 days) on diplomatic trips.64  
While this boosted Vance’s credentials within the administration and abroad, 
particularly over his handling of negotiations between Egypt and Israel, it did present 
problems at other times. Spending as much time abroad meant that it became difficult for 
Vance to provide feedback on the draft summaries of SCC meetings. While he had the 
ability to review and refute the reports of their deliberations, given the pressures on his time, 
this proved to be a difficult task to regularly undertake.65 Furthermore, the secretary of state, 
unlike the national security advisor, was required to testify regularly before Congress. As 
Brzezinski himself acknowledged, by not having to appear before various congressional 
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committees or even go through a confirmation hearing, he did not have significant constrains 
in the same way Vance did.66   
The heavy burden on his time ultimately prevented him from meeting with the 
president on a consistent basis to discuss foreign policy matters.67 In the first year of the 
administration Vance met infrequently with Carter and rarely on an individual basis and 
while they spoke on the telephone from time to time, calls typically only lasted several 
minutes.68 Brzezinski on the other hand met and spoke with Carter several times a day as his 
access to the president was much greater. The simple fact that his office was based in the 
White House afforded Brzezinski the opportunity to meet with Carter regularly. He later 
recalled that, in addition to his daily briefing, which became his first daily appointment, he 
would typically be in direct contact with the president around four or five times a day. 
Moreover, given the informality of their relationship, he was one of a few select individuals 
who visited the president in his office unannounced or even interrupted meetings if 
necessary.69 Vance meanwhile did not have the luxury of being able to access the president 
when he wanted in the manner that Brzezinski as his office was based across town, not down 
the corridor like the national security advisor’s.70 
An allegation made towards Brzezinski is that he utilised his close access to Carter, 
to advance or protect the strategies and advice he provided. For example, very few people 
met with the president without the national security advisor or someone from his staff 
present. During the Horn of Africa crisis, W. Averill Harriman complained that Brzezinski’s 
presence in his meeting with Carter prevented him from giving an honest analysis of the 
situation.71 Donald McHenry, who replaced Andrew Young as UN Ambassador in 
September 1979, had a similar experience. Upon meeting the president for the first time, he 
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discovered Brzezinski’s deputy David Aaron waiting to attend the same meeting. ‘I said 
“Sorry David, I am seeing the president” and I had to kill that’ he recalled, ‘it was a 
Brzezinski effort and one of a number them that went on at the time.’72  
Bert Lance, who served as Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
Management, alleged that Brzezinski deliberately scheduled NSC meetings when he knew 
he was unavailable. The national security advisor relented when Lance confronted him.73 
Others saw their authority within the administration gradually reduced by Brzezinski. 
Stansfield Turner, accused the national security advisor of denying him access to the 
president by incorporating the DCIA’s daily ‘intelligence briefing’ into his own ‘national 
security briefing.’ According to Turner, ‘Brzezinski was very domineering…He wanted to 
be in control of every minute of the president’s time and all the flow of information to the 
president.’74 Those close to Brzezinski argue that he simply adhered to the president’s 
wishes. However, the fact that he held as much influence over who could or could not see 
Carter reflected the closeness in their relationship but also his authority within the 
administration.75 
In other areas, Vance struggled to assert himself, which ultimately benefited 
Brzezinski’s position. Although he requested to be the foreign policy spokesperson, he was 
uncomfortable with various aspects of this post, specifically dealing with the press. By the 
1970s, television played an increasingly important role in politics and the practise of foreign 
affairs, with the secretary of state required to face the cameras on a regular basis.76 Carter 
criticised the previous administration for operating under a cloud of secrecy and deception 
and he pledged that if elected he would encourage an open and honest foreign policy. This 
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meant greater public engagement via the media.77 Vance however did not enjoy facing the 
press on a regular basis. He believed that diplomatic negotiations should be conducted in 
private and bemoaned having to break away from talks to provide on or off the record 
updates to the press while he questioned the value of publicly revealing aspects of 
discussions. He told his staff, ‘god help me, reality is I am a negotiator, I'm a man who 
believes you do your best work behind the door.’78 
Moreover, his cautious diplomatic style and demeanour did not endear him to the 
press corps and his reluctance to say anything regarding negotiations frustrated them. ‘There 
was nothing very sexy for the press about Vance’ recalled his spokesperson Hodding Carter 
III.79 The president became frustrated with the secretary of state’s inability to communicate 
the administration’s policies. As Press Secretary Jody Powell recalled, ‘Vance was not 
inclined to be an aggressive salesman and advocate of foreign policy decisions…We had a 
lot of controversial foreign policy decisions over the course of the four years. He (Carter) 
felt the need for somebody to do that.’80 Brzezinski however proved himself more adept then 
the secretary of state at interacting with the press who became more receptive to him. He 
later argued as result of Vance’s reluctance to deal with the media, he assumed the role and 
responsibilities of press spokesperson more regularly. This led to chargers from officials in 
the State Department that he used the press and his relationship with journalists to advance 
his own position within the administration at the expense of Vance.81 
Brzezinski also set up a press office within his own department, headed by former 
Time magazine journalist Jerrold Schecter who worked closely with the White House Press 
team. The move to create such an office was indicative of Brzezinski’s desire to formulate 
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the administration’s policies and play a more assertive role with the press.82 Carter recalls 
that it was his decision to allow the national security advisor to speak with the press. ‘I 
never, with one or two exceptions, knew Zbig to promulgate an issue that was contrary to 
my basic policy’ he recalled. Nevertheless, the situation reflected the tension within the State 
Department and their concern about who articulated foreign policy on behalf of the 
administration. As Carter himself noted, ‘whenever Zbig went anywhere or said anything, it 
created tremors in the State Department.’83 
A related problem for Vance was that he was not considered to be a policymaker, 
even by his own staff. ‘He often denigrated policy as the language baloney’ reflected 
Assistant Secretary Leslie Gelb, and as such he was not willing to define administration 
policy in public.84 Brzezinski on the other hand, much more policy orientated, endeared 
himself to the president whose attraction to him rested on what he perceived to be his 
dynamic mind and strategic thinking. In his first press conference after his appointment, 
Brzezinski denied that he would act as a policy maker but merely a co-ordinator and 
answered questions on a range of issues. Vance meanwhile refused to answer any questions 
on policy when he was first introduced to the press.85 
Brzezinski’s ability to respond to issues of the day with ideas and strategies set him 
apart from Vance who did not ingratiate him to the president or indeed others within his 
inner circle. As William Quandt, who worked closely with both noted, ‘Brzezinski was an 
intellectual professor like Kissinger and he was quick and had ideas and could be all over the 
place. Vance was much more kind of an experienced bureaucrat lawyer’ who dealt on a 
case-by-case basis rather than setting out a clear strategy.86 Carter meanwhile reflected, ‘I 
was an eager student of Zbig’s and I enjoyed being around him…Zbig put together a 
                                                          
82 Prados, Keepers of the Keys, 388. 
83 Carter, “Jimmy Carter Presidential Oral History Project.” 
84 Gelb, Interview with the author. 
85 Prados, Keepers of the Keys, 388. 
86 William Quandt, Interview with the author, 5 June, 2015, Charlottesville, Virginia. 
107 
 
constant barrage of new ideas and suggestions and plans.’87 For a president, who wanted on 
the spot schooling in foreign affairs, Brzezinski became an attractive alternative to Vance.   
Despite the potential for conflict within the administration, the principals did make a 
concerted effort to create a harmonious environment through informal channels, like the 
weekly foreign policy breakfasts with Carter, Vance, Brzezinski and Vice-President Walter 
Mondale. Although initially held infrequently throughout 1977, by the following year they 
had become a regular occurrence with Carter aide Hamilton Jordan, who later became chief 
of staff, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown attending the breakfasts, which typically 
lasted between an hour or an hour and a half.88 The breakfasts allowed the participants to air 
their views, have open discussions and review short to long term objectives in an informal 
environment, unconstrained by their own bureaucracies. Vance himself preferred these 
gatherings as opposed to the SCC or PRC meetings, which he later described as often 
aimless or unproductive.89 Brzezinski viewed the system as a good means of having practical 
discussions on the administration’s goals and objectives where other avenues did not exist.90 
The restructuring of the NSC system elevated the position of national security 
advisor to cabinet level and gave Brzezinski the opportunity to sit in on meetings. But he 
later described them as ‘just awful’ and a ‘waste of time’ as they afforded no time to discuss 
foreign policy matters. However, the breakfasts provided a suitable forum to debate issues 
and strategize. Vance, Brzezinski and Brown also met the day before to confer on various 
topics and issues from the previous week. Although Carter discouraged an official agenda at 
the breakfasts, the Brown-Vance-Brzezinski meetings allowed the principals to meet and 
develop ideas prior to their meeting with the president.91  
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However, despite attempts to harness cordial relations between Vance and 
Brzezinski, the decision-making structure created the potential for conflict between the two. 
It elevated Brzezinski’s status in the administration and despite Vance’s best efforts to re-
assert his influence, he was hindered by several factors. While he resolved to challenge the 
authority of the national security advisor, Brzezinski used his position to consolidate his role 
as Carter’s chief foreign policy advisor. The close relationship they developed in the years 
prior to entering office allowed him to use a variety of bureaucratic tools to advance his own 
policies and approaches at the expense of Vance. This heightened the sense of competition 
between the national security advisor and the secretary of state, as both attempted to guide 
the administration’s foreign policy agenda. Moreover, the decision-making structure not 
only set in motion the struggles between the president’s advisor but it also extended the 
rivalry to their respective departments. 
The State Department and the NSC: An ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ Tussle 
During the Nixon administration, because of the president’s desire to control foreign policy 
within the confines of the White House as well as his distrust of the State Department, he 
effectively excluded the agency from the foreign policy process.92 When Vance entered his 
post, he wanted to restore the department’s preserve as the historical vehicle for foreign 
policy development and implementation and give the agency a ‘crystallised sense of 
mandate.’93 During his time serving in the agency in the 1960s, Brzezinski belittled the 
department’s inability to develop policy. He chastised them for a lack of innovation and 
accused ‘many higher State Department officials’ of ‘confusing policy making with the 
defence of orthodox policies.’ The lack of consultation from Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 
Under Secretary of State W. Averill Harriman and others made policy development an 
ineffective process, which created a stagnant bureaucracy. ‘The absence of a strong policy 
orientated leadership at the top’ Brzezinski wrote, ‘made it easier for assistant secretaries to 
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defend established regional policies and to evade the challenges to prevailing orthodoxies.’94 
He later said of the State Department, ‘large bureaucracies do not produce strategies - they 
produce shopping lists.’95 
As a result, he sought to enhance the role of his own department with respect to 
policy development. Not only was Brzezinski more adept at providing Carter the advice and 
expertise he wanted, his department also proved itself more compatible to the president’s 
wishes then the State Department. PD/NSC-2 handed significant power to his staff. The 
structure reflected Carter’s desire to have a range of options to choose from but also operate 
as a foreign policy think tank, developing dynamic ideas and strategies.96 As Brzezinski 
himself noted, ‘the president wishes me and my staff to help him play an innovative role… 
to try to look beyond the problems of the immediate and help him define a larger and more 
distant sense of direction.’97 
When appointed to his position, Brzezinski quickly assembled a highly sophisticated 
team of individuals within his department. Those appointed consisted of young academics 
who were specialists in their respective fields but also had ties to the foreign policy 
establishment.98 Their stature reflected the wishes of Brzezinski and Carter to have a wide 
range of expertise at their disposal. As Karl Inderfurth, who remained on the NSC staff as 
Brzezinski’s special assistant, commented, ‘there was no question that the National Security 
Council staff he put together were intended to be a high-powered NSC. You do not bring in 
people like Bill Quandt on the Mideast and (Michel) Oksenberg and (Michael) Armacost on 
Asia and experienced policy hands like (William) Hyland, (Reginald) Bartholomew and 
(David) Aaron without recognising that you have got a bunch thoroughbreds and they’re 
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going to want to run.’99 Journalist Richard Burt defined the NSC as a ‘floating seminar’ 
while Brzezinski noted years later, ‘it’s to some extent part of my intellectual tradition…I 
wanted a staff in which I had people to the left of me, to the right of me, as well as people 
sort of in the middle.’100 
Not only did Brzezinski assemble a team of experienced and dynamic individuals, 
he fitted them into a system that proved to be fast and effective when it came to policy 
development. His staff, considerably smaller than Vance’s, had no vast hierarchal structure 
to negotiate and the process was streamlined to allow easier communication to generate 
policy ideas. Brzezinski’s NSC was made up of three clusters, which contained four offices 
with two or three specialists. In one cluster, four offices covered Europe, the USSR and 
East-West relations, the Middle East, North-South issues and the Far East while in the 
second cluster four other departments covered subjects such as global affairs, international 
economics, security analysis and security planning. In the third cluster, the offices covered 
intelligence, press and congressional relations, special projects and freedom of 
information.101 
Because of the small number of staff and departments, the NSC structure operated in 
a much more fluid fashion unlike the process that existed within the State Department. 
Commenting on the system, NSC staffer Gary Sick, said, ‘the NSC was very flat. You had 
Brzezinski on top with Aaron under him as his deputy and then everyone else. So everybody 
was reporting directly to the boss. You weren’t going through two or three layers of 
bureaucracy.’102 The flexibility of the department benefitted the NSC staff and as Brzezinski 
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gave them free reign to develop their ideas and suggestions, it created a harmonious working 
environment that encouraged ‘spontaneity and creativity.’103 
Those like William Quandt, who worked on the NSC under Kissinger, appreciated 
the refreshing change in approach. ‘Kissinger barely knew who I was’ he recalled, ‘but with 
Brzezinski virtually every day I would have some kind of interaction with him either written 
or telephone or going to see him…He wouldn’t always agree but he would at least listen.’104 
As Marshall Brement, who worked within the USSR/Eastern Europe cluster, noted, this 
helped boost morale within the NSC staff, ‘the most frustrating thing that you can have as an 
employee in any bureaucracy is to keep dropping things with your boss and having the 
feeling they are going down a deep well, never getting read and never getting acted on.’105 
Moreover, their elevated status under Brzezinski, as well as his close relationship 
with Carter meant they had a direct and positive affect on foreign policy as a lot of the 
material forwarded often reached the president. ‘I was just one step away from having my 
words get in to the president’s inbox’ recalled Sick, ‘which is a very powerful 
position…from my point of view it was wonderful.’106 Housed in the Old Executive Office, 
next door to the White House, the NSC staff could communicate regularly with their boss 
due to their proximity.107 As Quandt observed, ‘back then either Gary (Sick) or I took an 
issue and we would walk across the street and drop it off...we had an immediacy of access to 
our principal who was Brzezinski and the next person up the line was the president.’108 
Having close access not just to Brzezinski but also to the president added a heightened sense 
of importance to the NSC staffers and their roles.  
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Brzezinski also became very popular with his staff. As a prodigious worker, he 
devoted considerable time to going over documents and policy papers forwarded onto him 
and met with his staff regularly to discuss their ideas. ‘He is a speed reader, and got through 
his inbox every day, so that you could send him a note and get an answer back the next day’ 
recalled Brement.109 In return, his staff appreciated the amount of time Brzezinski dedicated 
to consider their thoughts. As Robert Gates, his special assistant, remembered, ‘he 
(Brzezinski) treated people well and was approachable and friendly, had a good sense of 
humour.’110 
That was part of a deliberate tactic by Brzezinski to harbour good relations within 
his department and create a harmonious working environment but he also valued their input. 
‘He used the staff’ Gates noted, ‘he really depended on them and relied on them and I think 
the staff had real influence with him.’111 ‘He never introduced us as ‘staff’; we were his 
colleagues’ reflected Congressional Relations Officer Madeline Albright.112 As Brzezinski 
himself observed, ‘I wanted them to feel that they were the president’s elite…I wanted them 
to feel that they were partaking of the relationship. I would tell them anecdotes, accounts, 
my discussions with the president, the president’s mood, the president’s interests, the 
president’s policy preferences and in the four years I never had any indiscretion on the 
subject.’113 With an effective structure in place to develop ideas within a harmonious 
working environment, the NSC under Brzezinski grew in confidence while their stature 
increased. As Brement surmised, ‘you really had a feeling you were doing something when 
you were working on the staff.’114 
As a result, the bureaucratic structure of the NSC proved to be more efficient and 
effective then the system at the State Department. While Brzezinski’s department was 
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relatively small, Vance presided over a vast bureaucracy composed of thousands of 
employees in a convoluted hierarchy. Moreover, while NSC staffers passed on policy 
suggestions directly to their boss, State Department desk officers had to manoeuvre their 
ideas through the various offices of assistant secretaries and under secretaries of state before 
they arrived on Vance’s desk.  
The process in many respects mirrored Allison’s organisational process model, 
whereby policies, navigating through a hierarchical bureaucratic structure, are refined and 
perfected through the contributions of government departments and officials. In the State 
Department, ideas and observations originating from desk officers, who retained specialist 
knowledge of a country or region, progressed through various offices who made their own 
modifications before the final output reached the desk of the secretary of state. However, as 
policies and ideas advanced through the bureaucracy, they were often reviewed, rewritten or 
outright rejected. Desk officers regularly discovered their impact on policy was minimal as 
their ideas were either diluted or failed to reach the secretary of state’s office. The input of 
officials within the hierarchy, rather than perfecting or refining policy according to Allison’s 
organisational process model, only served to hinder the development of ideas and strategies 
within the department.  
The process frustrated many within the department. As desk officer Henry Precht 
recalled, ‘when you work in a place like the State Department, maybe there’s no other place 
like it, you not only have to channel upward but you have people on the side of you who 
want to have a chomp at your actions…you constantly have to deal with these people who 
want to change what you’re saying or perfect it in some fashion.’115 Moreover, given the 
constraints on Vance’s time, there was no guarantee that a policy would even be discussed at 
a high level. This according to NSC staffer Gary Sick, made some within the State 
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Department resentful of their predominant position and encouraged dissent as time wore 
on.116  
The slow, long winded process only served to benefit Brzezinski and his staff who 
provided the president with a range of ideas and policies in an efficient manner (see figure 
2). Reflecting on the period, Carter, when asked why he appeared to a show preference to 
Brzezinski and his staff over Vance, commented, ‘Zbig sent me ten ideas a night, and I was 
lucky to get a single idea a month out of the State Department.’117  
Figure 2: Policy Development - State vs NSC 
He expanded in his memoirs, ‘Brzezinski and his small group of experts were not 
handicapped by the inertia of a tenured bureaucracy…They were particularly adept at 
incisive analyses of strategic concepts, and were prolific in the production of new ideas, 
which they were always eager to present to me.’118 For a president who wanted to immerse 
himself in the finer details of foreign policy, the NSC made a favourable impression on 
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Carter. It provided him with policy options quickly and fed into his perception of the NSC 
operating as a think tank as opposed to the overly lethargic State Department. As Harold 
Brown noted, ‘people who are used to getting things done tend to have more influence’ and 
as a result Carter turned to Brzezinski and the NSC staff for advice, policies and 
strategies.119 
Inhibited by the hierarchical structure of their department and resentful of the status 
afforded to the NSC, dissatisfaction within the State Department grew as a sense of 
competition between themselves and the NSC developed. Vance assured them that he and 
Brzezinski trusted one another and understood each other’s respective roles.120 But, upon 
viewing the directive, his staff immediately voiced their concern and displeasure. PD/NSC-2 
increased suspicion that Brzezinski would undermine and outmanoeuvre Vance as Kissinger 
had with Rogers years earlier. An unnamed State Department advisor told The New York 
Times, ‘it is inevitable that Zbig will become an originator of policy and not just a co-
ordinator. And once he starts making foreign policy recommendations to the president, his 
ideas will cut across the bow of the secretary of state.’121 
Those like Donald McHenry and Anthony Lake, who witnessed Kissinger’s 
treatment of Rogers first hand, warned Vance that Brzezinski and his staff would attempt to 
do the same but when they suggested he do something about it, Vance angrily cut them off 
and stated firmly that he would not tolerate unbridled conflict between the two 
departments.122 He believed infighting had damaged previous administrations and, conscious 
of a potentially difficult situation arising between himself and Brzezinski, warned his staff 
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not to engage the national security advisor or his staff in any bureaucratic warfare. Those 
who did, would be dismissed.123 
However, disciplining his staff proved to be a difficult task for Vance to achieve, in 
part because of his own popularity within the department. As The Boston Globe noted, he 
entered the administration with his own constituency of loyal advisors.124 Those who served 
in the top echelons of the department such as, Leslie Gelb, Philip Habib, Richard Holbrooke, 
Anthony Lake, Richard Moose and David Newsom, forged close links through their prior 
spells in government and felt a deep sense of loyalty to Vance. He also retained the services 
of many foreign service officers who appreciated his calm and respectful demeanour, in 
sharp contrast to his brash and abrasive predecessor Kissinger.125 Above all, his ability to 
give his staff the freedom and encouragement to put forward their views made him very 
popular. He listened and considered their ideas thoughtfully, even at times when he did not 
always agree but even those whom he regularly disagreed with, praised his open-
mindedness.126 
Having seen their authority whittled away by Nixon and Kissinger, Vance resolved 
to re-establish the State Department’s role as the traditional vehicle of foreign policy 
development. In his October 1976 memo to Carter, Vance proposed reforms to the agency 
that would allow them to ‘effectively implement diplomatic policies’ to give it a ‘crystallised 
sense of mandate.’127 But the creation of the new NSC system challenged his department’s 
ability to affect policy. His loyalty to the department never wavered and he spoke up if he 
believed they were treated unfairly, particularly with respect to their dealings with 
Brzezinski and the NSC. As Carter recalled, ‘Cy was very, very sensitive about any 
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reflection on the State Department or any usurpation of its authority or vestige of influence, 
to a fault.’128 
The frustration amongst those within the department about their inability to affect 
decision-making encouraged dissent. As Anne Wexler, Assistant to the President for Public 
Liaison, noted, ‘there got to be a real war between the State Department and the National 
Security Council, and one cannot minimize the bitterness and anger…I think people began 
to choose up sides and to really criticize the president when they felt that their sector of the 
establishment represented by Vance was being undercut.’129  
While Vance’s staff remained loyal, some became increasingly concerned about 
Brzezinski and his department’s overarching influence. This generated resentment with 
some prepared to fight back when they felt undermined, despite Vance’s warnings. As his 
spokesperson Hodding Carter III recalled, ‘Cy would call us in and say “look, we just can’t 
do this” “yes sir” but I don’t think there was a single person among them who wasn’t going 
to do it again.’130 Tensions between the State Department and the NSC duly developed as the 
policy struggles of the Carter administration developed into widescale interagency warfare 
and bureaucratic politics.  
Conclusion 
The reorganised NSC system created a sense of competition between the president’s two 
closest advisors and their departments as soon as they entered office. While Vance and 
Brzezinski attempted to work collegially with one another, the bureaucratic structure, 
coupled with other mitigating factors, enhanced the national security advisor’s position to 
influence the administration’s foreign policy agenda. The system afforded Brzezinski and 
the NSC staff significant authority with respect to policy development and implementation. 
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As Robert Hunter, who served on the NSC under Brzezinski, described it, PD/NSC-2 was, 
‘as an innocuous but powerful mandate for the national security advisor’ as it placed him 
and his department at the heart of designing the administration’s agenda.131  
Moreover, the sense of competition between the two departments allowed 
bureaucratic politics to develop within the administration. The NCS’s fluid structure gave 
staffers the opportunity to progress ideas without interference while ideas in the State 
Department had to negotiate ideas through a labyrinth of bureaus and officials inhibiting the 
policy process. While the system mirrored Allison’s organisational process model, the 
frustration at the hierarchical structure and the bureaucratic prerogatives handed to their 
rivals at the NSC, angered State Department officials. Questions over territory and the pre-
eminent role of the NSC quickly arose as the bureaucratic rivalry between the two 
departments developed. PD/NSC-2 created the potential for bureaucratic politics to fester 
within the administration. It was, as Anthony Lake put it, ‘a recipe for struggles’ as an ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ tussle within the department quickly manifested itself within the 
administration.132 
While the system handed a bureaucratic advantage to Brzezinski, Vance and his 
department resolved to re-establish themselves as the main vehicle for policy development. 
The secretary of state reasoned that if he could work with Brzezinski and develop a direct 
line to the president without interference he could overcome any potential troubles. 
However, given the numerous factors working against his position, this proved to a difficult 
task to maintain. Ultimately Vance’s power within the administration depended on Carter’s 
willingness to utilise him and take his views on board. Successfully persuading the president 
to adopt his advice and policies as opposed to Brzezinski’s, meant doing so despite a system 
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that disadvantaged himself and his department’s ability to affect the administration’s 
agenda.133 
When Carter entered the White House, he wanted to have a range of options 
available to him to help inform decision-making and policy development. For a president, 
who craved a fast and effective system that aided policy development, Brzezinski and his 
staff became an attractive alternative to what he perceived as the slow and lethargic 
performance of the State Department under Vance. While he intended to move away from 
the system that had existed during the Ford and Nixon administrations, he ended up 
embracing a similar scenario. As Kevin Mulcahy noted, ‘the irony is that although Carter 
entered office pledged to oppose the Kissinger model of foreign policymaking, the actual 
result was the concentration of nearly as much power in the White House as had been the 
case in the Nixon administration.’134 
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Chapter Three 
1977 
‘Peaceful Coexistence or Guerrilla War?’ 
Towards the end of 1976, both Vance and Brzezinski delivered strategy papers to Carter 
with foreign policy recommendations. Both documents drew upon very similar themes, 
arguing for greater understanding and appreciation of the complex issues facing the world 
and a new era of sensitivity. In terms of policies, both papers called for a new arms control 
deal with the Soviet Union, which reflected the reciprocal nature of détente, democratic 
advancement in the developing world, promotion of human rights initiatives and an Arab-
Israeli peace deal.1 The contents of the memos reflected many of the subjects Carter 
espoused during his campaign about the need to build a post-Vietnam foreign policy agenda 
but while Vance and Brzezinski shared the same priorities, their approaches brought the two 
of them into disagreement as soon as the administration entered office. 
 This chapter explores the varying degrees of conflict and consensus between the 
secretary of state and national security advisor during the administration’s first year in 
office. When Vance and Brzezinski entered their posts in January 1977, the potential for 
competition between them was apparent. The structure of the NSC system and the creation 
of the Special Coordination Committee exacerbated tensions between the principals and 
their departments as both jostled to affect the administration’s foreign policy agenda. The 
policy wars between them duly erupted within weeks of entering office as both attempted to 
influence the administration’s position towards strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with 
the Soviet Union. SALT exposed ideological and bureaucratic tensions between the 
secretary of state and the national security advisor, as both attempted to advance their own 
contrasting negotiating positions. 
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Moreover, this chapter analyses the relationship between the State Department and 
the NSC and assesses how the bureaucratic struggles escalated in relation to SALT 
negotiations as well as the development of a human rights strategy. This chapter also 
investigates the administration’s attempts to negotiate a peace settlement in the Middle East. 
Whereas other instances divided Vance and Brzezinski, their shared position and approach 
on the Middle East, their agreed upon roles and the bureaucratic harmony between officials 
positively affected the administration’s strategy and helped engineer the Camp David 
Accords. However, while they found common ground on issues such as the Middle East, the 
Panama Canal treaties and democratic advancement in Africa, ideological and bureaucratic 
tensions were never far from the surface. The first year set the tone for several years of 
infighting between the president’s principal advisors and their departments as they attempted 
to influence and direct the course of the administration’s foreign policy agenda. 
SALT II 
When the administration entered office, they inherited stalled arms control negotiations with 
the Soviet Union. A crucial staple of détente, arms control talks presented an avenue for the 
two superpowers to constructively engage with one another and regulate the escalating arms 
race. In 1972, both sides signed the first SALT accord and committed themselves to further 
reductions at the Vladivostok summit in 1974, but a second arms limitation deal proved 
elusive.2 While they agreed to fix the number of strategic launchers on both sides to 2,400 
each, with MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle) restricted to 1,320, 
they failed to reach an agreement on which weapons to include within the 2,400 limit or 
cruise missile ranges. Accordingly, no firm agreement was reached.3 
 Cutting the United States’ nuclear arsenal and working towards the gradual 
elimination of all deadly weaponry was a key policy commitment of Carter’s. During his 
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inaugural address, he declared his intention to forge ahead with a new SALT treaty.4 It was 
hoped that both sides could reach an agreement within Carter’s first few months in office 
however negotiations fell victim to the growing tensions within the administration between 
Vance and Brzezinski. SALT II ultimately become a by-product of their struggles as 
ideological and bureaucratic fault lines were exposed. 
The key principals considered the agreements negotiated by Ford at Vladivostok as 
unsatisfactory and Carter, as a newly elected president, believed he had the right to re-
negotiate the terms in a fresh round of talks.5 Vance and Brzezinski also considered the 
terms negotiated by the Ford administration as inadequate and believed a new accord was 
necessary to resolve the outstanding issues from the Vladivostok summit. However, their 
interpretations of how the administration should proceed with negotiation highlighted their 
divergent views on U.S.-Soviet relations as the potential for inter-departmental conflict 
loomed. As Brzezinski’s special assistant, Robert Gates noted, both had ‘a fundamentally 
different approach about how to deal with the Soviets.’6  
Brzezinski, highly critical of détente, questioned the reciprocal nature of the 
relationship. He held the view that the Soviets had benefited more from the thawing of 
relations then the U.S. and nowhere was this more evident than in respect to arms control 
negotiations. He was horrified at the terms of the 1972 SALT I agreement, which he 
believed strengthened the Soviet’s military prowess and weakened American defence 
capabilities.7 For him, SALT II, needed to reflect the reciprocity of détente and the Soviet 
Union needed to be prepared to make genuine and substantive sacrifices. This allowed them 
to display as much honesty about its capabilities as the U.S. He therefore advocated that the 
administration negotiate a comprehensive arms control agreement that committed the 
Soviets to the same reductions in their nuclear arsenal as the U.S. Brzezinski duly 
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encouraged a ‘deep cuts’ approach to negotiations, a significant deviation from the terms 
negotiated at Vladivostok by the Ford administration.8 According to Brzezinski, the proposal 
was a test of the Soviet’s willingness to work with the U.S. but also an opportunity to halt 
their military build-up and regulate the arms race.9 
Vance meanwhile favoured a more conservative approach. Although he shared 
elements of Brzezinski’s analysis of détente he did not agree with his position. The aim of 
arms control negotiations, he argued, was to regulate and restrict the production of nuclear 
weapons but also engage in constructive dialogue to help improve U.S.-Soviet relations and 
co-operate on areas of mutual interest. For Vance, the administration needed to resolve the 
outstanding issues from the Vladivostok accord and proceed to sign a new SALT treaty 
within several months of entering office. This approach allowed them to harness cordial 
relations with the Soviets, capitalise on their honeymoon period with Congress and lay the 
foundations for a third, more substantive, SALT agreement later in the administration’s first 
term.10  
Vance’s assessment received a ringing endorsement from his friend Paul Warnke, 
who Carter appointed as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). 
In their view, any major deviation would be met with a swift rejection by the Soviets, 
potentially embarrass the United States and undermine any future agreement.11 However, 
Vance’s ability to affect Carter’s position on arms control was limited. His status within the 
administration, as well as his lack of a close relationship with Carter, prevented him from 
asserting his authority. Moreover, the decision-making structure of the administration 
hindered his attempts to advance his views.  
Brzezinski became increasingly confident of having his proposed strategy accepted 
as the basis for the negotiations. As arms control fell under the domain of the SCC, 
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Brzezinski, as its chair, had the ability to control proceedings and manage the direction of 
the administration’s strategy.12 His department aided his endeavours with his deputy David 
Aaron, another ‘deep cuts’ convert, chairing the mini-SCC, and NSC staffer William G. 
Hyland operating a lower-level working group that provided both committees with 
background materials.13 At every stage in the process Brzezinski and his NSC staff 
controlled the administration’s deliberations. Furthermore, in addition to Aaron, he also 
enlisted the support of two key figures in the administration, Secretary of Defense Harold 
Brown and Vice-President Walter Mondale.14  
A clear divide amongst the administration’s key advisors on arms control emerged 
with Brzezinski, Aaron, Brown and Mondale on the one side arguing for ‘deep cuts’ while 
Vance, Warnke and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Leslie Gelb 
favoured a more conservative deal.15 However, when the SCC met to discuss SALT, 
Brzezinski manipulated the agenda so Warnke spoke first and Vance last in-between input 
from ‘deep cuts’ advocates. He claimed to be merely ‘balancing the softs and the hards’ but 
in effect it handed the bulk of the discussions to those who favoured a more radical 
approach.16 The SCC met on several occasions to formulate a proposal but a deadlock 
ensued as the stubborn resistance from Vance, Warnke and Gelb countered the ‘deep cuts’ 
approach of Brzezinski, Brown, Aaron and Mondale. But the national security advisor 
sought to break the impasse. Utilising a further bureaucratic tool, he elevated the SCC to an 
NSC meeting at the White House.17 
Due to his proximity to Carter both personally and professionally, Brzezinski 
controlled the flow of material forwarded to the president, briefed him daily and provided 
regular updates on discussions. He knew of Carter’s position on arms control, which he 
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shared. When the SCC met for the first time to discuss SALT, Brzezinski had Carter open 
the meeting and he spoke for forty minutes on arms control. According to U. Alexis 
Johnson, who worked on the SALT I and the Vladivostok framework, Carter showed 
considerable knowledge on the subject as he discussed his desire to see genuine reductions, 
which Brzezinski advocated, rather than conservative restrictions, favoured by Vance.18 
Knowing the president’s position on arms control, and bringing him into proceedings, the 
national security advisor believed he stood a greater chance of having his approach accepted. 
Moreover, as he elevated the status of the meeting, he excluded lower-level officials, such as 
Assistant Secretary Leslie Gelb but also NSC staffers Roger Molander and William Hyland 
who favoured a moderate arms control deal.19 
Sure enough, after Carter heard detailed presentations from Brown and Aaron on the 
merits of the ‘deep cuts’ he endorsed a more substantial proposal for Vance to take to 
Moscow.20 This meant reducing the ceiling on delivery vehicles and launchers to between 
1,800 and 2,000 while the number of MIRV missiles would be capped between 1,100 and 
1,200. Of those only 550 could be ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) and 150 other 
‘heavy missiles.’ The president expressed a willingness to accept the Soviet backfire bomber 
provided it did not have a strategic capability while the U.S. would agree to limit its cruise 
missiles range to 2,500km. They also included measures that included limits on test flights 
as well as the deployment of new ICBMs and SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic 
Missile).21 The administration’s position represented a significant divergence from the terms 
negotiated at Vladivostok (See Figure 3) but it also reflected Carter’s personal desire to see 
genuine arms control reductions. 
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Figure 3: Vladivostok vs ‘Deep Cuts’  
 
The outcome of the deliberations over the negotiating position in relation to SALT 
exemplified how bureaucratic politics influenced the administration. The strategy was 
neither developed through constructive and measured debate or an organisational consensus 
but rather conflict and competition between the president’s advisors. Brzezinski’s 
manoeuvrings in relation to SALT revealed his desire to control and manage policy 
development within the administration from an early stage. Rather than finding a common 
strategy with Vance through rational debate, Brzezinski persevered with his approach as he 
utilised his position and power given to him by Carter to influence the outcome of 
deliberations. The administration’s approach to SALT II was thus the result of the escalating 
bureaucratic competition between the president’s advisors, which continued to influence 
their position up to Vance’s arrival in Moscow.  
Neither Vance nor Warnke protested, however. Anticipating a Soviet rejection they 
sought a compromise position, based on the terms negotiated at Vladivostok, with an 
exemption on the Soviet backfire and cruise missile ranges.22 Brzezinski, unimpressed with 
the fall-back position, commented in his diary that the administration’s position could be 
undermined, if ‘any of our colleagues begins to act weak-kneed and starts urging that we 
start making concessions to the Soviets.’23 Furthermore, he resolved to prevent Vance and 
the State Department watering down their position and insisted the NSC formulate the 
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 Vladivostok ‘Deep Cuts’ 
Strategic Delivery Vehicles 2400 1800-2000 
MIRVs 1320 1100-1200 
MIRVed ICBMs & SLBMS No limits 550 
Cruise Missile Range No agreement 2500km 
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administration’s negotiating stance. He gave responsibility for drafting their proposals to 
NSC staffers William Hyland and Roger Molander with no input from anyone in the State 
Department and they were not permitted to share any details with members of the U.S. 
delegation who travelled to Moscow.24 
A sense of dismay and frustration emanated within the department as little appetite 
existed for a ‘deep cuts’ agreement. As State Department spokesperson, Hodding Carter III, 
surmised, ‘Vance and company, by which I mean the entire folks at State, the arms control 
community and the like, simply wanted to pick up where it had left off’ as the 
comprehensive agreement was ‘going to be utterly unacceptable to the Soviet Union who 
couldn’t stand surprises in this field and would simply reject it out of hand.’25 Leslie Gelb, 
who had been privy to the initial discussions on SALT was bemused, ‘I don’t know what the 
hell was going on. I thought it was bizarre. I mean just utterly bizarre.’ He speculated that 
some within the administration had deliberately advocated unrealistic terms to embarrass the 
Soviets and manipulate public opinion. ‘That may have been the reason why some people in 
the administration supported the proposal. Not that they thought it was going to happen but 
they wanted to show the Soviets were not interested’ he recalled.26 
U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Malcolm Toon echoed this sentiment and 
referred to the proposals as ‘dangerous.’27 Although he supported the administration’s 
approach, Vance too became exasperated with the position adopted by Carter. In a meeting 
with the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin he expressed his irritation. After Dobrynin 
told him the Soviets would not deviate from the Vladivostok framework, Vance replied ‘I 
tell him (Carter) it can’t happen but…’ he then ‘made a helpless gesture.’28 
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The Soviets, aware of the administration’s change of stance regarding arms control, 
became increasingly antagonised. Prior to Carter’s election he instructed W. Averill 
Harriman to visit the Soviet Union and relay on his behalf, his intention to press ahead with 
a second SALT treaty using the Vladivostok framework as the basis for negotiations.29 
Furthermore, in his first correspondence with Brezhnev after his election, Carter reiterated 
his desire to reopen negotiations on a new treaty but made no reference to any dramatic 
reductions while the Soviet premier reiterated that ‘the main parameter of an agreement’ was 
the Vladivostok accord.30 Carter’s tone then changed in his follow up letter to Brezhnev 
where he declared himself unbound by previous agreements and floated the idea of a more 
substantial treaty.31 Brezhnev met the suggestion with disdain and expressed his annoyance 
in a follow-up letter to Carter.32  
The Soviets speculated that Brzezinski had affected the president’s stance. In a 
meeting with NSC staffer William Hyland, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, Yuli Vorontsov asked 
about the potential impact of their relationship on negotiations. While Hyland played down 
the speculation that surrounded them, it nevertheless reflected the unease that emanated in 
Moscow.33 The Soviets, familiar with Brzezinski’s work and criticisms of the Soviet Union, 
believed he exerted undue influence within the administration. Dobrynin later remarked, 
‘when Carter spoke on foreign affairs, we tended to hear the echoes of the anti-Sovietism of 
Brzezinski.’34 
The U.S. delegation arrived in Moscow with the knowledge that their proposals 
would be rejected by the Soviets.35 Despite Vance’s efforts to put forward the 
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comprehensive proposal, the Soviets refused to significantly depart from the Vladivostok 
agreement. On the final day of the talks, Brezhnev addressed the meeting and labelled their 
proposals as ‘unconstructive.’36 ‘We got a wet rug in the face’ Vance recalled but Brzezinski 
used the rejection to attack the Soviets.37 He chastised them for their negative response to 
what he believed was a reasonable offer made in good faith that would deescalate the arms 
race and improve U.S.-Soviet relations.38 On the final day of talks, Vance sought permission 
to offer the compromise proposal but Brzezinski rejected the request. ‘Vance was stunned’ 
Hyland recalled but the national security advisor’s denial reflected his prominent position in 
the administration as a key architect of their foreign policy agenda.39 
It also demonstrated that the administration’s position vis-à-vis the Soviet was 
influenced by Brzezinski, not Vance. The Soviets refusal to even consider genuine 
reductions in their nuclear arsenals, confirmed their insincerity and lack of commitment to 
the reciprocal nature of détente, Brzezinski believed. In private, he confided to Carter, ‘by 
committing ourselves to reductions, we have made the Soviets seem opposed to genuine 
arms limitations. In the past, they have often made the United States look as if it was 
opposed to arms limitations. The tables have now turned.’40 
Others did not share Brzezinski’s view. Paul Warnke rejected Brzezinski’s 
suggestion that he appear on Meet the Press to defend the negotiations. He took exception to 
the idea of going on national television to defend a proposal that he had not fully endorsed 
but he also believed that it would make future negotiations harder if they were so closely 
welded to their original position.41 The debacle in the lead up to Vance’s trip to Moscow was 
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a serious setback for the administration. Those who advocated a more conservative position 
and argued against ‘deep cuts’, were perplexed by the series of events. As Leslie Gelb 
reflected, ‘you couldn’t do that kind of arms control and it took us months to climb down 
from that comprehensive proposal that we put on the table and to more or less resume talks 
where Kissinger had left them.’42 Meanwhile, upon his return to Washington, Vance met 
with Dobrynin and asked the ambassador about the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. ‘The most 
unsatisfactory in the last ten years’ he replied.43 
The early SALT negotiations highlighted the ideological friction between Vance and 
Brzezinski but the internal bureaucratic structure exacerbated those tensions and heightened 
the sense of competition between them and their departments. The national security 
advisor’s control of the bureaucratic process during the discussions on negotiating tactics 
ultimately weakened Vance’s ability to affect proceedings. Moreover, Carter and 
Brzezinski’s refusal to allow him to offer a counterproposal irritated Vance. On the eve of 
their return to Washington, he reflected on the Moscow episode with William Hyland, from 
the NSC, and bemoaned the whole experience. ‘I think he agreed that he would have to have 
a much clearer idea of the degree of his autonomy in the future’ Hyland recalled.44  
A sense of disharmony within the administration emanated as Vance and the State 
Department realised how Brzezinski’s manoeuvrings left them undermined and unable to 
significantly affect policy. The early SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union was the first 
of many disagreements in the bureaucratic wars between Vance, Brzezinski and their staff. 
Moreover, the case illustrated how their rivalry adversely affected U.S. foreign policy vis-à-
vis the Soviet Union.  
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Human Rights 
The Moscow incident also highlighted another area of disagreement between Vance and 
Brzezinski, which contributed to the Soviet’s hostile attitude towards the U.S. delegation, 
human rights. A key feature of Carter’s campaign, he entered the White House with the 
intention of placing human rights at the centre of his foreign policy agenda. For Carter, 
supporting the rights of citizens across the world was simply ‘the right thing to do’ and a 
fundamental principle of the United States to support those in need. In the wake of the 
Vietnam War, American conduct had severely damaged their image across the world and 
with a growing sense of interdependence in the developing world, it was a necessity for the 
U.S. to pay special consideration to human suffrage. Carter declared, ‘the basic thrust of 
human affairs points toward a more universal demand for fundamental human rights. The 
United States has a historical birth right to be associated with this process.’45  
As Carter’s speechwriter Patrick Anderson noted, the human rights agenda was a 
‘no lose’ issue because while liberals approved ‘conservatives liked it because it involved 
criticisms of Russia.’46 However, this approach presented a potential issue for the 
administration between balancing their commitment to human rights against strategic 
considerations. The fear amongst some was that such an agenda may well compromise other 
foreign policy objectives and damage relationships with regimes whose human rights 
records made for uncomfortable reading. As journalist Bernard Gwertzman noted, ‘the test 
will come in specific instances. For instance, will the administration let human rights 
problems interfere with arms control negotiations?’47 
Both Vance and Brzezinski held contrasting views on human rights in relation to the 
Soviet Union. The secretary of state, although concerned for the humanitarian situation in 
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the Soviet Union, wanted to avoid publicly antagonising Moscow in the lead up to arms 
control talks. He feared highlighting human rights abuses, would make them less receptive 
in negotiations. As spokesperson Hodding Carter III recalled, ‘he just didn’t think much was 
gained by a lot of constant public talk about the sins of anybody you were trying to negotiate 
with.’ But Vance was also concerned about the wider implications of the human rights 
agenda on U.S. foreign policy, as Hodding Carter reflected, ‘he also was not sure that we 
ought to have at the centre of a very real foreign policy, a policy, which in effect, allowed us 
to go chewing on people so promiscuously.’48 
Brzezinski however had spent a considerable portion of his career, criticising Soviet 
human rights abuses. During the campaign, he urged Carter to underline the importance of 
the Helsinki Accord and chastise the Ford administration’s lack of concern for the domestic 
situation in Eastern Europe. Moreover, he placed the human rights agenda within his wider 
strategy of ‘peaceful engagement’ and viewed it as an opportunity to weaken Soviet 
influence and strengthen the United States’ moral authority across the world. As he outlined, 
‘by actively pursuing this commitment we could mobilize far greater attention on the glaring 
internal weaknesses of the Soviet system’ and ‘put the Soviet Union ideologically on the 
defensive.’49  
As with ‘deep cuts’, Carter followed his national security advisor’s advice, despite 
Vance’s resistance, and affirmed his commitment to absolute human rights and his intention 
to speak out on abuses in the Soviet Union. ‘I think we come out better in dealing with the 
Soviet Union if I am consistently and completely dedicated to the enhancement of human 
rights, not only as it deals with the Soviet Union but all other countries’ Carter told the 
press.50 His statement generated, ‘an atmosphere of hysteria’ within the Kremlin. The 
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Soviets interpreted his comments as ‘convenient propaganda’ and they relayed to the 
president their unhappiness.51  
They were further incensed when the U.S. made direct contact with the Soviet 
dissident Andrei Sakharov. It was Sakharov who first initiated correspondence with the 
president following his election to praise his stance on human rights. Carter, who 
remembered Gerald Ford’s refusal to meet with the Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn 
in 1975, found it difficult to ignore the letter.52 In a brief and uncontroversial response, 
Carter reaffirmed his commitment to human rights but a vitriolic Brezhnev labelled 
Sakharov a ‘renegade who proclaimed himself an enemy of the Soviet state.’ He went on, 
‘we would not like to have our patience tested in any matters of international policy 
including the questions of Soviet-American relations. This is not the way to deal with the 
Soviet Union.’53 
Carter’s position vis-à-vis the Soviets further exasperated Vance and the State 
Department when on 22 May, 1977, the president spoke publicly of his commitment to 
absolute human rights. Because of their ‘inordinate fear of communism’ the U.S. had been 
too keen to ‘embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.’ ‘For too many years’ he 
declared, ‘we've been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our 
adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs.’ He finished by noting that 
‘our policy is based on an historical vision of America’s role…Our policy is designed to 
serve mankind.’54 Brzezinski labelled the speech a landmark address but it also underlined 
the differences between himself and Vance over human rights.55 As journalist David Binder 
noted, much of the speech reflected the thinking of Brzezinski with no input from Vance or 
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the State Department, and had been drafted while the secretary was in Europe attending an 
international summit.56  
The Moscow episode laid bare the potential pitfalls of inserting human rights 
considerations into wider foreign policy objectives. In the post-Vietnam era, Carter wanted 
to use human rights to help the U.S. regain its moral credibility and build friendships across 
the world. He wanted to institutionalise human rights within the administration and become 
a core staple of American diplomacy. However, like arms control, Carter had no clear 
strategy to achieve his pledges and left the development of the policy to his advisors. 
Accordingly, the evolution of the administration’s human rights agenda proved to be 
problematic and it was not until February 1978 that a definitive strategy was adopted. The 
intervening period led to confusion and charges of retreat from the press and critics. 
Moreover, varying degrees of conflict and consensus between Vance and Brzezinski as to 
how the administration should implement its agenda fed into the debates between the two 
individuals and their respective departments.  
Both Vance and Brzezinski had very clear commitments to promoting human rights 
but were concerned about Carter’s pledge of ‘absolute’ human rights. For Vance, it was an 
important for the U.S. to be a ‘beacon on the hill for the rest of mankind’ and in his post-
election meeting with Carter, both he and the president agreed on advancing the human 
rights agenda. At the same time, he advised that the administration ‘had to be flexible and 
pragmatic in dealing with specific cases that might affect our national security’ and ‘avoid 
rigidity.’57 The administration needed to work on a case by case basis so the human rights 
initiatives could be ‘universal in application, yet flexible enough to be adapted to individual 
situations.’58 Head of Policy Planning in the State Department, Anthony Lake shared 
Vance’s view and urged him to develop a strategy to ‘establish a general U.S. posture of 
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concern for human rights, but which present some of the complexities involved, which avoid 
raising unrealistic expectations.’59 
Vance attempted to clarify his approach on Face the Nation. ‘We will speak out 
when we believe it appropriate to do so with respect to the human rights issue’ he said but 
when quizzed about specific criticisms of Soviet human rights abuses he remarked, ‘there 
will be other times when we feel it appropriate to communicate by quiet diplomacy with the 
country involved.’60 Furthermore, in a speech in April 1977, Vance defined basic human 
rights as freedom from government oppression, the right to basic vital needs (shelter, food, 
healthcare, and education) and the right to enjoy political and civil liberties but he also 
explained, ‘in pursuing a human rights policy, we must always keep in mind the limits of our 
power and our wisdom. A sure formula for defeat of our goals would be a rigid, hubristic 
attempt to impose our values on others. A doctrinaire plan of action would be as damaging 
as indifference.’61 Critics accused Vance backing away from human rights while others 
argued that his speech only caused confusion. To others, it reflected the view that a blanket 
human rights agenda was potentially unworkable.62 
Brzezinski meanwhile shared Vance’s concerns about the need to balance their 
commitment to human rights with strategic considerations. He had urged Carter to highlight 
Soviet human rights abuses, to undermine their influence and enhance the position of the 
U.S. but he cautioned against a blanket human rights policy that interfered with wider 
foreign policy objectives. As he noted in his memoirs, ‘I put stronger emphasis perhaps than 
Carter on the notion that strengthening American power was the necessary point of 
departure.’63 
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Despite their scepticism both acknowledged the president’s wish to incorporate 
human rights into the administration’s approach to world affairs and they sought to 
institutionalise the agenda in their respective departments. Brzezinski created a ‘Global 
Issues’ cluster within the NSC to deal with human rights. He hired Jessica Tuchman, an 
advisor to Congressman Morris Udall, because of her perceived compassionate liberal 
views, which counterbalanced his alleged hawkishness.64 Tuchman was given free reign to 
develop her ideas but with Brzezinski’s strategic considerations in mind. The relationship 
between her and the NSC was uncontroversial as many shared Brzezinski’s view that while 
human rights should be weighed against strategic considerations. As such the department 
was united in its approach, in direct contrast to the situation that developed in the State 
Department.65 
Vance communicated with all diplomats and assistant secretaries in February 1977 
encouraging greater adherence to human rights issues in their respective posts. He stressed 
they should use ‘quiet diplomacy and symbolic gestures or statements of disapproval…such 
as withholding aid and other means of assistance’ but take into consideration its potential 
impact on American influence within their region.66 Reflecting his ambivalence to a blanket 
human rights strategy, he delegated responsibility to his deputy Warren Christopher to co-
ordinate his department’s approach.67  
However, the State Department proved unable to unite itself behind Carter’s human 
rights agenda and the bureaucracy faltered in its attempt to develop a clear and consistent 
policy. While some officials attempted to promote human rights across the various bureaus, 
their attempts were met with resistance as a lack of consensus among assistant secretaries 
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gave way to bureaucratic conflict. Moreover, as the NSC formulated its strategy, free of 
bureaucratic wrangling, further institutional frustration and resentment developed.  
Upon entering his post, Vance appointed civil rights activist and Carter campaign 
manager Particia Derian as Co-Ordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. At 
times outspoken, Derian resolved to bring human rights consideration to the forefront of the 
State Department’s approach to international affairs. Under Secretary of State David 
Newsom later remarked that Derian wanted to overthrow every right-wing dictatorship.68 
This regularly brought her into conflict with those in the department who did not share her 
thesis and were unwilling to embrace Carter’s human rights agenda. Richard Holbrooke, 
Assistant Secretary for East Asia, and Terrance Todman, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs, frequently clashed with Derian.69 Throughout 1977, Holbrooke argued 
that her criticism and calls for to cut aid to the regime of Ferdinand Marcos in the 
Philippines jeopardised the future of U.S. bases on the island. Vance meanwhile dismissed 
Todman from his position after the assistant secretary publicly criticised the application of 
human rights policy in Latin America.70 Nevertheless, the department failed to embrace 
Derian’s commitment. As Sandra Vogelgesang, a human rights officer on the State 
Department Policy Planning Staff noted, pressure from moderates like Vance, Christopher 
and Lake contributed to the shift in approach by the agency to be more accommodating to 
the concerns of the relevant bureaus.71 
While arguments raged between respective bureaus in the State Department, 
Tuchman and some members of the NSC became concerned about the impact of their 
disputes on human rights policy. Bureaucratic tension soon arose as NSC officials urged 
Brzezinski to take control of the human rights agenda. David Aaron complained to 
Brzezinski on 12 April, 1977, about the situation and remarked, ‘I believe the only answer is 
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a Special Coordinating Committee Working Group on the human rights issues…My concern 
with State, as indicated in the attached, is that they don’t know what they are talking about 
half the time.’72A week later Tuchman wrote to Brzezinski bemoaning the lack of leadership 
from the State Department. ‘Assistant secretaries at State often confuse the issue through 
testimony, which serves their interest but directly conflicts with what other witnesses are 
saying’ she wrote, also noting that her fellow human rights advocates, Derian and UN 
Ambassador Andrew Young were ‘unpredictable.’ She alleged that Derian was not able to 
affect human rights policy either ‘bureaucratically or personally.’73 
Brzezinski did not respond directly to either memo, but a month later he proposed 
the development of a PRM on human rights to Carter. In a handwritten note attached he 
wrote, ‘please note that I have deliberately placed the review—a truly interagency matter—
under SCC (and not under PRC–State).’74 Although the SCC took responsibility for 
developing the human rights policy, Brzezinski underlined the need for an interagency 
response and gave responsibility for chairing the SCC meeting to Warren Christopher. The 
deputy secretary of state was in many respects a bridge between Vance and Brzezinski on 
human rights but his appointment also symbolised the fact that neither wanted to take 
control of the issue.75 
In May 1977, Christopher produced a draft PRM that defined human rights in three 
categories: freedom from government violations, economic and social rights and the right to 
enjoy civil and political freedoms. The PRM noted, ‘while the promotion of human rights is 
a fundamental tenant of our foreign policy, raising it to a higher level of priority brings 
certain costs…There will clearly be situations in which efforts to achieve our human rights 
goals will have to be modified, delayed or curtailed in deference to other important 
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objectives.’ This accommodated the respective viewpoints of both Vance and Brzezinski on 
human rights but the PRM did offer advice on how the administration should proceed with 
its policy. Christopher noted that public rhetoric, such as Carter’s denunciation of the 
Soviets, despite Brzezinski’s advice, was counterproductive and had no positive influence on 
policy. He recommended that human rights issues in some instances should be discussed 
privately before any public proclamations.76 
Furthermore, it stressed the importance of using increases and decreases in aid as a 
means of affecting change. In April 1977, Brzezinski proposed to Vance and Treasury 
Secretary Michael Blumenthal that a ‘small interagency group’ be created to deal with the 
foreign assistance programme with Christopher as its head.77 The ‘Christopher group’ 
contained representatives from the White House, the Human Rights Bureau of the State 
Department and officials from Defense, the NSC and the Treasury.78 The group applied 
human rights considerations to requests for military and economic aid however, resistance 
across the executive branch saw the remit of the group gradually watered down as 
disagreements plagued its mandate.79 
Much of the group’s attention focused on Latin America. Throughout 1977, the 
group considered and either restricted, prohibited or dropped bilateral aid and loan proposals 
to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay and 
Uruguay.80 In public too, the administration took a stronger stance against Latin American 
countries. Even Vance, who usually reserved his opinions for private discussions, rather 
forthrightly put considerations for human rights in Latin America on the agenda while 
making a speech at the Organisation of American States (OAS) in June 1977 stating, ‘each 
of our governments has accepted the obligation to promote respect for human rights among 
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all nations. There is no ambiguity about these obligations.’81 Brzezinski meanwhile 
acknowledged that the administration’s stance on human rights had seen in improvements in 
Colombia, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.82 But Latin America was 
an easier target for the group. As Anthony Lake explained to Vance at the beginning of 
1978, because of the continent’s reliance on U.S. economic, security and military assistance, 
nations showed a disinclination to turn to the Soviet Union and made them more amenable 
to the administration’s human rights agenda.83 
In other areas the Christopher group, and the administration more generally, took 
little or no action to punish human rights abuses concerning their allies. Although aware of 
the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s crimes against his own citizens, apart from 
private discussions and encouragement between officials, the administration took no action. 
Nor was the negotiation of arms contracts, which Carter wanted to reduce, linked to the 
improvement of the human rights situation in Iran.84 The case of Iran highlighted the tenuous 
balance between strategic and human rights concerns but as William Odom, Brzezinski’s 
military assistant, pointed out, ‘if the Shah of Iran buys our arms, we can justify that as a 
measure toward stabilization of the region, (certainly a gain for some human rights) but we 
should not let anyone believe that such sales mean U.S. moral approval of SAVAK’s 
actions.’85 
China meanwhile received no attention in respect to human rights and the 
administration stayed completely silent on the issue throughout their time in office, in part 
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due to Brzezinski’s desire to normalise diplomatic relations.86 Christopher acknowledged in 
his draft PRM on human rights in July 1977 that, ‘potential normalisation with China and 
Cuba will place some strain on the credibility of our human rights policy, for in both cases 
other considerations will govern…with respect to human rights we will have little if any 
leverage or influence with the PRC.’87 
The lack of consistency of the human rights agenda was a charge the administration 
struggled to shake throughout its term in office however both Vance and Brzezinski 
attempted to strike a balance between strategic considerations and concern for human 
suffrage. PD/NSC-30, published in February 1978, amalgamated their views. The 
administration’s approach to human rights relied on ‘positive inducements and incentives’ 
with aid used to either reward improvements or punish consistent violators. However, 
PD/NSC-30 also confirmed the strategy would be applied with ‘due consideration to the 
cultural, political, and historical characteristics of each nation, and to the fundamental U.S. 
interests with respect to the nation in question.’88  
The human rights initiative brought varying degrees of conflict and co-operation 
between Vance, Brzezinski and their respective departments. While both agreed on the need 
to use human rights tactically, to avoid confrontation with allies and not interfere with wider 
foreign policy objectives, they disagreed about its application in some areas, particularly in 
relation to the Soviet Union. Vance viewed criticism of Soviet human rights abuses as 
counterproductive, whereas Brzezinski considered it part of his wider approach of peaceful 
engagement with the third world and those threatened by communism. As he noted, human 
right was important to ‘diminish hostility toward the U.S.’ but also lessen Soviet influence 
across the globe.89 Moreover, bureaucratic rivalry emanated between the State Department 
and Brzezinski’s Global Issues cluster of the NSC. The resistance of assistant secretaries and 
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other key officials, undermined the administration’s commitment to human rights, while the 
NSC attempted to forge a clear a definitive strategy. As a result, the administration 
developed an approach that did not reflect Carter’s commitment to absolute human rights but 
instead mirrored the bureaucratic and ideological divisions within the administration. 
Arab-Israeli Peace 
The third key foreign policy objective the administration embraced in their first year in 
office was peace talks in the Middle East. During the Six Day War of 1967 with Egypt, 
Jordan and Syria, Israel seized territory in the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West 
Bank and East Jerusalem, displacing a million Palestinians in the process. Hostilities 
continued with the Yom Kippor War of 1974 as Israel successfully defended itself however 
in the wake of the conflict the UN passed resolutions 243 and 338, which called for a 
negotiated settlement between the nations involved and ordered Israel to withdraw its forces 
from the occupied territories and respect the pre-1967 borders.90  
Unlike SALT and human rights, the issue united Vance, Brzezinski and Carter as 
they attempted to forge a strategy and orchestrate an agreement between Israel and its 
neighbours to bring peace to a volatile region. According to Brzezinski, he, Carter and 
Vance were ‘very much on the same wavelength insofar as the Middle East is concerned.’91 
Cordial relations between the secretary of state and the national security advisor proved to 
be crucial to the administration’s approach as they co-ordinated effectively with one another. 
As NSC staffer, William Quandt recalled, ‘if Vance was the steady, patient negotiator, 
Brzezinski was the theoretician and manipulator.’92  
Moreover, whereas tensions between the State Department and the NSC adversely 
affected the development of policy in other areas, on the Middle East, both worked 
collaboratively and harmoniously with one another. Quandt, who headed the Middle East 
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cluster in the NSC, worked closely with Alfred Atherton, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near East and South Asian Affairs and his replacement Harold Saunders.93 For Vance, it was 
important that the two departments worked cohesively and he embraced Quandt’s role in the 
team. As Saunders noted, ‘Vance was not the kind of person who would have indulged in 
petty bureaucracy. He welcomed Bill as soon as he joined the NSC.’94 Quandt meanwhile 
recalled the importance of working closely with those in the State Department, ‘they wanted 
us to keep the relationship in good repair because they knew from previous experiences that 
if the two parts of bureaucracy were working at odds it could really screw things up.’95 
The administration based their approach on a Brookings Institution study published 
in 1975, which contained contributions from Brzezinski and Quandt. According to Saunders, 
it reflected the private views of many in the administration. The report called on the Israelis 
to withdraw from the occupied territories and return to the pre-1967 borders but also 
encouraged the Arab states and Israel to normalise diplomatic relations with one another. 
Moreover, it advocated a negotiated settlement with respect to Palestinian self-
determination.96 The administration used the report as a blueprint for negotiations, as they 
planned to bring the relevant parties together at a conference in Geneva during the 
administration’s first year in office. Vance travelled to Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia and Syria on a fact-finding mission in February 1977 to lay the foundations for the 
talks.97 
In their initial discussions, the Israelis appeared receptive to a negotiated settlement 
however the election of Menachem Begin and Likud at the expense of Yitzhak Rabin and 
the Labour Party in May 1977 proved to be a significant setback. While talks with Rabin had 
been productive, when Begin visited the White House he outright rejected the idea of a 
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Geneva summit and negotiations on a return to the pre-1967 borders or Palestinian self-
determination.98 Begin proved to be a difficult operator throughout negotiations on Arab-
Israeli affairs and his relationship with Carter suffered as a result. The president later called 
Begin a ‘psycho’ but while he struggled to cultivate a working relationship with the Israeli 
prime minister, Vance’s intervention proved invaluable.99 
During his travels, Vance’s style, coupled with his diplomatic experience and 
expertise endeared himself to those he visited and spoke with. According to Quandt, ‘Vance 
did not lie to people…after a while we started getting feedback saying, “we’ve checked with 
our colleagues out here and Vance is telling everybody the same thing” …people tended to 
believe that he wasn’t jerking them around.’100 The Israelis viewed him as an open and 
honest individual and Vance managed to find common ground with Begin where others 
failed. ‘We all kind of disliked Begin but he (Vance) was always very cordial with him’ 
remembered Quandt.101 Brzezinski meanwhile had no diplomatic background with the Arab 
leaders, personal connections or a general feel for their objectives.102 Moreover, he was 
subjected to a vicious campaign from pro-Israeli groups, who accused him of being ‘pro- 
Palestine and anti-Semitic.’103 Vance’s close relationships with key figures proved vital. 
Whereas previously he had been side-lined, he managed to assert his authority as the 
president’s chief diplomat on his travels. This led U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel W. 
Lewis to remark, ‘this was Vance’s show.’104  
After several failed attempts to get negotiations back on track, Vance instigated a 
joint effort with the Soviet Union to reignite the idea of a Geneva conference and they issued 
a joint communiqué, which stressed the need to move forward towards peace. However, a 
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reference to the need for Palestinian rights to be upheld, angered the Israelis. Already 
infuriated by the administration’s decision to stop their sales of Kfir Jet planes to Ecuador 
coupled with Carter’s public commentary on the talks and references to a ‘Palestinian 
homeland’ they showed a disinclination to engage in talks.105 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, disillusioned with the process as well as his Arab 
neighbour’s attitude towards a settlement, took it upon himself to revive the talks. Much to 
the administration’s surprise, he publicly announced that he planned to visit Israel and speak 
in the Knesset. On November 19, Sadat landed in Israel.106 His intervention revitalised hopes 
for a peace settlement in the Middle East. Although Vance and Carter continued to work 
towards a separate interim settlement on Palestine, a deal between Israel and Egypt in 1978 
became their primary objective going forward.107 
Vance then travelled to the Middle East the following month to meet with various 
leaders and when he arrived in Jerusalem, he endorsed the idea of a bilateral agreement 
between Israel and Egypt. Carter then considered the idea of convening a summit at Camp 
David in September 1978. He floated the idea with Sadat and Begin and, although cautious, 
both agreed.108 The president believed they stood a good chance of achieving a peace accord 
if Sadat and Begin met face to face to discuss the issues their nations. Quandt considered 
their strategy overly optimistic and naïve. ‘My reaction was, “oh my goodness, we’re here 
for group therapy”’ he later recalled.109 
As Quandt predicted, little progress was made in the first few days at Camp David 
as both Sadat and Begin threatened to leave the talks. The Egyptian president wanted to link 
a peace deal between the two countries to Palestinian autonomy, leading to a swift and firm 
refusal from the Israeli prime minister.110 Vance then intervened and urged the president to 
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change his tactics. Prior to the summit, the secretary met with an old friend, the political 
scientist Roger Fisher, who specialised in diplomatic negotiations, and asked him for his 
advice on the administration’s approach. Fisher provided Vance with a draft of a book he 
was working on and the secretary became taken with one of the strategies outlined in the 
book, the ‘one text procedure.’ The idea was that the mediator in discussions creates a single 
document with various points and asks those involved to respond. As both sides put forward 
their ideas, the document is amended accordingly, while any issues not contested are deemed 
acceptable. Vance now decided to put this tactic into action at Camp David.111 
His team devised a document with list of terms and conditions and presented them 
separately to the Israeli and Egyptian delegations. Over the course of the summit, Carter and 
Vance shuttled back and forth between the two camps and re-drafted the document to 
incorporate their demands. In total, Harold Saunders drafted over twenty different alternative 
versions of the document entitled ‘Necessary Elements of Agreement.’112 After thirteen days 
of negotiations, they eventually finalised a deal. The summit ended with the signing of the 
Camp David Accords, which consisted of two agreements. The first, ‘The Framework for 
Peace in the Middle East’ called for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza over a 
five-year period under a transitional authority of Israel, Egypt, Jordan and representatives of 
Palestine. At the end of the five-year period, the status of the West Bank and Gaza would be 
determined by those involved. The second part of the accords, ‘The Framework for the 
Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel’ required Israel to withdraw from 
the Sinai and that both nations establish diplomatic relations with each other.113 
Although not the comprehensive agreement they originally sought, the deal was a 
significant foreign policy success for the Carter administration. While Carter’s personal 
diplomacy at the Camp David summit has been well documented, Vance’s contribution was 
equally important. ‘Vance deserves much of the credit for patiently shaping the Camp David 
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Accords and the text of the peace treaty’ Quandt later stated.114 Even his adversary, 
Brzezinski acknowledged that Vance was ‘tireless in seeking compromises and persistent in 
pressing the two sides to accommodate.’115 The Middle East case allowed Vance to 
showcase his diplomatic skills and assert his authority within the administration as an 
effective ‘thinker’ in addition to a ‘doer.’  
But the administration’s approach to the Middle East also demonstrated how 
effectively the principals and their departments worked with one another. At the lower-level, 
the relationship between the key players, Quandt, Saunders and Atherton helped build the 
foundations of the agreement. Saunders later recalled, ‘I have never known a finer group of 
human beings or a more capable group of professionals. We liked working together, and I 
think it showed in what we did.’116 Whereas SALT negotiations divided them and fuelled a 
sense of competition, the foreign policy process within the administration operated 
successfully. The case of the Middle East confirmed how the shared ideas, strategies and 
objectives of both the principals and their departments contributed to the team ethic that 
existed as they attempted to move forward with peace negotiations throughout 1977 and into 
1978.  
Conclusion 
In addition to the Camp David Accords, the administration also achieved notable successes 
in Africa and Central America. Having agreed to pay closer attention to developments in the 
third world, Vance, with UN Ambassador Andrew Young, spearheaded the administration’s 
attempts to advance democratic causes in Southern Africa and peacefully negotiate the 
deconstruction of Apartheid. Their efforts between 1977 and 1979 resulted in the agreement 
that oversaw a transition to majority rule in Rhodesia with democratic elections held in 
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August 1980.117 Elsewhere, in September 1977, Carter and General Omar Torrijos signed the 
Panama Canal Treaties, which resolved the future of the canal zone. The agreement 
guaranteed the neutrality of the canal with continued U.S. military support to defend it until 
the Panamanians took full control the canal by 2000.118 Upon signing the treaty, Carter 
remarked that the treaty represented ‘the commitment of the United States to the belief that 
fairness, and not force, should lie at the heart of our dealings with the nations of the 
world.’119 This statement, and many of his early initiatives, embodied Carter’s efforts to 
forge a post-Vietnam foreign policy based on respect for national interdependence and 
human suffrage. Both cases, in addition to Middle East talks, demonstrated the ability of 
Vance and Brzezinski to work effectively with one another. When they appreciated their 
roles, shared the same vision and approach, they operated collegially with a positive impact 
on foreign policy.  
Both SALT negotiations and the human rights agenda brought to the forefront the 
institutional conflict between the two departments and illustrated the degree to which 
bureaucratic politics operated within the administration. SALT negotiations highlighted 
ideological and bureaucratic tensions between Vance, Brzezinski and their departments. The 
role Brzezinski had been afforded certainly contributed to the disagreements and fuelled the 
sense of competition between them as both attempted to put forward their competing tactics 
for the negotiations. Rather than negotiate a consensual strategy according to the rules of the 
rational actor, Brzezinski aggressively pursued an approach that was at odds with Vance and 
his department. Even Vance’s attempt to develop a conciliatory fall-back position in the 
event of a Soviet rebuttal was met with opposition from Brzezinski. Competition and 
conflict, rather than collegial mediation, drove deliberations over SALT. 
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Human rights, similarly, was another example where their rival objectives affected 
the implementation of policy. While Vance wished to keep human rights considerations 
away from SALT negotiations, Brzezinski urged Carter to publicly condemn their abuses. 
Moreover, the lack of co-operation within the State Department created problems as the 
NSC sought to develop and implement the policy. Only the effective management of the 
issue by Warren Christopher prevented an inter-agency conflict on the matter. However, 
disharmony within the State Department, unable to unite behind the president’s initiative, 
resisted attempts to install human rights considerations within their bureaus. The internal 
organisational process faltered as the State Department struggled to maintain bureaucratic 
discipline and develop a consistent approach to human rights. Both events emboldened the 
NSC as their power and status within the administration continued to rise.   
Towards the end of 1977, Brzezinski sought to assert his authority more forcefully. 
He wrote to Carter in November and expressed his frustration with aspects of their agenda. 
‘While I believe that the various initiatives you have taken have been right, and individually 
correct, I feel that we are confronting a growing domestic problem involving public 
perception of the general character of that policy. To put it simply and quite bluntly, it is 
seen as ‘soft’’ he told the president, ‘you ought to take, before too long, a decision of some 
sort either on security or foreign policy matters that has a distinctively ‘tough’ quality to 
it.’120  
In February 1978, he wrote to Carter again and urged him to be more assertive in 
foreign policy matters. ‘A president must not only be loved and respected; he must also be 
feared’ he wrote, ‘I suspect that an impression has developed that the administration (and 
you personally) operates very cerebrally, quite unemotionally. In most instances, this is an 
advantage; however, occasionally emotion and even a touch of irrationality can be an 
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asset.’121 His desire for the administration to be more assertive in its foreign policy brought 
him into conflict with the more patient style of Vance. As the administration entered its 
second year, the president’s advisors resumed their struggles, not only on individual policies, 
but over the nature of the administration’s foreign policy agenda. 
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Chapter Four 
1978 
The Arc of Crisis and the China Card 
Following the rejection of the administration’s ‘deep cuts’ proposals in March 1977, Vance 
spent considerable time attempting to revive hopes of an arms control agreement with the 
Soviet Union. Talks resumed in May when Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko agreed to use the Vladivostok agreement as the basis for negotiations with some 
reductions in certain areas.1 However, throughout 1978, Brzezinski undermined Vance’s 
efforts as the bureaucratic rivalry between them heightened. As Brzezinski’s Special 
Assistant Robert Gates noted, ‘their differences were deep, philosophical, and were centred, 
in the first instance, on how to deal with the Soviet Union.’2  
Tensions between them had come to the surface when Brzezinski encouraged the 
‘deep cuts’ proposal and following its rejection, he bemoaned that Carter was spending an 
‘inordinate amount of time’ on SALT as Vance spearheaded a new negotiating position for 
the administration.3 While close collaboration on Middle East issues yielded some success in 
1978, for Brzezinski, the administration needed to take a stronger stance vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union as he sought to challenge their role in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Soviet and 
Cuban activity in the Horn of Africa and Angola came to dominate the administration’s 
agenda in early 1978 while attempts to normalise diplomatic relations with China exposed 
divisions between Vance and Brzezinski as both jostled with one another to steer the course 
of U.S. foreign policy. 
As this chapter illustrates, their divergent views on détente, and how to deal with the 
Soviet Union, brought the pair into conflict with one another as the policy wars escalated. 
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Brzezinski took on a more assertive role as he outmanoeuvred Vance in his attempt to shift 
the focus of their foreign policy agenda. In the process, the secretary of state’s authority 
gradually weakened, as the national security advisor positioned himself as the chief architect 
of U.S. foreign policy. This chapter also addresses the competition between their respective 
agencies, the NSC and the State Department, as both competed with one another to affect the 
administration’s approach to the Ogaden War, Shaba II and normalisation of relations with 
China. The resultant bureaucratic struggles, saw the NSC assert their domination over the 
State Department and establish themselves as the primary arena for policy development 
within the Carter administration.  
The Ogaden War 
Considered a strategically important area of the world given its proximity to the Middle East 
as well as shipping routes through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, a 
peninsula consisting of Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Sudan, became a highly 
disputed area in early 1978.4 Of those countries in the Horn, the United States previously 
had a close affiliation with Ethiopia under the regime of Emperor Haile Sellasie. The two 
nations enjoyed a long association after World War Two when economic and military aid 
flowed into the country as the U.S. presence steadily grew throughout the 1960s and into the 
early 1970s.5 The Nixon and Ford administrations, distracted by Vietnam and Watergate, 
neglected Ethiopia as the Selassie regime faltered and a bloody internal conflict resulted in 
the monarch’s fall from power.6 After spearheading the overthrow of the Selassie regime and 
installation of the Derg, Major Mengistu Haile Mariam spent the next two years purging 
rivals and consolidating his position before gaining complete control in February 1977, just 
weeks after Carter’s inauguration.7 
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 The brutality of the revolution and the repressive nature of his regime made the 
United States uncomfortable with both Congress and the press strongly condemning their 
actions and calling on the new administration to address the situation.8 In an attempt to stay 
true to their commitment to human rights, Carter dispatched Talcott Seelye, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, in February 1977 to inform Mengistu that 
while the U.S. wanted to maintain good relations they would be rescinding its military aid 
package to Ethiopia. Mengistu responded in April 1977 by publicly inciting violence against 
American personnel and institutions in Ethiopia. The administration then ordered the 
immediate closure of the American army base, Kagnew station, as well as the offices of 
United States Information Service (USIS), Naval Medical Research Unit (NAMRU) and the 
U.S. Military Assistance Group. They also closed the American consulate in Asmara and 
reduced the personnel at the U.S. embassy to just twenty-eight individuals as relations 
soured.9 
As Mengitsu renounced his nation’s ties with the U.S., he made overtures towards 
the Soviet Union. He had already nationalised swathes of the economy and passed social 
reforms aimed at creating an ‘all-Ethiopian Socialist movement’ and courted the support 
Cuba and the Soviet Union.10 After Fidel Castro provided a glowing report on the Derg’s 
handling of the revolution, Mengistu successfully pleaded to Moscow for an economic and 
military aid package worth $504million.11  
This move displeased another Soviet ally in the Horn, Somalia. Until 1977, Somali 
President Siad Barre enjoyed a close relationship with the Soviet Union following his rise to 
power in 1969. Somalia provided the Soviets with access to the port of Berbera in return for 
military aid and assistance, signing a formal friendship treaty in 1974.12 The Soviets 
showered $181million worth of arms on Somalia between 1967 and 1976 but as the Soviets 
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forged closer ties to Mengistu and Ethiopia, their relationship declined.13 While Castro 
lavished praise on Mengistu, he criticised Barre, questioned his socialist credentials and 
expressed concern over his territorial designs on the Ogaden region.14 Using the military aid 
and assistance the Soviets provided, Barre seemed intent on taking advantage of the volatile 
situation to reunite Ethiopia with Kenya and Dijibouti under a Somali flag.15 Castro reported 
that Barre’s ambition posed a threat to Mengistu’s regime but backing Ethiopia could result 
in the loss of Somalia’s friendship. Thus, the Soviets continued to reaffirm their commitment 
to both countries in the hope of reaching a peaceful settlement.16 
While his relationship with the Soviets deteriorated, Barre courted the support of the 
United States but the Carter administration kept its distance from developments in the Horn 
on human rights grounds.17 Furthermore, in light of the American experience in Southeast 
Asia, the administration was keen to avoid intervening in a conflict far from home. As Carter 
declared in his inaugural address, ‘we will not seek to dominate nor dictate to others. As we 
Americans have concluded one chapter in our nation's history and are beginning to work on 
another, we have, I believe, acquired a more mature perspective on the problems of the 
world.’18 A policy of non-intervention, not only recognised the growing demand for national 
interdependence and human suffrage in the developing world but affirmed Carter’s image of 
the U.S. as a force for good on the international stage. It also signified a significant shift in 
U.S. foreign policy in the post-Vietnam era, which Carter highlighted in his speech at the 
University of Notre Dame, declaring, ‘we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism 
which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.’ 19 
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With this pledge in mind, when Somalia made a tentative approach to the United 
States for military support, the Policy Review Committee dismissed Barre’s overtures as 
merely an attempt to play the U.S. and the Soviet Union off one another in a proxy war.20 
When the PRC explored the possibility of the United States and Somalia ‘becoming friends’, 
the consensus of opinion fell against closer ties.21 The administration still hoped to improve 
relations with Ethiopia and opposed severing their links completely. As Brzezinski noted in 
a memo to Vice-President Mondale, ‘we haven’t reached the point where we feel we should 
give up Ethiopia in exchange for Somalia.’22 His expert on Africa, Paul Henze, judged 
Ethiopia to be the more strategically important country in the Horn and argued against 
getting too close to Somalia.23 Vance meanwhile contended that increased support for 
Somalia would only aggravate relations with Ethiopia further and push them closer to the 
Soviets.24 The PRC noted that in the short term, prospects for improved relations with 
Ethiopia remained bleak but in the medium to long term, a sense of optimism pervaded. It 
warned against overtures towards Somalia or any actions perceived as hostile to the 
Ethiopians.25  
The PRC’s conclusions reflected the views of Vance and Brzezinski, both in accord 
over the administration’s position on the situation in the Horn.26 It also corresponded with 
Vance and Carter’s non-interventionist policies. Vance’s experiences of American 
involvement in Central America and Southeast Asia had illustrated to him, the limitations of 
intervention in regional disputes. At a meeting of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 
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council of ministers in May, Vance declared, ‘African problems should be resolved 
peacefully in an African context and in a manner acceptable to the African nations 
themselves. We are opposed to the use of force by external powers to bring about change in 
Africa.’27 Furthermore, coupled with ‘losses’ in China, Egypt and Yugoslavia, he did not 
believe the Soviets stood to profit from the situation. Whilst urging trepidation, he also 
argued against overstating their influence in the Horn for fear it may affect wider foreign 
policy goals on the continent.28 
Brzezinski initially supported the administration’s reserved approach to the dispute. 
Conscious of the Soviet and Cuban presence in the Horn he questioned Moscow’s 
commitment to Mengistu considering the tense domestic situation, which he believed made 
Ethiopia an unstable and unattractive proposition for the Soviets.29 He also remained 
sceptical about providing direct military aide to Siad Barre. As he told Carter, ‘Somalia is 
already one of the most heavily armed countries in Africa and makes no secret of its 
territorial claims against its neighbours. We cannot really gain by getting involved in this 
problem.’30  
However, by mid-1977, his NSC expert, Paul Henze broached the subject of 
providing defensive arms to Somalia. ‘We want to show friendliness towards Somalia but 
keep enough constraints on our renewed relationship to discourage the Somalis from 
adventurism. And we need to keep our own future options open’ he surmised in a memo to 
Brzezinski. With Congress unlikely to approve such a measure, he proposed encouraging 
their allies to supply arms as an alternative source.31 Providing defensive arms through their 
allies, allowed the U.S. to forge closer ties with Somalia without severely aggravating their 
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links with Ethiopia. But only weeks later the situation escalated when Somalia crossed the 
border and invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.32 
The Somali forces made quick and considerable gains against a struggling Ethiopian 
army, which now turned to the Soviet Union. Barre invaded the Ogaden with the belief that 
the Soviets would not back Ethiopia but Moscow provided 1,000 military advisers over the 
course of the war while Cuba dispatched 17,000 troops.33 Some within the Politburo 
believed aiding Ethiopia, provided an opportunity to restore its influence in the region, given 
their dwindling standing in neighbouring Egypt, while others viewed it as simply backing a 
fellow revolutionary ally. Furthermore, the Soviets also believed their increased support for 
Ethiopia did not threaten détente or relations with the United States as they insisted their 
support was ‘purely defensive’ and would not encourage Ethiopia to advance over the border 
into Somalia.34 
With the Soviets now backing their rivals Ethiopia, Soviet-Somali relations 
officially ended. On 13 November, 1977, Barre renounced the friendship treaty and 
terminated diplomatic relations with Cuba. Fearing that Soviet activity in Ethiopia may 
spark a communist insurrection in their country, American allies Egypt, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia were all permitted and encouraged to provide $400m in military aid to Somalia by 
the administration.35 They believed that the conflict would become a burden for the Soviets 
and potentially damage, rather than advance their position in the region. Even Vance 
remarked the Soviets may ‘fall off both horses.’36 
The administration held its initial position on the Horn. Carter confirmed in 
November 1977 they would provide Somalia with defensive arms after they withdrew from 
the Ogaden.37 However, through late 1977 and early 1978 evidence emerged of increased 
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Soviet and Cuban support for Mengistu as the Ethiopians prepared for a counteroffensive 
against Somalia. This increased Brzezinski’s concern that their presence in the Horn was 
less about defending Mengistu but rather an attempt to establish a foothold in the Horn. By 
forcing Barre out of Ethiopia, he believed the Soviets would not discourage Ethiopia from 
advancing over the Somali border, gaining control of a strategically vital part of the world.38 
He came to view the situation in the Horn as a clear case of Soviet expansionism that 
threatened the United States’ position in the region while failure to intervene potentially 
damaged American credibility with its allies.39 Henze later suggested that Brzezinski did not 
care about Somalia or Siad Barre but thought the administration needed to tackle ‘Soviet 
free-wheeling in the region.’40 
In November 1977, Carter gave Brzezinski permission to conduct background 
briefings with members of the press. Using this avenue, he fed the press with stories on ‘the 
growing Soviet-Cuban military presence’ in the Horn.41 At the beginning of November, the 
State Department acknowledged the presence of Soviet and Cuban advisors in Ethiopia but 
denied speculation about a large number of Cuban soldiers fighting alongside the 
Ethiopians.42 By February 1978, reports estimated nearly 3,000 Cubans were fighting in the 
Horn while the Soviets provided 1,500 military advisors.43 Within weeks intelligence 
gathered put the number of Cuban troops in Ethiopia as closer to 10,000.44 Brzezinski then 
went public with the figures and openly condemned the Soviets for their involvement, 
labelling it a clear example of ‘external, foreign intrusion into a purely regional conflict.’45 
In private, he raised the issue more forcefully with the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly 
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Dobrynin and warned him that Soviet activities in the Horn damaged relations with the U.S. 
as well as co-operation in other areas, like SALT.46  
The Soviets dismissed his vitriol. Dobrynin declared it another example of 
‘Brzezinski’s insistence on opposing communism wherever he found it.’ Nevertheless, the 
Soviet ambassador rationalised that ‘uproar in the West’ and the strength of feeling 
emanating from the stories adversely affected their relations with the United States.47 As a 
compromise, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko proposed a joint mediation effort 
with the U.S. but Brzezinski dismissed it as ‘the classic Soviet solution to regional disputes’ 
that only served to legitimise their presence in the region.48 Despite Dobrynin and 
Gromyko’s insistence that they would not let the Ethiopians cross the border into Somalia, 
Brzezinski did not believe either of them.49 
Ethiopia had, he believed, provided the Soviets with the opportunity to expand its 
influence in the Horn, which threatened the American interests as well as their influence in 
the neighbouring Arab countries.50 The House Committee on International Relations 
strengthened his position, when they expressed concern about Soviet and Cuban 
involvement in the Horn. ‘What is happening in the Horn of Africa today is much more than 
a conflict between two African countries’ they noted, ‘by undermining the fragile 
governments that exist in the Horn, Soviet influence could rapidly spread throughout the 
region and along the entire East Coast of Africa.’51 Brzezinski lobbied Carter to be tougher 
on the Soviets. ‘Public pressure on Cuba regarding Africa came none-too-soon’ he said as 
the opportunity to appear tough and score a significant foreign policy victory with the public 
presented itself in the Horn of Africa.52  
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To Vance and those in the State Department the situation in the Horn of Africa as a 
‘a text-book case of Soviet exploitation of a local conflict.’53 Although the Soviet Union 
sought to exploit the situation, the secretary of state and his advisors viewed them as a 
‘symptom of the problem, not the problem.’54 The ‘inherently pro-Ethiopia’ African Bureau 
of the State Department advocated improved relations with them and not Somalia, whom 
they saw as ‘the pariah of Africa.’ Support for Somalia only offered short-term gain, while 
tolerance of territorial expansion as well as the repressive regime of Siad Barre damaged 
their credibility across the continent in the long term.55 Others in the State Department 
ridiculed Brzezinski’s about-turn as typical Cold War thinking. ‘Somalia was lousy because 
it was under Soviet influence but then it became great because it was no longer under Soviet 
influence. Ethiopia was great because it was under American influence and then it was lousy 
because it was under Soviet influence’ recalled USUN Deputy Representative Donald 
McHenry.56 The department’s position remained the same. Given the local nature of the 
conflict, they stressed the need for those involved to negotiate a peaceful resolution.  
Initially, Carter fell on the side of Vance and the administration continued to keep its 
distance and refused to provide any support to Somalia, even as late as January 1978 when 
the Soviet and Cuban helped orchestrate the Ethiopian counteroffensive.57 At the end of 
January, the State Department organised a five-power summit with Britain, West Germany, 
France and Italy, which called for the withdrawal of Somali troops from the Ogaden and a 
negotiated settlement that saw the region federated with Ethiopia but retain some 
independence. Nevertheless, they stressed that those issues needed to be negotiated by those 
involved, the U.S. and others should keep their distance.58 
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However, Brzezinski succeeded in persuading some members of the administration 
to take a harder tone with the Soviets. UN Ambassador Andrew Young strongly condemned 
the Soviet and Cuban presence in the Horn and accused them of ‘contributing to the 
escalation of death and destruction.’59 Carter himself criticised the Soviets for getting 
involved in the conflict and accused them of undermining attempts by the U.S. and the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) to negotiate a peaceful settlement by continuingly 
shipping arms to the Horn.60 Vance also labelled their actions as ‘disappointing.’61 
Apart from public denunciations, little appetite existed within the administration to 
take a differing course of action that Brzezinski craved. Vance also stressed the need to tone 
down their vitriol towards the Soviet’s behaviour. He bemoaned Brzezinski’s background 
briefings, which he believed contributed to a hardening of public opinion towards the 
Soviets and had a detrimental impact on other foreign policy goals, primarily SALT.62 
Significant differences between the secretary of state and national security advisor emerged 
while a clear chasm developed between the globalists in the NSC, who viewed the situation 
through the East-West framework, and the regionalists in the State Department who 
interpreted events as a local conflict. 
The NSC lobbied more forcefully for stronger condemnation of the Soviet and 
Cuban presence in the Horn. To them, the Soviet exploitation of a local conflict represented 
an attempt gain an upper hand against the United States in the Horn. Moreover, if left 
unchecked, it created the potential for further interventions in the developing world.63 Henze 
described the State Department’s five-power summit as, ‘a remarkable testimony to the 
poverty of real thinking in State’ and argued that they ‘seem lusting to draw the Soviets into 
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a discussion on the Horn.’64 The administration, he believed, needed to ‘make their stay as 
costly as possible and the source of fundamental strain for them.’65 
To Brzezinski, Vance and his department’s position equated to weakness. As he 
noted in his journal, ‘everyone is afraid of getting into a crisis, and hence the general 
tendency is to downplay the seriousness of the issue.’66 The U.S. needed to show its allies in 
the region its resolve and challenge what he perceived as Soviet expansionism. He did not 
believe the assurances offered by Gromyko and Dobrynin and refused the guarantee offered 
by Mengistu to his deputy David Aaron, when he travelled to Ethiopia in February, that they 
did not intend to cross the border and invade Somalia. The New York Times reported a State 
Department source, as saying ‘what’s he trying to do, undermine his own deputy?’67 
Utilising bureaucratic prerogatives, Brzezinski took control of the situation and 
categorised it as a ‘crisis.’ By doing so, he placed it under the domain of the SCC with 
himself as chair, which gave him the authority to control and manage their deliberations. 
Strong words and public condemnation were important but the U.S. needed to demonstrate 
more directly their displeasure at Soviet actions to deter any such moves in the future. He 
began to float the idea of sending an American aircraft carrier task force into the vicinity of 
the Horn as it represented a ‘strong message to the Soviets’ and a ‘tangible backing for our 
strong words.’68 At an SCC meeting on 10 February, Brzezinski, supported by Aaron, put 
the idea forward but Vance, Brown and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
Richard Moose, immediately rejected it.69 Even the suggestion of using some form of 
military action in this dispute appalled them. ‘You could sense the anxiety in the room when 
I mentioned the possibility of more direct action’ Brzezinski later recalled.70 
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Nevertheless, he persisted with the idea and raised it at a further SCC meeting on 21 
February. He argued the deployment of an aircraft carrier, for purely political reasons, in 
order ‘to make clear the serious consequences of an invasion.’ Moreover, he suggested that a 
task force ‘could be a confidence building measure, encouraging countries in that region that 
the U.S. is present, stands with them, will protect the flow of arms, and will provide 
protection from the Russians.’ To Vance, this was ‘playing a bluff we cannot carry through.’ 
Harold Brown, who noted that the carrier would have ‘negative consequences’ remarked, 
‘what you (Dr. Brzezinski) want to deter – the Russians – do not need to be deterred.’ 
Brzezinski then retorted that he ‘foresaw immediate regional and international consequences 
to an invasion of Somalia and that this action would contribute to uncertainty and 
destabilisation in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. The lesson they would learn is that if they 
were in a contest, they should not get caught relying on the United States.’71  
At an NSC meeting the same day, with Carter present, Brzezinski continued to make 
the case for deploying a carrier to the region, suggesting that it ‘could deter the Ethiopians 
and Cubans from invading, this would retrieve the situation.’ Furthermore, ‘if the United 
States is afraid to take the Cubans on now, what will this do to the confidence in us of other 
countries?’ Both Vance and Brown countered this with the secretary of state suggesting, ‘the 
Somalis brought this on themselves. They are no great friend of ours, and they are reaping 
the fruits of their actions. For us to put our prestige on the line and take military steps is a 
risk we should not take.’ The president agreed and voiced his concern that their involvement 
was escalating unnecessarily.72 Brzezinski viewed the rejection of the air carrier idea as a 
bitter blow. Of those who opposed him, he singled out Vance, Brown and General David C. 
Jones, chair of JCS, ‘all of them seem to me to be badly bitten by the Vietnam bug and as a 
consequence are fearful of taking the kind of action which is necessary.’73 
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The discord between Vance and Brzezinski grew. The later noted, ‘for the first time 
in the course of our various meetings, he (Vance) started to show impatience, to get red in 
the face, and to raise his voice. I could sense that personal tension was entering into our 
relationship’ particularly when the question of linkage arose.74 The policy of linkage – the 
‘linking of one matter to another as a bargaining counter to trade or to levy pressure’ in an 
area of common agreement, had been used frequently by Nixon and Kissinger as means of 
deterring the Soviets or forcing concessions.75 Brzezinski regarded it as a necessary policy 
tool to regulate Soviet excesses and ensue co-operation but Vance opposed linkage, as he 
believed it to be counterproductive toward certain foreign policy goals.76 However, he 
publicly conceded that linkage would have an adverse effect on public attitudes vis-à-vis the 
Soviets and in particular, SALT negotiations. As he noted in a press conference, ‘I am not 
suggesting any direct linkage, but I do suggest it affects the political atmosphere in which 
these discussions take place.’77 
‘As soon as the linkage issues surfaced, Cy became very angry and agitated’ 
Brzezinski recalled.78 At a prior SCC meeting on 26 January, the participants reached an 
agreement that ‘the U.S. government should be cautious about taking actions that would in 
themselves encourage a sense of crisis or confrontation with the Soviets.’79 The State 
Department accepted that linkage could arise from Soviet activities in the Horn. 
Spokesperson Hodding Carter III and Director of the ACDA Paul Warnke acknowledged a 
potential ‘spill over’ effect in Congress and the nation but Warnke also stressed that ‘a 
SALT treaty is not a reward for Soviet good behaviour. It’s a way in which we advance our 
own interests.’ Therefore, negotiations should proceed regardless of events in Africa.80 
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Nevertheless, in a meeting with Dobrynin on 31 January, Vance confided that it might be too 
difficult a promise to keep, given the views of some within the administration. ‘Let me tell 
you straight that there are people close to the president telling him that the latest Soviet 
actions are a direct personal challenge to the president, a test of his fairness, and he should 
show the Russians he is not to be trifled with’ he noted to the ambassador. ‘I understood 
Vance’s sense of alarm’ Dobrynin recalled in his memoirs.81  
Brzezinski however seemed determined to link Soviet activities in the Horn to arms 
control negotiations. On 1 March, he told the press, ‘if tensions were to rise because of the 
unwarranted intrusion of Soviet power that will inevitably complicate the process’ but also 
‘any ratification that would follow the successful conclusion of the (SALT) negotiations.’ 
White House Press Secretary Jody Powell later confirmed that Brzezinski’s view reflected 
the position of the administration but it clearly did not.82 The next day Vance testified before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Attempting to reaffirm the administration’s 
position, he stated that ‘there is no linkage between the SALT negotiations and the situation 
in Ethiopia.83 At the same time however Carter made contradictory remarks at his news 
conference with the president remarking:  
The Soviets' violating of these principles would be a cause of concern to me, would 
lessen the confidence of the American people in the word and peaceful intentions of 
the Soviet Union, would make it more difficult to ratify a SALT agreement or 
comprehensive test ban agreement if concluded, and therefore, the two are linked 
because of actions by the Soviets. We don't initiate the linkage.84 
Vance, furious with the events that had unfolded, pointed the finger of blame 
directly at Brzezinski at an SCC meeting later that day:   
CV: I think it is wrong to say that this is going to produce linkage, and it is of 
fundamental importance. 
ZB: It is going to poison the atmosphere. 
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CV: We will end up losing SALT and that will be the worst thing that could happen. 
If we do not get a SALT treaty in the president's first four years, that will be a 
blemish on his record forever. 
ZB: It will be a blemish on his record also if a treaty gets rejected by the Senate. 
CV: Zbig, you yesterday and the president today said it may create linkage and I 
think it is wrong to say that. 
 
Harold Brown then spoke in support of Vance, ‘there is going to be linkage – but we 
should not encourage it…We should find something else to beat the Soviets with.’ Vance 
then reflected, ‘we are at the point where we are on the brink of ending up with a real 
souring of relations between ourselves and the Soviet Union and it may take a helluva long 
while to change.’ Brzezinski continued to press on linking SALT to Soviet actions in the 
Horn, stating, ‘they must understand that there are consequences in their behaviour. If we do 
not react, we are destroying our own posture.’ Vance brought the debate to a close ‘this is 
where you and I part. The consequences of doing something like this are very dangerous.’85 
The heated discussions between the pair revealed significant differences between 
them not only in relation to the Horn but to wider issues relating to détente and U.S.-Soviet 
relations. They not only battled over the administration’s response to a single issue but 
engaged in a wider debate on the approach to foreign affairs as they attempted to influence 
the president. Brzezinski used the crisis to advance his own views and approach towards the 
Soviets. Although he failed to change policy significantly, he succeeded in getting it on the 
agenda and debated amongst the president and his advisors. Tellingly, towards the end of the 
meeting, Vance noted ‘a year ago the Soviets were in Somalia and in Ethiopia as well – now 
it has become a daily crisis. We are stirring it up ourselves.’86 
Ironically, the situation in the Horn quickly deescalated in the weeks after the 
linkage debacle and Brzezinski’s suggestion that the U.S. send an aircraft carrier to the 
region. On 8 March, after losing nearly 8,000 men and seeing his military decimated during 
the conflict, Siad Barre announced the withdrawal of Somali forces from the Ogaden. 
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Ethiopia did not take advantage and cross the border as Brzezinski and others had 
speculated.87 However, events in the Horn proved to be a considerable setback for Vance 
and his approach to foreign policy. The press quickly noticed the divergence in Vance and 
Brzezinski’s assessment of the situation as speculation intensified. State Department 
officials expressed their annoyance at recent events with one source quoted in The 
Washington Post referring to Brzezinski’s linkage policy as ‘effective as shooting yourself 
in the foot.’88 Another implied that ‘differences are causing concern to others who fear that 
American policies will appear confusing.89 Correspondent Jim Hoagland meanwhile noted: 
upper echelon State Department officials…are disturbed that Brzezinski’s insistence 
on drawing lines against the Soviets in distant places like the Horn of Africa will 
turn that view into a rapidly self-fulfilling prophecy…Moreover they fear that 
Brzezinski is trying to use his advocacy of a tougher approach to expand his 
bureaucratic power, at state’s expense.90 
A general concern pervaded the State Department that events in early 1978 signalled 
a shift in policy towards the Soviet Union, as well as a scrapping of the regionalist approach 
they advocated, in favour of a hard-line anti-Soviet strategy. Vance too shared similar 
concerns over the administration’s approach. ‘Our African policies were sound and, I was 
convinced, would protect our interests as long as we kept a clear sense of what was 
attainable. We needed to be more consistent in explaining the purposes of our policies or we 
would end up creating public uncertainty and confusion’ he recalled in his memoirs.91 Even 
Brzezinski’s expert on the NSC Paul Henze, criticised the administration’s approach to the 
crisis remarking in a memo to his boss, noting that, ‘very little in our approach to the Horn 
over the past year could be characterised as exhibiting qualities of high statesmanship.’92 
Anthony Lake of the State Department Policy Planning Committee meanwhile reflected, 
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‘instead of claiming credit for a success, the NSC continued to emphasise the role of the 
Cubans and the Soviets…why focus more on the threat than our actions to counteract it?’93  
The situation not only highlighted ideological differences between Vance and 
Brzezinski but also the bureaucratic tussle that existed for influence over the 
administration’s agenda. While the approach of Vance and the State Department became the 
accepted course of action, Brzezinski exploited the bureaucratic process to advance his own 
views, despite a lack of support. Carter, busy with other issues, came to rely on the 
information provided by his national security advisor.94 Brzezinski used his daily brief with 
the president to affect the administration’s approach to the Horn and underline the threat 
posed by Soviet and Cuban intervention while he used the press to feed stories about their 
activities and whip up an anti-Soviet fervour.95  
As he categorised events in the Horn as a ‘crisis’ in early 1978, discussions took 
place under the direction of the SCC, which Brzezinski chaired. This allowed him to set the 
agenda of meetings and put forward the idea of sending an aircraft carrier to the Horn. 
Despite the opposition to his suggestion, his communications with Carter did not reflect the 
unanimous rejection of his proposal at an SCC meeting. In his report, Brzezinski wrote that 
during the discussions, only some disagreement emerged. In his memoirs, Vance wrote that 
some of Brzezinski’s reports of discussions contained discrepancies. The SCC meetings on 
the Horn were a clear example.96 After the argument over linkage, Brzezinski attempted to 
play down the dispute by insisting that ‘an extensive discussion of steps that could be taken 
to demonstrate our displeasure to the Soviets’ while simply noting that ‘Secretary Vance was 
strongly opposed to any linkage with SALT’ in the summary of conclusions memo to the 
president.97 
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At numerous stages during the crisis, Brzezinski attempted to influence the president 
using the bureaucratic arrangements within the administration. While he did not initially 
succeed, a noticeable shift in the administration’s approach followed at the end of hostilities 
in the Horn. His role in exploiting the bureaucratic processes certainly aided his cause but 
also detrimentally affected Vance’s position as well as his approach to handling U.S.-Soviet 
relations and SALT negotiations. It laid bare the frictions between himself and Brzezinski 
and the desire to control the administration’s foreign policy agenda. In light of events in the 
Horn, The New York Times wrote that while Carter attempted to maintain unity within his 
administration, ‘other officials expect the internal tug-of-war for the president’s mind to 
continue.’98 
Shaba II 
The dust had barely settled on the Horn of Africa situation before a similar conflict emerged 
between Angola and Zaire over Shaba province. Plagued by war since gaining independence 
in 1975, Angola became a Cold War battleground between the United States, the Soviet 
Union and Cuba. The Soviets and Cubans supported the People's Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) headed by President Agostinho Neto. The U.S. meanwhile 
secretly provided funding and arms to the Front for the National Liberation of Angola 
(FNLA) led by Holden Roberto as well as the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) ran by Jonas Savimbi. In 1976 however, Congress rejected calls for greater 
backing of the Angola rebels and halted funding.99 At the same time, Cuban support for the 
MPLA and Neto increased with 36,000 soldiers dispatched to Angola in addition to vast 
amounts of humanitarian aid to support the country.100  
When the Carter administration came into office, they explored the possibility of 
improving political and economic ties with Cuba, in the hope of eventually normalising 
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diplomatic relations. They also hoped increased co-operation might persuade Fidel Castro to 
reduce Cuba’s presence in Angola.101 Vance and the State Department supported this 
position and believed that the possibility of removing the embargo on Cuba gave them 
sufficient leverage to gradually reduce their presence in Angola. Brzezinski remained 
sceptical. Although an opportunity existed to weaken the Soviet-Cuban relationship, he 
doubted that Castro desired to sever ties with Angola. Indeed, the Cubans insisted their role 
was purely defensive and humanitarian and refused to let the U.S. dictate its position in 
Africa. Normalisation of relations with Cuba remained on hold.102 
While attempting to improve ties with Cuba, both Vance and UN Ambassador 
Andrew Young lobbied Carter to begin talks with Angola with a view to normalising 
relations. They argued that improved ties with Angola aided their diplomatic efforts in South 
Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia. This would not only stabilise the region and secure Angola’s 
borders but it would reduce the need to have the Cubans there as a defensive force, 
ultimately weakening their influence.103 Neither believed that this was a red line in 
negotiations and Vance conceded they could not realistically expect Neto and the MPLA to 
loosen their ties to Cuba given the threat posed to Angola by FNLA and UNITA. Young 
agreed, infamously suggesting that the Cubans brought a degree of ‘stability and order’ to 
Angola.104  
This exposed differences between the regionalists in the administration, headed by 
Vance, and the globalists led by Brzezinski who opposed increased co-operation with 
Angola while the Cubans still had a military presence in the country.105 According to USUN 
Deputy Representative, Donald McHenry, whenever the subject of normalising relations 
with Angola arose Brzezinski intervened in opposition to it. ‘Every time that there was an 
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effort to improve relations with the Angolans, Brzezinski would come up with some kind of 
way to make sure it didn’t happen’ he recalled, ‘it was always done in such a way that there 
was an effort to appear in favour of something but the timing wasn’t right or you had to 
consult with this person or they had to agree to some of condition that was impossible.’106 To 
Brzezinski recognition of Angola without any reduction in the Cuban presence legitimised 
their role. Carter agreed and sided with his national security advisor.107 In any event, hopes 
of normalising relations faded following the conflict in the Shaba region between March and 
May 1977. 
Hostilities erupted when exiled Katangan Congolese soldiers crossed the border into 
the Shaba province of Zaire from Angola on 11 March, 1977. The Katangans, who fled to 
Angola in the 1960s, forged close links to Neto and the MPLA who supported them with 
military training and arms. They formed themselves into the Congolese National Liberation 
Front (FLNC) with the intention of overthrowing the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. Zaire 
meanwhile supported two of the anti-Neto rebel groups in Angola, the FNLA and UNITA, 
contributing to the growing mistrust and hostility between the two nations. When the FLNC 
entered the Shaba, Neto did little to discourage them.108 
Early successes by the Katangans, threatened Mobutu’s regime. Vance labelled the 
Zairian army as ‘useless’ while others expressed concern that without any international 
support, Mobutu could be defeated. The Carter administration did not hold a particularly 
favourable opinion of Mobutu and his regime, citing his appalling human rights record, but 
with economic interests in Zaire at risk, they decided to provide a non-lethal aid package. 
The administration, reflecting the views of Vance and the State Department, viewed the 
conflict as a local one and encouraged a diplomatic resolution from the countries in the 
region.109 
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Fearful for his own position, Mobutu blamed the Soviet Union and Cuba for 
instigating the attacks and appealed for help from the West and the United States.110 This 
was, according to some within the State Department, a typical attempt to entice their support 
by turning a local conflict into an East-West Cold War struggle between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union.111 Nevertheless, pressure mounted on the administration from allies, 
particularly France, as well as sections of the American press to support Mobutu. Publicly, 
the administration decided to keep its distance, refraining from placing the conflict into an 
East-West Cold War narrative, underscoring the importance of ‘African solutions, to African 
problems’ and encouraging the Organization for African Unity (OAU) to mediate in the 
dispute. Privately, despite their grave misgivings of Mobutu and uneasiness at the brutality 
of his regime, they recognised the economic benefits his regime provided them and their 
allies. Furthermore, its geographic and political importance to the U.S. given its proximity to 
South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia where the administration was trying to make 
diplomatic progress towards majority rule, increased the need for a solution to stabilise the 
region.112 
The administration decided to encourage its allies to help Mobutu repel any attacks. 
He duly received support from Belgium, France and Morocco while the United States 
continued to provide limited non-lethal aid. The conflict, although a short one, earned Carter 
a fair amount of praise from Congress and the press as Zaire forced the Katangans out of the 
Shaba. The administration also prevented the conflict from escalating into an East-West 
battle, when Carter publicly stated that that Cubans had not been involved in the invasion. 
To the disappointment of Vance and Young however, the president decided not to proceed 
with normalising relations with Angola in the wake of Shaba I. While the administration did 
not blame the Cubans for the incursions into the province, they pointed the finger at Angola 
and accused them of encouraging the Katangans in response to Mobutu’s support for the 
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FNLA and UNITA. Moreover, the administration decided to focus its attention on other 
African issues, primarily Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia, which required more 
immediate concern.113   
In the aftermath of Shaba I, Neto requested Cuban support to quash any threats to 
his regime. Ironically, while the United States cited the Cuban military presence as a factor 
preventing increased co-operation between them, Castro had already begun the process of 
withdrawing Cuban troops from Angola. But citing Neto’s request, as well expressing 
concern regarding the international military support for Mobutu and Zaire, Castro ordered 
the suspension of the troop withdrawal and increased Cuban support for Angola.114  
This came at the same time as their support for Ethiopia was increasing and when 
Brzezinski briefed the press on their activities in the Horn, Christian Science Monitor quoted 
him as saying the possibility of normalising relations with Cuba was effectively impossible 
given their involvement in Africa. This drew a furious response from officials in the State 
Department who accused Brzezinski of using the press to affect policy.115 Coupled with 
events in the Horn, attitudes hardened regarding the role of the Cubans and the Soviets in 
Africa. Policy struggles continued within the administration when fighting, for the second 
time in a year, erupted in Shaba province. 
On 11 May, 1978, the Katangans once again invaded the Shaba making considerable 
gains, as they took the city of Kolwezi. Like Shaba I, the invasion threatened the regime of 
Mobutu as well as the interests of the United States and their allies. Mobutu once again 
blamed the incursions on the Cuban influence in Angola but in the aftermath of the Ogaden 
War and the controversy that surround the role of the Soviet Union, his accusations, despite 
the lack of evidence, received greater credence then before.116 
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Initially, the administration adopted a similar position to what it had done during 
Shaba I the previous year. It provided Mobutu with ‘non-lethal’ military aid, albeit increased 
to $17.5m, as well as a C-141 aircraft to airlift French and Belgian troops into Kolwezi. 
Their actions helped repel the Katangan’s advance and drove them out of Kolwezi, 
safeguarding Mobutu and his regime, again earning the administration considerable praise 
for their restrained yet effective response.117 But while they denied any Cuban or Soviet 
involvement during Shaba I, they did not do the same this time. Instead, they pointed the 
finger of blame directly at Cuba.   
As soon as he became aware of the invasion, Castro immediately summoned the 
Chief of U.S. Interests Section Lyle Lane to deny any involvement or knowledge of the 
Katangan’s attack. Vance accepted Castro’s version of events however the next day 
Brzezinski’s deputy David Aaron, citing CIA evidence, instructed press spokespersons 
within the administration to blame Cuba for the insurgency in the Shaba.118 ‘Shaba II was a 
godsend for the Cold War warriors’ recalled Donald McHenry, ‘they seized on it to urge a 
more hard line foreign policy on Carter.’119 Brzezinski pressed Carter, as he had done during 
the crisis in the Horn of Africa, citing public opinion polls that favoured taking a tougher 
stance.120 He also argued that African leaders wanted the U.S. to get involved, again 
suggesting that the credibility of the administration was under threat. Like with the Horn of 
Africa, Brzezinski succeeded in persuading the president to adopt a hard-line approach.121  
On 25 May, Carter criticised Cuba for Shaba II and accused them of having prior 
knowledge of the Katangans plans to invade as well as providing them with equipment and 
training.122 Vance, who had not been briefed by Brzezinski and unaware of Carter’s 
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comments, met with a visibly angry Carlos Rafael Rodriquez, Cuba’s Vice-President. When 
Rodriquez informed Vance of what Carter had said, the bemused secretary of state asked 
Andrew Young, also present at the meeting, if this was indeed the case.123 A day later, 
before a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Vance received 
questions on CIA evidence that showed Cuba had instigated Shaba II. The secretary of state 
urged them to ask the agency, as he had no evidence of Cuban involvement.124 That same 
day he met with Gromyko where the foreign minister insisted that the Soviets had played no 
role in Shaba II. ‘The Soviet Union did not have a single soldier or rifle in that area, and had 
no intention of sending any there’ he reminded Vance.125 
Carter did not believe him. At a meeting on 27 May during Gromyko’s visit to the 
United States, the president chastised the Soviet foreign minister saying that he believed that 
the Katangan invasion could not have been possible without Cuba’s involvement and that 
the Soviets had either approved or encouraged the escalation of their involvement. 
Furthermore, Carter noted, ‘the elimination of Soviet-Cuban involvement in Africa would be 
a contributing factor to the improvement of Soviet-American relations.’ Gromyko fired 
back, ‘not a single Cuban had been caught or even seen in that invasion. Yet, for some 
reason people had started to blame first the Soviet Union and then the Cubans.’ The foreign 
minister reiterated that the Soviets held ‘no designs on Africa at all. The president could rest 
assured that the Soviets did not want to lay their hands on Africa.’126 Gromyko’s assurances 
failed to convince Carter who remarked in his diary, ‘as we sat across the table from each 
other, Gromyko continuously made false statements. I knew he was lying, and he knew that 
I knew he was lying.’127 
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Having successfully encouraged a hard-line approach towards Shaba II, Brzezinski 
then gave an interview on Meet the Press. After echoing Carter’s statement about evidence 
relating to Cuba’s involvement in the Shaba invasion, he criticised Soviet and Cuban 
‘intrusion’ in Africa, which he described as not ‘compatible with what was once called the 
code of détente.’ He also said, in an obvious threat, that their behaviour damaged détente. ‘I 
do not believe that this kind of Soviet and Cuban involvement should be cost free’ he 
remarked, ‘in fact it carries with it consequences, which may be inimical to them.’128 
Even Carter believed his national security advisor had gone too far. ‘I chastised him 
about it. He was quite upset. I don’t want to create sympathy for the Soviets amongst the 
European allies or to drive them away from continued negotiations with us on SALT’ he 
noted in his diary.129 Vance, also upset, wrote to the president to complain. In a letter to 
Carter, reproduced in Brzezinski’s memoir, he wrote, ‘sharp and fundamental differences 
exist within the administration and are now public knowledge’ but he also noted that he had 
written the letter before Brzezinski’s comments on Meet the Press. Evidently, the divisions 
had become an increasing concern for Vance even before Brzezinski publicised his views.130 
Nevertheless, the national security advisor’s remarks as well as his increasing 
influence over Carter convinced those abroad that he was behind the administration’s shift in 
approach. Fidel Castro, furious at Carter’s accusation that Cuba instigated Shaba II, accused 
the president of being persuaded by lies ‘manufactured in Brzezinski’s office.’131 The 
Soviets also blamed Brzezinski for whipping up anti-Soviet sentiment during Shaba II. 
Gromyko remarked to Vance that, ‘Mr. Brzezinski had surpassed himself in this respect.’132 
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Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania and one of the founders of the OAU, also 
criticised Brzezinski’s influence over Carter as well as the potentially detrimental effect on 
its strategy in Africa. ‘If President Carter is to turn around and listen to the new Kissinger in 
his administration, he should not be surprised if we change our views because then he’s 
saying he does not care about one-man, one-vote in Africa. He only cares about 
confrontation with the Soviet Union’ he said.133 British Prime Minister James Callaghan, in 
an obvious jibe to Brzezinski, remarked, ‘there seems to be a number of new Christopher 
Columbuses setting out from the United States to discover Africa for the first time.’134 
The disagreements within the administration over the Horn of Africa and the Shaba 
highlighted the tensions between the State Department and the NSC. The State Department 
continued to underscore the local nature of the conflicts while many believed no clear proof 
of Cuban involvement existed. As Anthony Lake noted, ‘instead of emphasising our role in 
helping meet the Shaba crisis in Zaire, we got bogged down by our own claims that the 
Cubans were behind it all when we couldn’t prove it.’135 The NSC however frequently 
highlighted what it perceived as Soviet and Cuban misdemeanours. As Robert Gates, 
Brzezinski’s special assistant, recalled, ‘coming after Vietnam, Vance’s approach signalled 
weakness and invited Soviet aggressiveness in the third world – and that’s what we got.’ To 
Gates, Vance and the State Department’s view of clashes in the Ogaden and the Shaba as 
local conflicts and should be treated as such was ‘idealistic and naïve.’136  
The effect of the pressure on Carter from Brzezinski and the NSC resulted in a 
noticeable shift towards a more hard-line position vis-à-vis the Soviets. At Wake Forest 
University on 17 March, 1978, the president adopted a noticeably harsher tone when 
discussing the Soviets. He noted that, ‘there also has been an ominous inclination on the part 
of the Soviet Union to use its military power—to intervene in local conflicts, with advisers, 
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with equipment, and with full logistical support and encouragement for mercenaries from 
other communist countries, as we can observe today in Africa.’137 The speech, drafted by 
Samuel Huntington, head of national security planning on the NSC staff and described as 
‘the last of the hawks’ received minimal input from either Vance or Brown. ‘There were a 
lot of raised eyebrows’ within the State Department to the speech, according to sources 
quoted in The Washington Post.138  
A speech in Annapolis in June, also contained harsh criticisms of the Soviets with 
Carter observing that, ‘the Soviet Union apparently sees military power and military 
assistance as the best means of expanding their influence abroad.’139 As Vance noted in his 
memoirs, the Soviets reacted badly to the speech as he feared for SALT negotiations. 
‘Although Carter refused to slow down the negotiations, some of his advisors were less 
concerned about the progress in SALT than in sending signals to the Soviets that their 
international activities were damaging U.S.-Soviet relations and that the administration was 
responding firmly’ he reflected.140 Brzezinski meanwhile commented in his journal ‘SALT 
lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden.’141 
Carter’s speeches at Wake Forest and Annapolis also exposed the differences 
between Vance and Brzezinski and fuelled the speculation regarding their battle to influence 
policy. As noted in previous chapters, Carter was heavily reliant on the policy debates 
between Vance and Brzezinski due to his inexperience when it came to foreign affairs. But 
the tug-of-war between his advisors over U.S.-Soviet policy in Africa was precipitated by 
Carter’s inability to find a common ground between the two. While Brzezinski had 
contributed to the president’s growing scepticism and harsher tone towards the Soviets, he 
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was not prepared to embrace his doctrine and still sympathised with Vance’s approach 
towards détente, particularly in relation to SALT.142 ‘It was good to have it argued out’ 
Assistant Secretary of State Leslie Gelb recalled ‘but Carter didn’t have the capacity to 
combine them, to make them mesh in a sensible way.’143  
This was reflected in Carter’s two key foreign policy speeches that year at Wake 
Forest and Annapolis. In both speeches, he attacked Soviet actions in Africa but also spoke 
of the hope for increased collaboration between them and the United States.144 For example, 
Carter spoke at Wake Forest about co-operation with the Soviets in various areas in various 
areas, particularly around arms control. That was Vance. However, he also noted ‘if they fail 
to demonstrate restraint in missile programs and other force levels or in the projection of 
Soviet or proxy forces into other lands and continents, then popular support in the United 
States for such co-operation with the Soviets will certainly erode.’ That was Brzezinski.145 
The speech he then delivered at Annapolis in June contained glaring ambiguities. While 
complimenting the progress on SALT as well co-operating on issues such as human rights, 
he then reverted to a harsher tone. ‘The persistent and increasing military involvement of the 
Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa could deny this hopeful vision’ he declared.146 
The differences within the speeches only resulted in confusion, as Gelb recalled 
‘you could see one paragraph of a Carter speech was from Brzezinski and a paragraph from 
Vance and never meshed together. Just there as an obvious contradiction.’ This led The 
Washington Post to refer to his address at Annapolis as ‘two different speeches’ while also 
noting, ‘it can be argued that the president merely gathered all the bits and pieces into one 
speech and proclaimed the results to be his policy. Certainly, there were identifiable traces 
of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s conceptual view of great-power relationships and Secretary of 
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State Cyrus Vance’s tactical approach, and that lent the speech a certain on-the-one-hand-
on-the-other quality.’147 To Vance, the lack of unity was a concern. As he recalled in his 
memoirs:  
I was concerned about administration disunity during the previous year. In the face 
of adverse conditions, our policies in the Horn and in the Shaba had been 
remarkably successful. Yet a large segment of Congress and the public saw 
confusion and weakness, not only regarding Africa, but more significantly, in our 
ability to manage our relations with the Soviet Union…Good policies would not 
ensure public support and understanding if we tolerated diverse and discordant 
voices who made us appear to be the loser.148  
 
Normalisation of Relations with China 
The crises in Africa in early 1978 fuelled Brzezinski’s distrust of the Soviet Union. He had 
actively challenged the course of action as advocated by Vance and as 1978 progressed, he 
continued to assert his own views. When Carter entered office, he inherited stalled 
negotiations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to normalise relations between the 
two countries. After the Chinese revolution, the United States severed its diplomatic ties 
with the PRC who aligned themselves with the Soviet Union but disagreements throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s resulted in the breakdown of their relationship culminating in violent 
border skirmishes in 1969.149 At this point Mao and Nixon began to look closely at an 
alliance between their two countries as a means of countering Soviet influence across the 
world. In 1972, Nixon made his famous trip to China signalling a rapprochement in relations 
between the PRC and the U.S. with both signing the Shanghai communiqué affirming their 
commitment to normalisation. However, talks stalled on the issue of Taiwan. The island off 
the coast of China was the home to the government of the Republic of China (ROC) who 
lost power to Mao in 1949 but were considered the legitimate rulers of China by the U.S. 
who had provided them with military and humanitarian aid. The Chinese demanded the U.S. 
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renounce its diplomatic and military relationship with the ROC but while Nixon was 
prepared to end the United States’ association with Taiwan, public and congressional 
opinion was a significant obstacle to his hopes of establishing full diplomatic relations. The 
Watergate scandal, Mao’s death and electoral politics put normalisation on hold until the 
Carter administration entered office in 1977.150  
During the election campaign, Carter vowed to proceed with normalisation but did 
not enter into any specifics except to confirm that a promise of non-intervention in Taiwan 
on the part of the PRC would be critical before proceeding.151 When the administration 
entered the White House, China was not an immediate priority given their emphasis on 
SALT, which they knew the Chinese would not look favourably on.152 In the build-up to 
Carter’s first meeting with a representative of the PRC, Ambassador Huang Chen, Vance 
urged the president to reaffirm that normalisation was of ‘mutual interest’ and that the 
Shanghai Communiqué would guide them. But the cautious Vance told Carter to ‘avoid 
being drawn into substantive areas we are not yet prepared to address.’153 Vance’s warning 
not to get in specifics was indicative of the fact that the administration had not formulated a 
clear strategy towards normalisation.  
Following the election Vance recommended pursuing normalisation but told Carter, 
‘in the long run I feel we clearly should move toward total normalisation, but I do not think 
we need to rush.’154 He viewed normalisation as a historic as well as politically, 
economically and culturally significant act but crucially he was not keen on pursuing 
negotiations at the expense of U.S.-Soviet relations and SALT.155 Nor did Vance wish to 
comprise American links to the ROC. The Shanghai Communiqué called for the U.S. to 
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sever its diplomatic ties to Taiwan, abrogate their mutual defence treaty and withdraw all 
military personnel. Vance believed turning their backs on Taiwan was unacceptable, as he 
wrote to Carter, ‘I do not believe we should feel so compelled to establish diplomatic 
relations with Peking that we jeopardise the well-being and security of the people of 
Taiwan.’156  
However, he did offer a compromise. If the U.S. terminated the defence treaty, they 
had a year to honour the agreement, which meant they could respect their military 
obligations to Taiwan. Thereafter, Vance believed the administration could provide 
‘carefully selected defensive arms.’157 Moreover, the secretary of state wanted to maintain 
some form of diplomatic relationship and keep an official U.S. consulate on the island.158 
Despite advocating these terms, he suggested to Carter that the Chinese would find any 
deviation unacceptable and they could face an ‘indefinite postponement of diplomatic 
relations.’159  
Despite Vance’s lack of enthusiasm, Brzezinski, upon entering his post, immediately 
instructed his China specialist on the NSC, Michel Oksenberg, to provide him with a report 
on how to ‘restore momentum to our relationship with the PRC.’ Oksenberg argued in 
favour of normalisation as soon as possible. ‘I fear that the president has done nothing so far 
to express his personal interest in this issue’ he confided to Brzezinski.160 Although 
Brzezinski had once viewed the dispute between China and the Soviet Union as a mere 
‘family quarrel’ he viewed normalisation as an important instrument in the same way Nixon 
and Kissinger had. Given the breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations, Brzezinski believed the 
U.S. should forge a strategic-military relationship with China to discourage Soviet 
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expansionism.161 ‘U.S.-Chinese collaboration could be valuable in helping Moscow 
understand the value of restraint and reciprocity’ he noted.162  
But Carter wanted to focus on resolving unsettled issues rather than appealing to 
their anti-Sovietism. He told Brzezinski Nixon and Kissinger’s criticism of the Soviets 
during their negotiations had nauseated him and he did not want to ‘ass kiss’ the Chinese.163 
Unlike Vance, Brzezinski was prepared to accept Chinese demands to cut American 
diplomatic and military ties with Taiwan, if it resulted in an agreement on normalisation.164 
To some in the State Department, like Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Richard 
Holbrooke, the national security advisor ‘didn’t give a goddamn about Taiwan.’165  
Brzezinski admitted his position made him a lone voice within the administration 
and at a Policy Review Committee meeting on 27 June, 1977, he lost the argument.166 While 
they still favoured normalisation, no appetite to make major concessions on Taiwan existed 
and no timetable for normalisation was outlined.167 Carter did flirt with the idea of pursuing 
full normalisation but feared talks may adversely affect SALT and the Panama Canal 
Treaties, which faced intense scrutiny in Congress. He authorised Vance to visit China on an 
‘exploratory mission’ only.168 The position Carter adopted reflected Vance’s initial proposal 
– normalisation but with diplomatic representation in Taiwan and continued arms sales. Both 
knew the Chinese would reject their position but they wanted to open dialogue for 
normalisation further down the line, thus not interfering with SALT negotiations with the 
Soviets.169  
On 20 August, Vance arrived in Peking and informed the Chinese of their position. 
As the secretary and his team had predicted the Chinese were unwilling to negotiate on any 
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U.S. presence in Taiwan. The PRC leadership rejected the U.S. suggestions while Vice-
Chairman and de facto Premier, Deng Xiaoping, referred to their proposals regarding a 
diplomatic presence in Taiwan as akin to a ‘flagless embassy.’170 The Chinese believed the 
administration would respect the Shanghai Communiqué but were taken aback by their 
position. Deng told Vance, ‘in my opinion, this formula is not a step forward from the 
original process of normalisation. It is, on the contrary, a retreat from it.’171 Although they 
expected a rejection, the vehemence of their dismissal surprised Vance, who did not offer 
any alternative positions to the Chinese. In preparation for the visit, a draft proposal for 
normalisation had been prepared that accepted the Shanghai Communiqué but Vance kept it 
in his pocket. Brzezinski, aware that talks were not going well, intervened and attempted to 
get Carter to instruct Vance to compromise and pursue full normalisation. But the president 
rejected Brzezinski’s overtures and the communiqué remained in Vance’s pocket and he 
prepared to return home.172  
The Chinese, clearly disappointed, showed no hostility to Vance or his party. 
However, as they left their stopover in Japan, a leak to the press, from NSC staffer Samuel 
Huntington, indicated that the administration was pleased with the progress made and that 
the Chinese had shown a fair amount of flexibility on the issue of Taiwan. Vance and his 
travelling party angrily pointed the finger at Brzezinski.173 The story, ‘made us look like 
fools’ William Gleysteen, the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the East Asia bureau, remarked. 
An incensed Vance attempted to have Leonard Woodcock, the head of the U.S. Liaison 
office, discredit the leak but he was unable to reach the Chinese before they read the story. 
The leak only served to irritate the Chinese. Deng, giving interviews to the American press 
following Vance’s visit, criticised the administration’s proposals and branded them as a 
significant setback in the normalisation process.174 Gleysteen later reflected, ‘I half 
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convinced myself that Brzezinski must have been the source and deliberately set Vance up 
for a fall. Although this was probably unfair of me, it was symptomatic of the uncomfortable 
relationship that had already developed by this time between the NSC and ourselves.’175  
The leak embarrassed the administration and had a detrimental impact on their 
efforts to normalise relations. When Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited the United 
Nations a month later, Vance told him the U.S. would review its position and Woodcock 
would submit new proposals in due course. Five weeks then passed and only when 
Woodcock threatened to go directly to the president unless he received new instructions, did 
the secretary of state agree to provide them.176 Woodcock bemoaned to Oksenberg the delay 
in receiving the new instructions as ‘most unpleasant.'177 When he finally received 
instructions from the State Department, there was no significant deviation in their position, 
nor did he have the authority to proceed any further with negotiations. When Woodcock 
relayed them to Hua upon his return to China, the Foreign Minister expressed his 
disappointment at the lack of progress.178  
The lack of guidance from the State Department reflected their ambivalence. Vance 
wrote to Carter, prior to Woodcock’s return, that the administration should not proceed with 
any substantive proposals aimed at normalisation. Any major concessions, on Taiwan, 
would come later.179 Moreover, in a meeting with Gromyko in September, the Soviet foreign 
minister warned him that ‘playing the China card’ was a ‘dirty game’ and could have serious 
ramifications on U.S.-Soviet relations and SALT.180 Carter concurred and put normalisation 
on the ‘backer burner’ while they addressed other issues.181 For Vance and the State 
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Department, negotiating SALT, as well as peace talks in the Middle East, took precedence 
over China but Brzezinski and the NSC considered normalisation a high priority. 
On 25 October, Oksenberg wrote to Brzezinski that, ‘the longer we postpone 
making our presentation to the Chinese, the more likely it becomes that the Chinese will 
conclude not that we are patient about normalisation but that we don’t give a damn.’182 
Events dramatically changed within the space of two weeks. A few days after he wrote the 
memo, Oksenberg and Brzezinski dined with Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of 
Singapore, who enquired as to the state of Sino-American relations and asked why they were 
not pursuing normalisation. This struck a chord with Brzezinski and afterwards he asked 
Oksenberg about the possibility of receiving an invitation to visit China. He had become 
frustrated with the lack of progress on normalisation and with the supposedly increasing 
Soviet presence in Africa troubling him, he wondered whether it was not time to ‘play the 
China card.’ Through Oksenberg’s connections, Brzezinski elicited an invitation to visit 
China.183  
On 3 November, 1977, Ambassador Huang Chen, in front of a stunned Vance, 
Holbrooke and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Phillip Habib, extended an 
invitation to Brzezinski to visit China. ‘It’s a date’ the national security advisor gleefully 
replied.184 The horrified trio immediately registered their unhappiness. Habib protested with 
Brzezinski directly from Vance’s car phone on their way back to the State Department while 
Holbrooke called Oksenberg and asked, ‘have you been playing games?’185 Vance ‘in 
considerable agitation’ accused Brzezinski of deliberately trying to undercut him and the 
administration’s negotiations with the Chinese.186 For the secretary of state, Brzezinski’s trip 
was premature given the administration had not agreed a new position or indicated a 
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willingness to restart negotiations. He also construed the invitation as blurring the lines of 
who acted as the administration’s foreign policy spokesperson.187  
Cater sided with his secretary of state and denied Brzezinski permission to visit 
China, and explored, on Vance’s advice, the possibility of sending Vice-President Walter 
Mondale instead.188 He told Brzezinski ‘I don’t want to be seen as jumping all over Cy given 
that he has such strong feelings on the subject.’189 Undeterred he continued to lobby the 
president and others within the administration to support his position, enlisting the support 
of both Secretary of Defense Harold Brown as well as Mondale. Soviet and Cuban activity 
in the Horn of Africa meanwhile provided Brzezinski with the opportunity to press more 
forcefully to be allowed to go to China.190  
On 27 February, he wrote to Carter saying, ‘bearing in mind developments on the 
Horn and the related need to send a sensitive signal to the Soviets, the time is ripe for your 
decision on this subject.’191 On 16 March the president relented and decided to send 
Brzezinski to China with the instruction that he had ‘made up his mind’ on normalisation.192 
Soviet activities in Africa contributed to the shift in the Carter’s mind and his decision to 
link it to arms control indicated his willingness to pressure the Soviets to curb their 
behaviour and make concessions on arms control. ‘Playing the China card’ would only add 
further pressure to the Soviets. Moreover, it could also appease the more anti-Soviet 
elements within Congress and thus benefit SALT when it came to the floor.193 Although 
Vance remained opposed to sending Brzezinski, he sympathised with Carter’s position. 
Normalisation may negate any criticism from detractors of SALT but he conceded that it 
was the president’s decision.194  
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To Brzezinski, Vance and the State Department’s resistance and opposition to his 
trip was symptomatic of being the most ‘turf-conscious’ agency in Washington but any 
semblance of bureaucratic harmony quickly evaporated.195 Prior to working together, 
Holbrooke and Oksenberg agreed to work co-operatively with one another to help shape the 
administration’s policy towards China.196 Paul Kreisberg, the Deputy Director of the State 
Department Policy Planning Committee, recalled, ‘although Holbrooke and Oksenberg 
detested one another…there was an agreement that we ought to go for the deal that would be 
easiest to work with the Chinese.’197 That collegiality fractured as Brzezinski and Oksenberg 
attempted to fashion a new approach without consulting the State Department. ‘Oftentimes 
not all the cards were on the table’ recalled desk officer Harry Thayer, ‘it took quite a lot of 
extra effort to keep track of what Mike Oksenberg, on his own or on Zbig’s behalf, was up 
to at any given time.’198  
Holbrooke’s determination to regain control of negotiations led him into direct 
confrontation with Brzezinski, who he disliked. Holbrooke had been an advisor to Carter 
during his campaign and when the president-elect was selecting his cabinet, he asked for his 
opinion on prospective appointments. When it came to Brzezinski, Holbrooke ‘tried to stick 
the knife in as delicately as possible’ telling him that he was not a good pick and would 
undoubtedly clash with Vance.199 Brzezinski disliked Holbrooke in equal measure, believing 
him to be part of a group of ‘left wing nuts’ and a prolific leaker. Keen to maintain secrecy 
and maintain control over the development of the administration’s position, Brzezinski and 
Oksenberg wanted to keep Holbrooke and the State Department out of the loop.200 
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In March 1978, Oksenberg informed Brzezinski, ‘Holbrooke said that in his lunch 
with you, you agreed planning for your trip would proceed as for a Vance trip. This would 
mean papers would be prepared at State, primarily in the EA (East Asia) Bureau, and that 
Holbrooke would take the lead bureaucratically.’ He then requested, ‘assuming your trip 
takes place, planning for it will occur here.’201 Brzezinski approved Oksenberg’s appeal. In 
retaliation, Holbrooke attempted to fill the party travelling to China with State Department 
officials but when Brzezinski learned of this, he telephoned the assistant secretary and 
threatened to ‘throw him off the airplane’ if he persisted.202  
Carter felt the State Department’s sensitivity to Brzezinski’s role in the 
normalisation process was a result of being bypassed by Kissinger during the initial 
negotiations with China in the early 1970s.203 However, such was the seriousness of the 
negotiations and the secrecy required, he sided with his national security advisor. He also 
viewed Holbrooke and the State Department as a potential obstacle believing that if they did 
not support his proposals they may leak them to the press. ‘In the State Department, nothing 
is secret. There is a pipeline between The Washington Post and the State Department’ Carter 
later claimed.204  
On 20 May, 1978, Brzezinski and his travelling party arrived in China and the 
national security advisor told the PRC leadership, the United States had ‘made up its mind’ 
on normalisation. The basis would be the Shanghai Communiqué but during his initial talks, 
Brzezinski did not venture into any great specifics, leaving them for when negotiations 
reached an advanced stage. Instead, he appealed to a common interest, the Soviet Union. 
During his visit, Brzezinski exulted in his anti-Sovietism. In private meetings, he stressed 
the importance of an alliance between the U.S. and the PRC to counter Soviet expansionism 
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in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.205 He also promised to provide them with American 
technology that the Soviets were unable to obtain and, while they remained opposed to 
selling arms or weapons systems directly to the Chinese, Brzezinski confirmed that they 
would not object to European allies providing them with arms or any transfers of advanced 
technology.206  
Within the travelling delegation, hardliner Samuel Huntington, along with Ben 
Huberman of the NSC and Morton Abramowitz from Defense, briefed the Chinese on the 
Soviets military capabilities and shared intelligence while Oksenberg provided a 
presentation on SALT negotiations.207 Outside of the meetings, Brzezinski’s comments 
amounted to, ‘schoolboy-like, almost appealing, naive enthusiasm for sticking it to the 
Russians’ State Department Director for Chinese Affairs Charles W. Freeman 
remembered.208 When they visited the Great Wall, Brzezinski joked to the Chinese, ‘if we 
get to the top first, you go in and oppose the Russians in Ethiopia.’209 
The PRC leadership developed a personal rapport with the national security advisor 
whereas the secretary of state’s commitment to détente and SALT had not gone down 
favourably. One official later said, ‘we know where Brzezinski stands on the Soviet Union, 
China and Japan. With Vance, we never knew.’210 Vance, who viewed normalisation as a 
separate foreign policy objective rather than placing it within the framework of the Cold 
War, was left horrified by the anti-Soviet rhetoric Brzezinski projected during his visit. ‘He 
allowed his trip to be characterised as a deliberate countermove by the U.S. at a time of 
worsening relations with Moscow,’ he recalled but it was indicative of the shift in focus 
within the administration.211 In the beginning, Carter embraced the Vance school of thought 
                                                          
205 Andrinaopoulos, Kissinger and Brzezinski, 206-207. 
206 Mann, About Face, 87. 
207 Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 131. 
208 Charles W. Freeman, “Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection: Interview with Ambassador 
Charles W. Freeman, Jr.,” interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 14 April 14, 1995, ADST. 
209 Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 134-135. 
210 Cohen and Tucker, “Beijing’s Friend, Moscow’s Foe,” 92; Tyler, A Great Wall, 244.  
211 Vance, Hard Choices, 116. 
191 
 
on pursuing arms control as a means of strengthening détente but switched to developing a 
military relationship with China in an atmosphere of hostility towards the Soviets.212 
The tension between Holbrooke, Brzezinski and Oksenberg increased during the 
China visit. Prior to their departure, Holbrooke learnt he would not sit in Brzezinski’s 
meetings with Deng at the national security advisor’s request. After Woodcock 
unsuccessfully lobbied on his behalf, Gleysteen, Holbrooke’s deputy, then pleaded with 
Brzezinski to allow his boss to attend the meetings but the national security advisor snapped 
back, ‘screw you. I’m not going to.’213 ‘Other members of the delegation accepted this 
restriction, except for Holbrooke, who made a great issue of personal privilege out of his 
exclusion’ Brzezinski recalled, attributing his omission to Carter’s desire to keep the talks 
secret and confidential.214 In his quest to maintain secrecy, Brzezinski also instructed 
Oksenberg to prevent Holbrooke from seeing the memorandum of the conversations 
(MEMCONS) with Deng.   
On the flight back from China, when Oksenberg denied Holbrooke permission to 
view the MEMCONS, the assistant secretary’s frustration boiled over. A physical 
confrontation ensued between the two with Holbrooke apparently grabbing Oksenberg by 
the collar demanding access to the materials yelling, ‘if you don’t give me those 
MEMCONS after we get back, I will destroy you!’ Oksenberg retorted ‘if I give you those 
MEMCONS after we get back and you violate our trust, I will destroy you!’215 ‘It was awful, 
probably the nadir of my bureaucratic experience’ remembered Gleysteen who, believing 
Brzezinski had taken a great deal of pleasure out of humiliating Holbrooke, labelled him ‘a 
national disgrace.’216 Brzezinski continued to voice his belief that Holbrooke and the State 
Department were a potential obstacle to progress on normalisation. It was his, and the 
president’s wish, to limit their role in the talks but many in the agency considered the 
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assistant secretary’s treatment outrageous and a clear sign of their exclusion from the 
process.217  
In a further blow to Vance and Holbrooke, on 11 October, Carter decided to drop 
talks aimed at restoring relations with Vietnam. Both embraced normalisation to increase 
economic development and regional co-operation in Southeast Asia and repair old wounds. 
Although they believed the administration should not view foreign policy objectives through 
the Cold War lens, they considered normalised relations with Vietnam as an opportunity to 
offset Soviet influence and loosen Hanoi’s dependence on Moscow.218 Carter viewed 
normalisation as a means to repair war wounds and build friendships in the third world, 
rather than any strategic gains or losses the United States may or may not make against the 
Soviet Union.219 Brzezinski however, characterised the attempts of Vance and Holbrooke to 
normalise relations as essentially ‘pro-Soviet, anti-Chinese.’ He did not share their 
optimistic view that Hanoi would cut ties with Moscow, essentially seeing Vietnam as part 
of an ‘East-West geopolitical struggle’ where the Vietnamese were essentially Soviet 
proxies exploiting the region for its own gain.220 
Moreover, after a series of border skirmishes, the prospect of Vietnam, with the 
support of the Soviet Union, invading neighbours Cambodia looked increasingly likely.221 
The United States had no interest in defending the Cambodian regime of Pol Pot and in 
April 1978, Carter labelled the Khmer Rouge as the ‘worst violator of human rights in the 
world.’ But China had supported the Khmer Rouge for many years and provided them with 
vast sums of military aid. Therefore, Brzezinski did not want the issue of Cambodia to 
jeopardise improved relations with China.222  
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Although Brzezinski had called for tough action against the Khmer Rouge and Pol 
Pot when the administration fashioned its approach to human rights, he believed that 
pushing the Chinese to exert pressure on Cambodia would be detrimental to 
normalisation.223 When quizzed about the border skirmishes in January 1978, he blamed the 
Vietnamese and referred to them as a ‘Soviet proxy’ in effect granting tacit backing to 
Chinese support for Cambodia.224 When Brzezinski visited in May, the PRC affirmed their 
support for Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge and blamed the Vietnamese for the border 
skirmishes. In the first round of talks, Foreign Minister Huang Hua told the American 
delegation that Vietnam, in collaboration with the Soviet Union, had militaristic designs on 
Cambodia with the intent on forming an ‘Indochinese federation.’ Brzezinski responded by 
affirming that the administration’s concern was primarily for human rights in Cambodia. 
‘We feel that we cannot entirely ignore the internal circumstances in Cambodia. These 
circumstances offend our moral concerns’ he noted. But he also stated that the U.S. did not 
support Vietnam’s desire to oust Pol Pot, which he intimated was ‘inspired not only in the 
area immediately contiguous to Cambodia but from farther north.’225  
Brzezinski viewed the Vietnamese-Cambodia border skirmishes, in the same way he 
interpreted the crises in Africa, as a proxy war with the Vietnamese fighting on behalf of the 
Soviets. Attempts to normalise relations with Vietnam only harmed their negotiations with 
the PRC.226 Vance and Holbrooke meanwhile believed that normalisation could run 
concurrently with talks with the Chinese. They felt that if talks with Vietnam concluded 
first, it gave the PRC sufficient time to accept their rapprochement. Nor did they agree with 
Brzezinski assessment of Vietnam as a Soviet proxy and continued to argue that improved 
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relations may tempt Hanoi away Moscow.227 Encouraged by the noises they received from 
the Vietnamese, who agreed to drop their demand for aid from the U.S., they pressed ahead 
with normalisation. Oksenberg dismissed them as not being serious, telling Holbrooke, 
‘Dick, they are teasing you; they are mocking you.’228 Nevertheless, Holbrooke made 
significant progress with the Vietnamese and on 29 September, Vance informed Carter they 
had reached an agreement to normalise relations but he told the president to hold off on 
announcement until after the November midterm elections.  
The delay gave Brzezinski the opportunity to dissuade Carter from restoring 
diplomatic ties with Vietnam. He wrote to the president on 13 October, stating his belief that 
negotiations with Vietnam adversely effected talks with the Chinese and gave the impression 
they were ‘pro-Soviet.’ He described the efforts of Vance and Holbrooke as tantamount to 
‘war guilt’ and urged the president to give priority to talks with the Chinese and delay any 
announcements on Vietnam until after the conclusion of negotiations with the PRC. On the 
memo Carter wrote, ‘I want to move re VNam’ but agreed to the delay.229 Brzezinski had 
scuppered another foreign policy objective of Vance and the State Department as talks with 
the Chinese proceeded towards a successful conclusion, while hopes of improving relations 
with Vietnam dissipated.  
The national security advisor provided fresh momentum to normalisation talks with 
the Chinese and made significant progress. The U.S. agreed to sever its diplomatic ties with 
Taiwan and remove all military personnel from the island but still unofficially sell defensive 
arms. They promised to make a statement confirming that its future be resolved peacefully, 
while the Chinese agreed not contradict the American position.230 As negotiations 
progressed, Vance continued with SALT talks. Although no breakthrough had been reached 
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with the Soviets, he received an assurance that an announcement on normalisation would 
follow the arms control agreement.231 
By 13 December however, an agreement between the United States and China to 
normalise relations was in place. With Vance on a diplomatic trip to the Middle East, 
Brzezinski decided to move quickly and bring forward the announcement of normalisation 
to 15 December, scuppering any chance of an agreement on SALT in December or a 
possible U.S.-Soviet summit in January. For him, a new relationship with China was more 
desirable then one with the Soviets and he did not want any interference from the State 
Department.232 China specialist Roger Sullivan, whom Oksenberg asked to call in sick so as 
not to arouse Holbrooke’s suspicions, was the only member of the department to help in 
their endeavours.233  
Holbrooke became suspicious after his attempts to contact Oksenberg throughout 
the day were continuously brushed off. He protested to Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, who made his way to the White House. On arrival, Brzezinski told him of the 
development. Christopher believed it inconceivable that the assistant secretary be cut out of 
the loop and he summoned Holbrooke against Brzezinski’s wishes.234 To Christopher, 
Brzezinski had deliberately ‘blacked them out’ for six hours while he attempted to complete 
normalisation. Brzezinski’s motivation, he argued, was not to avoid leaks as he claimed but 
rather finalise normalisation before the State Department could raise any objections thus 
putting it ahead of U.S.-Soviet relations and SALT as a priority. Even Oksenberg argued this 
to be the case.235  
On 15 December, President Carter formally announced that the United States and 
China had agreed to normalise relations with one another. In a joint communiqué, which 
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outlined the terms of the agreement, the U.S., by cutting its diplomatic ties with Taiwan and 
the ROC, recognised the PRC as the sole government of China. The U.S. vowed to maintain 
commercial and cultural links with Taiwan and sell defensive arms but terminate the defence 
treaty and withdraw American military personnel from the island. The two nations also 
pledged to work co-operatively with one another to reduce the danger of international 
military conflict and oppose attempts by others to enforce ‘hegemony’ on another.236 
Brzezinski certainly appeared to revel in telling Dobrynin the news. 'His face turned 
grey and his jaw dropped’ he recalled.237 Although Vance referred to normalisation as a 
historic and enduring achievement for the administration, he also expressed regret at the 
impact it had on his own agenda, specifically SALT. Whilst he did not believe that 
normalisation had directly damaged an agreement, the announcement, on the eve of talks in 
Geneva, had a negative effect. When Vance met with Gromyko following the 
announcement, the Soviet foreign minister was ‘testy and showed none of his customary 
sardonic wit.’ He criticised the remark in the communiqué that the U.S. and China were both 
opposed to any nation’s attempts to establish ‘hegemony’ in the Asia-Pacific region or 
across the world, which he interpreted as a direct reference to the Soviet Union. There was a 
general feeling they had been upstaged and that normalisation was directed at them.238 
Vance sympathised with the Soviets position. He later noted, ‘I don't see any usefulness in 
using words like "hegemony" which just raise red flags.’239 
While they continued to voice their commitment to SALT, the Soviets quibbled over 
numerous issues during the talks but to Vance, his delegation, and even Brzezinski, they 
sought excuses to delay finalising an agreement. China undoubtedly complicated the matter. 
It created a feeling within the Soviet delegation that the administration was trying to 
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embarrass them to force concessions. Normalisation certainly hindered a potential agreement 
on SALT in December 1978 as Vance had hoped. It would take a further six months before 
they finalised a deal on arms control.240 Annoyed that normalisation delayed SALT, he later 
reflected, ‘if you're asking the question, should we have done it? I would have said we 
should have deferred it, and announced the Chinese things after the negotiations with the 
Soviet Union in Geneva.’241 However, Brzezinski’s intervention had detrimentally affected a 
key foreign policy objective of the secretary of state. 
Hopes of the U.S. normalising relations with Vietnam deteriorated following the 
signing of the joint communiqué with the PRC on 1 January, 1979. When Deng visited the 
United States, he informed Carter that China intended to retaliate against Vietnam for 
toppling the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot in Cambodia. Carter attempted to dissuade Deng, but 
responded that the U.S. would not publicly condemn such action when it occurred.242 To 
Vance, this pushed Vietnam closer into the Soviets hands. Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge 
began a fight to retain Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations.243 As Vance noted in his 
memoirs, ‘we were being asked to vote for the continued seating in the UN of one of 
history’s most barbaric regimes.’ The Human Rights Bureau led by Patricia Derian wanted 
them unseated, as did the USUN delegation however, ‘strategic interests’ prevailed.244 
Brzezinski and the NSC countered their opposition, arguing that a vote to unseat Cambodia 
meant siding with Vietnam, the Soviets and Cuba against their new ally in China. Carter 
agreed, while Vance, torn by the decision, told the USUN mission to vote against unseating 
Cambodia.245 
At the end of the day on 13 December, Christopher and Holbrooke retreated to a bar 
where the deputy secretary remarked that Brzezinski was ‘running rampant over the 
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department.’246 On the back of the trip to China, Holbrooke’s deputy Gleysteen requested 
reassignment but not without giving the secretary of state a word of advice. To Gleysteen, 
Brzezinski deliberately undermined Vance and the State Department as the driver of foreign 
policy and he urged him to reassert his authority. ‘I was emboldened to do what I did by the 
power of my feelings’ Gleysteen recalled. ‘I am sure Vance got the same advice from many 
others. He listened to me in obvious pain, made no comment, and changed the subject.’247  
To many in the department, their role and influence diminished amid concerted 
efforts by Brzezinski and his staff. As they lost significant policy battles in respect to the 
administration’s approach to the Soviet Union, Vance’s more accommodating and co-
operative strategy towards détente was gradually eroded in favour of a more assertive hard-
line approach advocated by Brzezinski. Even Fidel Castro publicly noted the 
administration’s policies reflected the shift from Vance, commenting, ‘Brzezinski has a 
policy of international intervention, the policy of using China against the Soviet Union, the 
policy of mixing SALT negotiations with the problems of Africa…And you, the Americans, 
know this perfectly well.’248 Brzezinski succeeded in hardening U.S. policy towards the 
Soviet Union and in turn wrestled control of the foreign policy agenda to do so, outflanking 
Vance at numerous intervals. He was now not only influencing elements of U.S. foreign 
policy but was also the driving force behind it at the expense of Vance and the State 
Department.  
Conclusion 
At the same time as the policy wars between Vance and Brzezinski heightened, there was a 
rare moment of co-operation at Camp David in September 1978. As outlined in Chapter 
Three, the Middle East had been an area of close collaboration between the secretary of 
state, the national security advisor and their departments as they orchestrated the signing of 
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the Camp David Accords and later the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. After the Camp 
David talks, Brzezinski travelled via helicopter with Assistant Secretary of State Harold 
Saunders. As Saunders recalls, ‘he (Brzezinski) turned to me and with a certain amount of 
surprise in his voice said: “You know, the State Department and the White House worked 
quite well together!”…I don’t remember what I responded, but the thought came to mind 
that Zbig should not have been surprised; that is the way good government functions.’249  
The Camp David negotiations represented a rare period of co-operation between the 
two departments in a year fraught with disagreements that became public and damaged their 
credibility. The national security advisor’s desire to see a hardening of the administration’s 
approach succeeded and at the same time undermined the efforts of Vance and the State 
Department throughout 1978. After the initial setback from the ‘deep cuts’ rejection, Vance 
effectively moderated the administration’s approach but events in Africa led Brzezinski to 
persuade the president to change course. He succeeded in pursuing tougher rhetoric in 
respect to Soviet activities in Africa and normalising relations with China. Moreover, 
Brzezinski used the bureaucracy to his advantage throughout the year, to the detriment of 
Vance and the State Department.  
1978 illustrated the extent to which bureaucratic politics had manifested itself within 
the administration as the formation of policy increasingly created tensions between the NSC 
and the State Department. The administration’s attempts to co-ordinate talks with the PRC 
over normalisation and develop an appropriate response to Soviet and Cuban intervention in 
the Horn of Africa and the Shaba, were undermined by disagreements between the 
president’s advisors and their departments. Moreover, the animosity between Oksenberg and 
Holbrooke with respect to normalisation, demonstrated how personal rivalry between 
individuals within the respective bureaucracies permeated the policy process.  
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The harmony from the Camp David talks was short lived. While the administration 
focused on negotiations, other events occurring at the time had serious ramifications for the 
administration’s foreign policy agenda as the Shah of Iran’s grip on power began to weaken. 
The situation in Iran proved to be a significant blow for the administration over the coming 
year but it also divided Vance and Brzezinski once again as the bureaucratic rivalry 
escalated.  
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Chapter Five 
1979 
‘Acquiescence vs. Assertiveness’ 
As 1978 came to an end the United States faced the prospect of losing a key ally in a 
strategically vital area of the world: The Shah of Iran. The Carter administration sought to 
save the Shah and prevent Iran falling into the hands of a radicalised anti-Western 
revolutionary movement hostile to American interests in the country. However, their 
response to the crisis was beset by internal disagreements between Vance and Brzezinski 
and officials from the State Department and the NSC. Differences also emerged on 
Nicaragua as Anastasio Somoza’s grip on power loosened and a leftist revolutionary 
insurgency threatened a takeover in Latin America. The loss of two Cold War allies within 
six months had a detrimental effect on U.S. foreign policy and fuelled the bureaucratic 
rivalry within the administration. Moreover, a bitter row over the discovery of a brigade of 
Soviet troops in Cuba following the signing of SALT II in July 1979, threatened to derail the 
treaty’s ratification and led to a conflict over the nature of U.S.-Soviet policy as well as the 
administration’s overall approach to foreign policy. 
This chapter examines the debates Vance and Brzezinski had on Iran and Nicaragua, 
and how those international circumstances divided the two departments. The impact of the 
SALT II fallout resulted in an inconsistent and at times contradictory series of measures, 
which contributed to the divisions within the administration and led to a permanent rift 
between the president’s two principal advisors and their departments. Despite attempts to 
work collegially with one another when they first entered the administration, the previous 
year tested relations between Vance, Brzezinski and their departments in response to crises 
in Africa and attempts to normalise relations with China. As Vance and Brzezinski, 
supported by their staff, competed to influence policy, tensions gradually escalated. Events 
in 1979, in Iran, Nicaragua and Cuba provoked further conflict as both attempted to 
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influence the administration’s strategy. As this chapter will illustrate, the policy wars in the 
Carter administration came to ahead as Brzezinski consolidated his position as the 
president’s chief foreign policy advisor.  
Iranian Revolution 
On 31 December, 1977, President Carter spent the New Year in Tehran and declared ‘Iran, 
because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more 
troubled areas of the world.’1 However, within a year the Shah’s regime faced the threat of 
being swept away by a revolution gathering momentum. After he ascended the Peacock 
throne in 1941, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, forged a lasting political and military 
alliance between Iran and the United States. His nation’s proximity to the Soviet Union, 
coupled with the Shah’s own anti-communist sentiment, allowed the U.S. to monitor and 
gather intelligence on Soviet activities while Iran’s booming oil sector also made them one 
of the biggest single exporters of petroleum to the West. When the leftist regime of Prime 
Minister Mohammed Mossadegh threatened his rule in 1953, as well as Western interests in 
Iran, the CIA engineered a coup to oust Mossadegh from power. The Shah sought to use that 
relationship to develop his nation’s infrastructure and their military capabilities to protect 
Iran from internal and external threats. To keep him happy, the U.S. acquiesced to his 
various requests.2 Under the Nixon and Ford administrations, military sales proliferated as 
the Shah squandered oil profits on amassing a huge arsenal of weapons, a decision which 
one former under secretary of state described as ‘giving the keys to the world’s largest liquor 
store to a confirmed alcoholic.’3 Pahlavi’s opponents meanwhile dubbed him ‘the American 
Shah.’4 
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Throughout those years, the nation’s oil wealth led to high levels of corruption while 
economic inequality resulted in increased poverty levels across the country and the secret 
intelligence service, the SAVAK, repressed any opposition. The Shah’s ‘White Revolution’ 
of the early 1960s, an attempt to modernise Iran through economic and social reforms, 
offended a religiously conservative section of Iranian society.5 Inspired by the Islamic cleric 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, widespread demonstrations against the regime ensued. When 
the SAVAK cracked down, Khomeini denounced the Shah’s Iran as a ‘regime of tyranny’ 
prompting his arrest in 1964 and expulsion to neighbouring Iraq. This did not silence the 
cleric however, as a network of supporters smuggled recordings of his sermons encouraging 
further dissent against the Shah into Iran. The cleric also attacked the United States for its 
continued support of Pahlavi, who he cited as the source of Iran’s woes believing their 
influence and military alliance corrupted Iranian society.6 
The U.S. ignored the excesses of the Shah and the SAVAK but Carter’s election in 
1977 gave opponents of the regime hope that he would condemn the repression exerted by 
the Shah and encourage reform. The new administration, however, embraced the approach 
of its predecessors. Carter made personal appeals to the Shah in private when he visited 
Washington in November 1977, and urged him to recognise human rights and avoid 
violations, but these pleas fell on deaf ears while the military goods continued to be sold to 
Iran unabated.7 After his 1977 New Year’s Eve toast, opposition groups lined up to 
denounce the president while from exile Khomeini accused Carter of using the ‘logic of 
bandits’ stating that as long as the U.S. held a military presence in Iran, they would not 
disassociate themselves from the Shah.8 Given the hostility directed towards the 
administration by the opposition, the position of the United States became increasingly 
dependent on the survival of the Shah’s regime.  
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In January 1978, an article, authorised by the Shah, criticising Khomeini, appeared 
in a state newspaper provoking a furious reaction from supporters of the Ayatollah in his 
hometown of Qom. In the protests that followed, police fired on the demonstrators, killing 
five. The massacre set off a wave of protests across the country that called for the fall of the 
Shah’s regime and ignited the revolution.9 Although some alarm at events developed in 
Washington, the situation in Iran did not appear on the radar of the administration. The 
American embassy in Tehran, for example, reported all the uprisings and demonstrations 
that occurred but never gave any indication that the regime faced any imminent overthrow.10  
Despite this confidence in the Shah, those who followed events in Iran more closely, 
within the NSC and the State Department, began to express concern about the seriousness of 
the unfolding events. Gary Sick, an NSC staffer, and Henry Precht, the State Department’s 
desk officer for Iran, first met when they served at the American consular office in 
Alexandria in the 1960s. Precht then transferred to the U.S. embassy in Tehran while Sick 
entered the Pentagon before joining the NSC. After Precht returned to Washington and was 
appointment desk officer in 1978, he and Sick renewed their acquaintance as the situation in 
Iran began to unfold.11  
Both became concerned about the challenge the Shah faced but convincing their 
superiors of its severity proved challenging. Precht needed to negotiate with the State 
Department bureaucracy at a time when the attention of his boss, Assistant Secretary of State 
Harold Saunders, was focused on the Middle East and the Camp David negotiations. To 
approach Vance directly and side step those above him would be a bureaucratic sin and 
potentially end Precht’s career. As such his ability to influence policy remained limited.12 
Sick however enjoyed a direct link to Brzezinski and did not need to navigate through a 
bureaucratic hierarchy. As events in Iran escalated, he decided to voice his opinion that the 
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continued disturbances weakened the Shah’s position as the opposition grew in confidence. 
This observation proved to be prescient over the coming months but the president’s principal 
advisors remained unmoved.13 
While Vance dedicated his time and energy on the Middle East and SALT 
negotiations, Brzezinski focused his efforts on normalising relations with China but both 
expressed confidence in the Shah to successfully manage the difficulties he faced. When 
Precht and Sick attempted to affect policy, and attract the attention of their superiors, their 
efforts were rebuffed. As the crisis progressed and their worries increased, Professor Richard 
Cottam, an Iranian specialist, who held links to Ebrahim Yazdi, an associate of Khomeini’s 
who studied in the U.S., approached Sick with a proposal. Cottam suggested they meet with 
Yazdi to initiate dialogue between the administration and Khomeini’s camp. Viewing it as a 
useful means to acquire greater knowledge on the motivations and goals of the opposition 
movement, Sick agreed to set up a meeting between Precht and Yazdi.14 Harold Saunders 
agreed but as the idea progressed up the State Department hierarchy, Deputy Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher vetoed the idea.15 Saunders later alleged that Brzezinski, in 
addition Christopher, called it off but the decision reflected the administration’s continued 
loyalty towards the Shah while viewing attempts to reach out to the opposition as unfaithful 
to a loyal ally.16  
Furthermore, the concerns felt by Precht and Sick did not resonate with the 
American embassy in Tehran. Charles Naas, the Deputy Chief Mission, confirmed a feeling 
of ‘uncomfortableness, nervousness, but not a great sense of urgency…we certainly did not 
foresee the collapse of the Shah.’17 When the U.S. Ambassador to Iran, William H. Sullivan, 
encountered Brzezinski and Sick after returning on home leave in July 1978, he voiced his 
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own confidence in the Shah to overcome the challenges he faced. ‘I sat there in amazement’ 
remembered Sick, as he exchanged quizzical glances with Brzezinski, while Sullivan 
contradicted his analysis of the situation.18  
When the ambassador met with Precht, he told him that the Shah had paid off 
influential clerics, the mullahs, to subdue the more vocal religious opposition. Precht 
believed this unlikely to succeed but the upper echelons of the State Department accepted 
Sullivan’s assessment.19 As Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders noted, if Sullivan had 
relayed a different message then Vance would almost certainly have taken notice and 
addressed the issue but further reports indicated that the situation in Iran was not serious 
enough to cause alarm.20 In August the CIA produced a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 
that concluded, ‘Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a ‘pre-revolutionary’ situation.’21  
However, protests continued throughout August, each time met with forceful 
repression by the SAVAK. Tensions escalated when a fire, started deliberately, broke out at 
the Rex Theatre in Abadan killing 430. The SAVAK accused Islamic fundamentalists of 
setting the cinema ablaze but in an increasingly tense environment, the anti- Shah forces 
blamed the regime and protests intensified.22 In the aftermath of the Rex Theatre fire, the 
Shah, in addition to his pledge to hold free and fair parliamentary elections in 1979, decided 
to implement new reforms. He appointed Jafar Sharif-Emami as prime minister who quickly 
oversaw the closing of casinos, relaxation of press regulations and the return to the 
traditional Islamic calendar. The Shah hoped Sharif-Imani’s close links to key religious 
figures would appease dissent and find some form of accommodation. But it failed to 
supress the opposition and the protests continued.23 When Ambassador Sullivan returned to 
Tehran, he found the Shah in a depressed state of mind. After he relayed his concerns, he 
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drafted a message of support, intended to encourage and reassure the Shah of the 
administration’s continued support. ‘The letter was so filled with flattering references’ Sick 
remembered, ‘it might have been written by one of the Shah’s courtiers…Some of us 
considered its tone embarrassingly obsequious.’24 However, the administration’s 
preoccupation with the Camp David summit meant that the message went undelivered as the 
situation in Iran deteriorated.25  
The holy month of Ramadan ended with protests planned in Tehran. Troubled by the 
large-scale anti- Shah gatherings congregating throughout Iran, the Shah’s advisors 
persuaded him to take a hard-line approach and introduce martial law.26 On 8 September, as 
demonstrators gathered in Jaleh Square outside the Iranian parliament, the police prepared to 
disperse the crowds by force. When the protestors did not adhere to their threats, the police 
opened fire. Although estimates vary as to how many died, ‘Black Friday’ as it came to be 
known, proved to be a momentous event as the Shah’s support amongst the more moderate 
elements of Iranian society began to dwindle.27  
From Camp David, Carter telephoned the Shah to express his support and 
confidence in him in to overcome the issues he faced while encouraging further steps 
towards liberalising Iran. Despite the vote of confidence from the president, the situation 
continued to worsen for the King of Kings.28 Demonstrations continued after a forty-day 
period of mourning with a wave of industrial strikes that hit key industries. Oil production 
plummeted and the Iranian economy stagnated.29 Khomeini’s presence in Europe meanwhile 
added to the Shah’s woes. After his expulsion from Iraq, the Ayatollah settled in the suburbs 
of Paris under the curious gaze of the international media where he encouraged further 
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resistance to the Shah’s regime as his network of supporters circulated his messages around 
Iran.30 
The day after the Jaleh Square massacre, Henry Precht concluded that the uprisings 
amounted to a revolution and the Shah stood little chance of surviving. ‘This was a war 
between him and his people and he could not prevail in such a war’ he recalled. To prevent a 
bloody civil conflict, and preserve U.S. interests in Iran, the administration, he argued, 
should facilitate a peaceful transfer of power to the moderate elements of the opposition. 
Harold Saunders, joined him in that assessment, as this approach gathered support within the 
State Department but their counterparts at the NSC did not share their position.31 In contrast 
to Precht, Gary Sick believed in continued loyalty to the Shah to protect U.S. interests. The 
pair clashed as a result. Sick later wrote ‘a telephone call to Henry Precht, even on the most 
mundane issue, inevitably turned into an extended lecture.’32 ‘I think it had something to do 
with my big mouth’ Precht recalled but their split had serious ramifications for co-ordinating 
a consistent policy on Iran. As Precht noted, ‘effectively the two people on the working level 
were not working together.’33  
Moreover, their disagreements came at a time when Brzezinski took more of an 
interest in events in Iran. Sick’s warnings eventually caught his attention around the time of 
the Jaleh Square massacre. Unbeknown to Vance and the State Department, Brzezinski 
initiated contact with the Iranian Ambassador to the United States, and the Shah’s former 
son-in-law, Ardeshir Zahedi. The pair dined at the ambassador’s residence where Zahedi 
provided a frank and honest assessment of the situation. He acknowledged that the anger 
directed at the Shah emanated from systemic problems throughout Iranian society and posed 
a serious threat to the regime. ‘This dinner convinced me, if I needed further proof, that the 
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Shah was in trouble’ Brzezinski later wrote. Due to their dependence on Iran to serve 
American interests in the region, the national security advisor considered the Shah to be an 
indispensable ally and his potential fall would have negative consequences for the 
administration and the U.S. Pointing to examples from European history, Brzezinski 
believed that to successfully counter revolutionary movements and re-establish law and 
order, tough action was required. He encouraged Zahedi to return to Iran to help ‘stiffen the 
Shah’s spine’ and implement stronger decisive action against the opposition and use an ‘iron 
fist’ to crackdown.34 
When Sullivan met with Zahedi on his return to Tehran and learned of the advice the 
Shah had received, the Iranian ambassador told him, ‘Brzezinski has taken over Iran policy.’ 
After querying how he should proceed, Sullivan was told that the U.S. supported the Shah 
unreservedly and accept his judgement if he chose to install a military government. The 
response confirmed Sullivan’s suspicions regarding Brzezinski’s influence in co-ordinating 
the administration’s approach to Iran but when the ambassador met with the Shah several 
days later, he did not relay the advice he received. Instead, he urged the Shah to persevere 
with reforms reflecting the views of the State Department. A memo, that originated in the 
Near East Bureau, circulated to Vance and the embassy, called for the continued process of 
liberalisation and rejected the idea of a military government.35  
‘To my knowledge, this important judgement was not approved by the White 
House’ Brzezinski complained in his memoirs but it highlighted the bureaucratic rivalry 
between the State Department, in conjunction with the embassy, and the NSC to affect Iran 
policy that had developed.36 As Gary Sick noted, ‘the State Department paper was intended 
to focus attention on Iran and to stimulate a policy debate to clear the air. Instead, each side 
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in the emerging battle continued to muster arguments and allies almost in clandestine 
fashion, waiting for events to force the issue.’37 
In the wake of more disturbances, and after he received inconsistent advice, the 
Shah confided to Sullivan that he was thinking of abdicating and installing a military 
government. This triggered the first high level meeting on the crisis in Iran and saw the 
battle lines drawn between the State Department and the NSC. As the issue fell under the 
auspices of the SCC, Brzezinski was able to influence proceedings as its chair. Warren 
Christopher deputised for Vance, pre-occupied with Middle East issues.38 The deputy 
secretary challenged the view of the NSC that the Shah needed to install a military 
government and assert ‘decisive action’ to restore order, an approach he derided as short-
termism at best. Alternatively, a coalition government allowed the Shah to build bridges 
between himself and his people to avoid bloodshed and mass disorder.39 The other attendees 
agreed and said they should advise the Shah to proceed appropriately but Brzezinski refused 
to accept that proposal. After obtaining Carter’s approval, he proposed a compromise 
message that stressed the importance of forming a coalition government but if order could 
not be restored, a military government should be established.40 
To some in the administration, the contradictory message offered no clear guidance 
to the Shah. Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders regarded it as an example of Carter sewing 
together two contradictory policies. ‘Crackdown but liberalise…Carter, instead of coming 
down on side or the other side, ended up as I say brokering the difference between them.’41 
Brzezinski too remained dissatisfied with the message and decided, with Carter’s approval, 
to telephone the Shah the next day and use it as an opportunity to ‘subtly tilt the American 
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position towards support for military action.’42 He told the Shah, ‘you in effect, it seems to 
me, have the problem of combining some gestures which would be appealing in a general 
sense with a need for some specific actions which would demonstrate effective authority 
…concessions alone are likely to produce a more explosive situation.’ He discredited the 
notion that reforms could appease dissent, as he encouraged the Shah to adopt a direct and 
authoritative course of action.43    
The Shah accepted Brzezinski’s guidance but, perhaps reflecting the conflicting 
advice he received from various voices within the administration, he went on television to 
announce the formation of a military government but only as a temporary measure and he 
promised reforms after restoring law and order. During the address, he praised the 
revolutionaries for justifiably revolting against ‘oppression and corruption’ while he offered 
an apology for the indiscretions of previous governments.44 ‘The apologetic tone of the 
speech and it’s almost pathetic attempt to align the Shah to the revolution was not the tough 
message of a sovereign who had just appointed a military government’ Sick recalled.45 The 
anger and discontent continued to reverberate within Iran as the country spiralled into chaos. 
On 9 November, Charles Naas spoke with Ambassador Sullivan and reviewed the situation. 
‘I said, “this is not going to work.” He said, “I know.” And he threw me, on the yellow-lined 
paper in his handwriting, the famous telegram.’46 
Sullivan’s memo, entitled ‘Thinking the Unthinkable’ concluded that the Shah’s 
support had dissipated to the extent that his authority was irreparably damaged. His refusal 
to crackdown sufficiently had given protestors the confidence to demonstrate freely without 
fear of recriminations, paving the way for the collapse of the monarchy with Khomeini’s 
forces taking over. Faced with that possibility, he argued that the U.S. should undertake ‘a 
careful evaluation of its consequences for our position.’ He noted that Khomeini held 
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strongly anti-communist and anti-Soviet beliefs that neutralised any strategic threat posed by 
the Shah’s fall. Moreover, holding a ‘Gandhi-like position’ within the political system, he 
would likely leave the day-to-day running of government to a moderate figure acceptable to 
him and the military. In surmising, the administration needed to ‘think the unthinkable’ and 
consider the consequences of a post-Shah Iran and a Khomeini takeover. Sullivan portrayed 
the scenario as not having as detrimental an effect on American interests as first suspected. 
‘U.S. involvement would be less intimate than with the Shah, it could be an essentially 
satisfactory one’ he noted.47  
The suggestion the United States disassociate themselves from a loyal Cold War ally 
provoked dismay in Washington. Labelled ‘as a veiled attack on existing policy’ it did not 
trigger a reassessment of policy as Sullivan hoped.48 Carter, Brzezinski and Vance all backed 
the Shah and dismissed Sullivan’s insinuations. They viewed the Shah as a ‘major force of 
stability’ and recognised the strategic importance of their relationship in the Persian Gulf 
particularly at a time when Soviet activities in neighbouring Afghanistan concerned them. 
Strategically and economically, Iran remained an indispensable ally and none of them 
believed they should abandon the Shah to facilitate a transfer of power as Sullivan 
intimated.49 The cable failed to generate a re-evaluation of policy at the top of the 
administration but it did escalate the bureaucratic conflict between the State Department and 
the NSC.  
Brzezinski believed the cable represented ‘the views of those in the State 
Department who were generally inclined to argue that the fall of the Shah would have 
benign consequences for American interests’ while ‘lower echelons at State, notably the 
head of the Iran desk, Henry Precht, were motivated by a doctrinal dislike of the Shah and 
simply wanted him out of power altogether.’50 As events progressed, Precht recalled a 
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chance meeting with Hamilton Jordan where the White House Chief of Staff exclaimed ‘“Ah 
Henry Precht, you’re the guy that Brzezinski used to say was fighting our policy in the State 
Department.”’51 This view was shared by others within the NSC. George Griffin, from the 
State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, recalled Gary Sick frequently 
calling him and saying ‘“this is wrong, you guys don’t know what you’re talking about”.’52 
The continued dismissal of the advice of Precht and others led Brzezinski to ban them from 
strategy meetings on Iran, which according to Under Secretary David Newsom was 
motivated purely by his desire to exclude any opinions that went against his own.53  
The mistrust of the State Department also extended to the embassy in Tehran. Sick, 
recalling his meeting with Sullivan in June, expressed irritation at him for allowing the 
situation to drift without warning the administration. To Sick, the ambassador deliberately 
misled them about the Shah’s predicament. ‘Sullivan didn’t want Washington messing 
around in his business…I think he felt that if he let people in Washington know just how 
serious the problem was they would be all over him and pushing him this way and that way 
and he didn’t want any of that’ he alleged.54 A few days after the ‘Thinking the Unthinkable’ 
telegram, Arthur Callahan, a businessman and former CIA officer who previously worked in 
Tehran, arrived at the embassy on Brzezinski’s behalf to assess the situation. When Sullivan 
queried Brzezinski’s decision, the national security advisor replied angrily that it was none 
of the ambassador’s business. ‘I was aware from the tenor of this reply that my views were 
no longer held in much regard at the White House’ Sullivan remembered.55 ‘Frankly we 
were annoyed’ Charles Naas recalled ‘it was the first sign that somehow we weren’t getting 
our messages across.’56  
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Following, Callahan’s visit, Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal and Senate 
Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd all made trips to Iran and returned portraying the Shah as a 
demoralised and dispirited figure, paralysed by indecision and overwhelmed by the situation. 
When Blumenthal relayed his judgement to the administration he recommended they ask 
former Under Secretary of State and UN Ambassador George Ball to undertake a review of 
the situation and compile an independent report with recommendations on how to proceed.57 
Brzezinski agreed, but he later expressed regret at doing so. ‘I violated a basic rule of 
bureaucratic tactics’ he recalled, ‘one should never obtain the services of an ‘impartial’ 
outside consulting regarding an issue one feels strong about without first making certain in 
advance that one knows the likely contents of his advice.’58  
When Ball arrived in Washington in November 1978 to undertake his review, he 
took an immediate dislike to Brzezinski and expressed concern for what he described as the 
‘distorted role of the National Security Council.’ Ball became aware of the significant 
differences between the two departments as well as Brzezinski’s attempts to control the 
administration’s approach by excluding the State Department. When the national security 
advisor told Ball not to contact Henry Precht, he ‘immediately disregarded’ the instruction. 
Ball not only criticised Brzezinski and his department, he also sided with the State 
Department in their assessment of the situation in Iran. Irreparably damaged by events, the 
Shah stood little chance of surviving while U.S. interests rested on a peaceful transfer of 
power. Ball proposed that the Shah remain as a constitutional monarch but cede power to a 
‘council of notables’ comprised of members of the moderate opposition who would preside 
over the transfer of powers, previously controlled by Pahlavi, to a new government. Ball also 
proposed reaching out to Khomeini as without his ‘implied acquiescence’ the proposal 
would be difficult to implement.59  
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Forwarded to senior figures in the administration, Ball’s plan encountered strong 
resistance. Only Warren Christopher, on behalf of the State Department, backed the 
suggestion while Brzezinski emphatically rejected it. When Ball met with the president he 
found, much to his surprise, the national security advisor in attendance. Reviewing the 
report, the president told Ball he wished to support Pahlavi, ‘so long as the Shah wished to 
remain in Iran.’ He also told Ball he intended to send Brzezinski to Iran to meet with the 
Shah as he lacked confidence in Ambassador Sullivan and the State Department to reliably 
relay instructions to the Shah. Ball, flabbergasted at the idea, told the president ‘(this) is the 
worst idea I ever heard.’ He rationalised that Brzezinski’s presence would only antagonise 
anti-American sentiment and convince discontented Iranians that the Shah operated directly 
on the advice of Washington. ‘Anything he does after that will be regarded…as an action 
taken on your instruction’ he told the president.60  
Carter backed away from the idea but as he reflected on the conversation, Ball 
concluded that Brzezinski clearly exerted considerable influence and sway over the 
president’s decisions and his strategy towards handling the revolution.61 Several days later, 
Ball relayed his concerns to Vance. He later wrote, ‘I advised him, as an old friend, that I 
had found a shockingly unhealthy situation in the National Security Council, with Brzezinski 
doing everything possible to exclude the State Department from participation in, or even, 
knowledge of our developing relations in Iran.’ Ball noted that ‘Vance was obviously upset’ 
by what he told him.62  
Up until that point Vance, distracted by the Middle East and SALT negotiations, 
watched events in Iran unfold from afar but following his conversation with Ball he took a 
more assertive role. This coincided with the Shah’s decision to appoint Shapour Bakhtiar, a 
Western educated member of the National Front opposition party, as Prime Minister in mid-
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December 1978. Bakhtiar accepted the invitation to form a government but insisted that, as 
part of a series of reforms, the Shah leave Iran in order to disassociate himself from the 
former regime and give his initiatives a chance of succeeding.63 The Shah reluctantly agreed 
and began to make plans for his departure but he still harboured significant doubts about 
Bakhtiar’s ability to appease the chorus of dissent in Iran. He returned to the idea of forming 
a military government to restore order and asked Sullivan, if he could guarantee the support 
of the U.S. in the event of a crackdown. ‘The policy issue had been reduced to a single 
question’ Gary Sick noted, ‘would the United States support or reject an ‘iron fist’ policy in 
Iran?’64  
The question divided the president’s two principal advisors. Vance advocated a 
political solution and supported the idea that the Shah cede power, and revert to a 
constitutional monarchy, but with Pahlavi looking increasingly unstable, he concluded that 
he needed to leave Iran and transfer power to a moderate opposition group. He rejected the 
idea of a military crackdown, a counterproductive move resulting in further bloodshed. As 
Sick noted, 'he had seen riots and he had been involved in peace making processes and had 
seen people take extreme positions and push things too far and the end result was that people 
just got killed and it didn’t solve the problem.’ 65 Moreover, the ‘iron fist’ he noted would be 
‘antithetical’ to what he believed the Carter administration stood for.66 Brzezinski 
meanwhile continued to voice his view that the initiation of a crackdown remained the only 
way to preserve U.S. interests in Iran. A military government without the Shah remained the 
only viable option.67  
On 28 December, 1978, the principals met at an SCC meeting to draft a message to 
advise the Shah on how to proceed. Vance and Brzezinski both represented the two 
contrasting schools of thought on the matter but with the latter in control of proceedings, he 
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succeeded in titling the tone of the message to support his view. The message urged the Shah 
to form a coalition government but if impractical, he needed to install a ‘firm military 
government.’ Both Vance and Brzezinski believed that ‘firm military government’ translated 
into the ‘iron fist’ policy.68  
Whereas previously he passively accepted the conclusions of meetings and did not 
exert pressure on the president, aware of the potential consequences of such an instruction, 
Vance took it upon himself to outflank Brzezinski and travelled to Camp David to meet with 
the president. Vance appealed to Carter’s concern for safeguarding human rights and 
requested that the reference to a ‘firm military government’ be removed from the message. 
Carter agreed and gave his approval for it to state that a military government should be 
formed only to ‘end disorder, violence and bloodshed’ as a final alternative. ‘The Shah could 
not fail to see from this message’ Vance later wrote, ‘that we would support a military 
government only to end bloodshed, but not apply the ‘iron fist.’69   
After he extracted a significant concession from Carter, Vance also encouraged the 
president to authorise an attempt to reach out to Khomeini in Paris by sending the Farsi 
speaking diplomat Theodore Eliot, to meet with the Ayatollah. Brzezinski would inevitably 
veto the proposal but emboldened by his policy victory in respect to the message, Vance 
persuade Carter of the merits of the Eliot mission. He argued that its purpose would be to 
negotiate an accommodation between Khomeini’s supporters and the military and 
discourage an imminent return to Iran to give Bakhtiar sufficient time to initiate reforms. 
Carter agreed and gave the mission his approval, a second significant policy victory for 
Vance and the State Department.70  
After he became aware of the president’s compromises to Vance, Brzezinski fought 
back at an NSC meeting held on 4 January, 1979, and once again called for the installation 
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of a military government. A ‘rather irritated’ Carter however sided with Vance and rejected 
his suggestion.71 Undeterred, the national security advisor developed another avenue to 
affect policy. Instead of installing a military government, Brzezinski successfully persuaded 
Carter to send the Deputy Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command, General 
Robert E. Huyser to Iran. He believed if General Huyser unified and reconciled the armed 
forces effectively, he could persuade them to launch a coup and a military takeover if the 
Bakthiar government fragmented. Vance supported sending Huyser believing that it gave 
Bakhtiar extra confidence and help support his efforts to reform Iran.72 Their divergent 
interpretations of Huyser’s role in Iran led the general to describe his brief as ‘ambiguous.’ 
‘I began to wonder if this rather crucial issue had been thrashed out in Washington’ Huyser 
recalled.73  
Brzezinski also scuppered Vance’s plan to sending Theodore Eliot to meet 
Khomeini in Paris. He argued to Carter that that such a move would undermine Bakhtiar and 
embolden the Ayatollah’s supporters. The discussion ‘raged back and forth’ between himself 
and Vance when they discussed the Eliot mission as tempers frayed. Carter, in an attempt to 
find a balance between his warring advisors, agreed to cancel the Eliot mission but initiate 
contact with the Khomeini camp through the French and lower-level officials in the U.S. 
embassy.74 While Carter thought, he had brokered the difference between his two advisors, 
those in the State Department and the embassy believed he had sided with Brzezinski once 
again. A furious Sullivan, cabled Washington calling the cancellation of the Eliot mission ‘a 
gross and irretrievable mistake…I cannot, repeat, cannot understand the rationale for this 
unfortunate decision.’75 A furious Carter wanted Sullivan fired for insubordination and only 
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Vance’s intervention prevented his dismissal but the ambassador’s future as the 
administration’s man in Tehran became fait accompli.76  
The appointment of Huyser and the cancellation of the Eliot mission served to 
heighten tensions between the president’s principal advisors. ‘Personal relations between 
Vance and Brzezinski were bad enough so that contributed to the distortion of the process’ 
Harold Brown remembered.77 At the same time, Brzezinski’s connection to Ardeshir Zahedi 
became an increasing source of agitation to Vance. When Ball told Vance of their 
interactions, the secretary immediately asked Brzezinski to close this channel. Although he 
denied contacting Zahedi, Vance’s threat to take the matter to Carter motivated him to 
acquiesce to the secretary’s demand.78 It proved to be a temporary reprieve. Unaware of 
what had taken place previously, Precht discovered recent communications between 
Brzezinski and Zahedi and casually mentioned it to Harold Saunders. The assistant secretary 
then dragged Precht up to the seventh floor of the State Department to tell Vance what he 
had discovered. ‘I started relaying what I heard and I noticed that none of them looked me in 
the eye’ Precht noted, ‘they were quite embarrassed by this problem in the White House.’79 
Evidently the pendulum in the policy wars had swung back towards Brzezinski away from 
Vance and the State Department. 
On 16 January, 1979, the Iranian parliament approved Bakthiar’s government and 
the Shah left Iran later that day. He elected not to take up the administration’s offer to reside 
in the U.S. but instead headed to Morocco after a brief stay in Egypt, which increased 
suspicion that the Shah may return to Iran as he had done in 1953 after the overthrow of 
Mossadegh.80 This, Vance asserted, left Iranians dubious of Bakhtiar’s independence from 
the Shah. In Paris meanwhile, Khomeini hailed his departure as a preface to their victory and 
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urged his supporters to help bring down the Bakhtiar government through non-violent 
protests and civil disobedience.81 With the new prime minister under pressure, losing support 
for his reforms and struggling to exert his authority, Iran slid towards a showdown between 
the military and the Ayatollah’s forces.82 
At this point, the administration threw its full weight of support behind Bakhthiar 
but many, particularly within the State Department, remained unconvinced the new prime 
minister could succeed. ‘I did not think he had much of a future’ Precht recalled, ‘I don’t 
know of anyone in State or the embassy who disagreed with me.’83 Harold Saunders 
meanwhile speculated, ‘it was more of a question of how long he could last’ while 
Ambassador Sullivan referred to the new prime minister as a ‘fig leaf’ and pondered ‘just 
how unrealistic the White House had become.’84 Vance meanwhile considered Bakhtiar’s 
collapse inevitable. ‘We were tying ourselves to the Bakhtiar experiment beyond the point 
where there was any chance of his participating in a new regime’ he wrote in his memoirs. 
To protect their interests in Iran, he again argued for dialogue with Khomeini and his 
supporters. He noted, ‘by early February, our only sensible course of action was to attempt 
to come to terms with the revolution’ but the administration ‘could not overcome its internal 
policy divisions.’85  
Khomeini returned to a rapturous reception in Tehran, on 1 February, 1979, and 
immediately set about consolidating the revolution by appointing Mehdi Bazargan as prime 
minister of the provisional government.86 ‘We found ourselves in the extraordinary situation 
of attempting to deal with two governments’ Vance recalled, ‘Bakhthiar’s constitutional 
disintegrating government, and Bazargan’s, representative of the real political power in the 
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country.’87 But while Vance and his department believed that facilitating a transfer to 
Khomeini’s forces remained the only alternative, Brzezinski returned to the idea of 
launching a military takeover. On 11 February, the military command informed Bakhtiar 
that they would not defend his government in a showdown. At a crisis meeting held that day, 
Brzezinski proposed that the military launch a coup to prevent a Khomeini takeover and 
restore law and order rather than negotiate an accommodation with Bazargan as Warren 
Christopher and others at the meeting advocated.88  
Brzezinski disregarded the advice of the other departments and persisted with the 
idea of launching a military coup, and instructed Under Secretary David Newsom to put his 
plan to Sullivan. When the ambassador heard Brzezinski’s proposal, he responded with what 
he later described as a ‘scurrilous suggestion’ for what the national security advisor could do 
with his idea. When Newsom replied that his reply did not help, Sullivan asked if Brzezinski 
wanted it translated into Polish.89 As a last resort, Brzezinski turned to Huyser, who had left 
Iran the previous month, and enquired about the possibility of a takeover. But the general 
replied that such an operation had arrived too late and would be impracticable. He noted in 
his memoirs that the national security advisor remained the only principal figure advocating 
this position and no consensus existed that supported a coup.90 The national security advisor 
lost the argument and the administration unanimously rejected idea of a military takeover. 
As Bakhtiar fled, Khomeini took charge, dismantled the remnants of the Shah’s regime, and 
installed a new Islamic republic in Iran.91  
The administration’s inability to develop a consistent approach to the crisis resulted 
from differences between the NSC and the State Department with both departments using 
different avenues to affect policy. While Vance and his department prevented a forceful 
crackdown by the Shah and averted a military takeover as Brzezinski advocated, their 
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position weakened as a result of the competition with the NSC. The press reported on the 
conflict, fuelled by leaks by sources within both departments. The president became 
exasperated by the constant press coverage of their struggles and the leaks that he believed 
undermined his administration. In the weeks prior to Bakhtiar’s fall, CBS ran a story with a 
State Department source quoted as saying that Bakhtiar stood little chance of surviving. 
Carter’s frustration at the leak led to a showdown at the White House.  
Carter summoned Vance and officials from his department, and accused them of 
deliberately leaking stories to undermine the administration’s policy towards Iran. He vowed 
to fire the person responsible and hold Vance personally responsible, much to the secretary’s 
own irritation.92 ‘Vance’s face was turning redder and redder at Carter saying the leaks are 
coming from people in this room’ Leslie Gelb recalled. The president finished and left the 
room, giving nobody the opportunity to respond.93 Those who remained voiced their anger at 
Carter’s accusations with Gelb and Anthony Lake particularly vocal. Vance cut them off and 
stated that he did not tolerate leaks of this nature either but many in the department felt 
aggrieved at their treatment.94  
After the meeting, Gelb, walking with State Department press spokesperson 
Hodding Carter III, decided to resign from the administration. ‘Here I was going to testify on 
our Iran policy and why was I going to go leak that what I was testifying was bullshit?’95 
‘I’m thinking wow, if Les can’t stand this why should anybody else?’ Hodding Carter 
observed as displeasure within the department mounted.96 Vance meanwhile expressed 
frustration at the situation between himself and the national security advisor over Iran. His 
wife Grace later recalled that he became dispirited with the tussles with Brzezinski, whom 
she called ‘that awful man.’97 Remembering the events of that day, Gelb and Lake later 
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wrote that the president ‘had assembled, and then, humiliated those people in the State 
Department most loyal to him and whose allegiance he most needed.’ This, coupled with 
events through the previous year, led them to conclude that the president had shifted towards 
Brzezinski and the NSC staff at the expense of the State Department. Brzezinski had 
outmanoeuvred Vance as the president’s chief foreign policy advisor. As they noted ‘it was 
his courtier Brzezinski, not his baron Vance, to whom he now looked for primary support.’98  
Nicaraguan Revolution 
While the Shah’s regime crumbled, disturbances in Nicaragua escalated as opposition to 
President Anastasio Somoza grew. Like Pahlavi, Somoza was an anti-communist ally that 
enjoyed lucrative economic aid packages from the United States over the years. Following 
the 1972 earthquake near Managua, however, corruption spiralled as Somoza and his cronies 
abused the international humanitarian assistance provided. Living conditions for many 
Nicaraguans worsened. Coupled with the repressiveness of Somoza’s leadership, discontent 
rose as moderate and radical opponents mobilised against him.99 A series of insurgent strikes 
by the socialist guerrilla fighters of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in 
October 1977, ‘shattered the myth of Somoza’s invulnerability’ and threatened to destabilise 
the regime. Meanwhile the assassination of newspaper editor and Somoza critic Pedro 
Joaquin Chomorro on 10 January, 1978 sparked fury across the country as the business 
community rebelled and called a general strike. Despite the increased pressure on him to 
step down, Somoza retaliated forcefully. Twelve months of violence and bloodshed ensued 
as the Sandinistas grew in confidence and Somoza teetered on the brink of falling. Once 
again, the administration faced the possibility of ‘losing’ a second anti-communist ally to an 
unfamiliar and potentially hostile opposition group.100 Like Iran, divisions between Vance, 
Brzezinski and their respective departments adversely effected their approach.  
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 When the administration entered office, disagreements over human rights policies 
caused consternation within the State Department Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. 
Assistant Secretary Terence Todman poured scorn on efforts to implement human rights 
policies in Latin American arguing that such an approach could destabilise the region and 
pave the way for Soviet and Cuban intervention. After Todamn went public with his 
criticisms in February 1978, Vance replaced him with career diplomat Viron P. Vaky.101 As 
a former ambassador to several Latin America nations, Vaky witnessed events unfold in 
Nicaragua and viewed the situation as potentially fatal for Somoza but also damaging to 
U.S. interests in the region. Whereas Todman warned against action that might destabilise 
allies in the region, Vaky took the dramatic step of advocating that the U.S. facilitate his 
departure to avoid a Sandinista takeover. Either the administration replaced Somoza with 
‘pro-American moderates or pro-Cuban revolutionaries.’102  
Support for Vaky existed within the Latin American and human rights bureaus but 
others did not believe that the U.S. should orchestrate Somoza’s departure. Robert Pastor, 
the assistant secretary’s opposite number at the NSC, was one of them. While Vaky drew 
upon a wealth of experience, Pastor was somewhat of a novice when he entered the 
administration, aged just twenty-nine. Like others, he endured a difficult relationship with 
Todman but Vaky’s appointment re-energised Pastor.103 Vaky, conscious of the bureaucratic 
turf wars within the administration, as well as his own experiences during his time on 
Kissinger’s NSC staff, determined to work cohesively with his counterpart. Pastor valued his 
input and wrote in his journal following Vaky’s appointment, ‘procedurally and 
substantively my relations with State have changed 98%, all attributable to Vaky.’104  
Despite harbouring good relations however, Pastor disagreed with Vaky on Somoza. 
Although unsympathetic to the dictator’s predicament, he did not endorse U.S. intervention 
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to overthrow another government no matter how well intentioned. Given the American 
experience in Latin America over the years, such action would adversely affect U.S. interests 
as well as the administration’s commitment to non-intervention. He wrote to Brzezinski, ‘I 
am certain U.S. intervention to encourage the departure of Somoza may gain us some 
points…in the short term, but in the long term, I believe it will compromise the president’s 
moral stature.’105 Whereas previous disagreements divided individuals within the 
administration, Pastor and Vaky maintained a respectful relationship with one another and 
did not initiate a bureaucratic conflict. As Anthony Lake observed, ‘they argued and 
competed, but fairly and without personal malice’ and unlike other State-NSC relationships 
at that time ‘neither tried to freeze the other out of the action.’106 
Vaky also found few voices from the upper echelons of the State Department willing 
to support his view. Vance delegated much of the responsibility for Latin America to Lake 
and Warren Christopher who both agreed that forcing Somoza out, no matter how desirable, 
would not be in the United States’ interests.107 The murder of Chomorro in January 1978 and 
the demonstrations that followed failed to lead to a re-examination of the department’s 
position. The U.S. embassy in Managua was told, ‘some opposition groups are trying to 
convince the embassy that Somoza must go and U.S. should somehow manage departure. 
You should make clear to Nicaraguans that this issue is one of a purely Nicaraguan internal 
political character and one in which the U.S. will play no role.’108 Brzezinski too exhibited 
little enthusiasm to involve the administration in the situation and did not endorse a full-
scale review of their approach.109  
Domestic politics also motivated the administration’s policy toward Nicaragua. 
Their efforts to affect human rights in Nicaragua upon entering office attracted strong 
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resistance from an influential pro-Somoza lobby in Congress headed by Democrat Senators 
Charles Wilson and John Murphy. When the Panama Canal Treaties underwent considerable 
scrutiny in the Senate, the support of Wilson, Murphy and others became essential to its 
ratification. Carter submitted to their pressure to ‘lay off Somoza’ by appropriating 
$10.5million worth of humanitarian aid to Nicaragua, in return for the lobby’s support for 
the treaties.110 The decision encountered resistance from human rights advocates both inside 
and outside the administration. They were further antagonised when Carter decided to send a 
letter to Somoza in June 1978 praising his decision to release political prisoners and co-
operate with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.111   
Both Pastor and Vaky opposed the sending of the letter but neither Brzezinski nor 
Vance thought the issue warranted a debate or require the president’s invaluable time, 
energy and effort. Pastor and Vaky relented and the letter was sent.112 On 1 August, 1978, 
The Washington Post reported the delivery of the letter, leaked via a disgruntled source 
within the State Department, which they believed damaged the credibility of the 
administration’s human rights agenda. The source also falsely blamed the NSC for 
encouraging the letter.113 A furious Carter ‘came down on the State Department like a ton of 
bricks’ reported Pastor but the source of the leak remained undetected. As a result, feelings 
of distrust between the two departments that plagued the administration previously, arose in 
respect to Nicaragua. As Anthony Lake, noted ‘the effect of the incident was to deepen the 
divide between the NSC and State. As always happens after leaks, the circle of decision-
making was narrowed.’114  
In the months that followed, the situation deteriorated for Somoza. A moderate 
opposition group formed by Nicaraguan business leaders, the Broad Opposition Front 
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(FAO), instigated a series of industrial strikes that damaged the economy. The Sandinistas 
meanwhile launched a military offensive against Somoza, taking control of the National 
Palace in Managua and holding 1,500 hostages. Although Somoza gave into the Sandinista’s 
demands, he retaliated violently.115 The crackdown did not silence the voices of discontent 
and only served to convince many that the only way to resist Somoza’s rule was through 
armed insurrection. A growing number of Nicaraguans turned to the Sandinistas as an 
avenue to bring down Somoza as opposed to the moderate FAO.116  
Troubled by events the State Department, the NSC and their heads began to address 
the situation but the bureaucratic rivalry developed once again. On 4 September, 1978, 
Brzezinski intervened to switch a meeting reserved for the PRC, to be headed by Vaky, to 
the mini-SCC chaired by David Aaron. ‘From then’ Pastor later wrote ‘U.S. policy toward 
Nicaragua would be hammered out in the National Security Council.’ Despite the 
bureaucratic tussle for control of proceedings, the mini-SCC decided to back an idea 
advocated by Under Secretary of State David Newsom and support a Central American 
mediation effort.117 Although reluctant to involve themselves, pressure from allies in the 
region, most notably Costa Rica, Venezuela and Panama, encouraged the administration to 
take an assertive role in addressing Nicaragua’s future. Costa Rican President Rodrigo 
Carazo’s offer to act as a mediator, although he later retracted his proposal, between the 
Somoza regime and opposition groups presented the U.S. with an ideal opportunity to affect 
events without evoking the perception of direct intervention or interference.118 As Warren 
Christopher noted, the proposal ‘was preferable because it is consistent with our 
commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.’ Both the State 
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Department and the NSC backed the mediation effort led by the Organisation of American 
States (OAS).119 
Headed by former U.S. Ambassador William Bowlder with representatives of the 
Dominican Republic and Guatemala, the OAS mediation team, keen to prevent a Sandinista 
takeover, sought to facilitate Somoza’s transfer of power to a united opposition but preserve 
the National Guard, the government forces, to support a new government.120 Bowlder 
succeed in persuading the FAO to accept the idea but the more hostile elements of the group, 
which contained those sympathetic to the Sandinistas, rejected it, labelling the proposal 
‘Somocismo without Somoza.’ Somoza then intervened with a suggestion of his own - a 
national plebiscite on a future government with the other parties involved. The FAO gave its 
tacit approval but Somoza’s refusal to accept an international monitoring body led him to 
remark, ‘I can lose that kind of election.’121  
The mediation effort collapsed in January 1979. Its failure made a peaceful 
transition from Somoza’s regime to a new democratic government increasingly unlikely as 
hostilities between the military and the FSLN continued. By June, after successfully fighting 
off Somoza’s forces, a Sandinista takeover appeared likely. During this time, public and 
congressional opinion turned against Somoza after the murder of ABC reporter Bill Stewart 
by members of the National Guard on 20 June. Calls intensified for U.S. intervention to 
force Somoza’s resignation to prevent further bloodshed.122 The situation required the 
administration to face the issue directly. All agreed that Somoza’s departure was desirable 
but they also wanted to prevent the Sandinistas from taking power. How they achieved that 
objective divided both Vance and Brzezinski.  
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Brzezinski, evoking the domino theory, envisaged further insurrections in El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, if they unsuccessfully prevented ‘communist guerrillas’ 
sweeping into power in Nicaragua. The U.S. had a duty to their allies to prevent ‘another 
Cuba.’ He also linked the growth of the Sandinistas to the Soviet Union by accusing them of 
sponsoring their activities through Cuba.123 He submitted a draft proposal that formed the 
basis of a speech Vance was due to give at meeting of the OAS. The U.S. would support a 
multilateral peacekeeping force in Nicaragua that oversaw Somoza’s departure and the 
installation of a ‘Government of National Reconciliation’ but crucially, the National Guard, 
Somoza’s gendarmerie, remaining in place. Coupled with a ceasefire agreement with the 
Sandinistas and the cessation of arms sales to both sides, the draft speech also contained 
direct links to Soviet and Cuban adventurism in Latin America.124  
Vance predictably disagreed. As U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence Pezzullo 
noted, such a proposal represented direct American intervention and carried negative 
consequences from the past. Vance had been part of the negotiating team that unsuccessfully 
attempted to form an anti-communist government in the Dominican Republic in 1964. The 
controversial U.S. presence and the Pan-American peace force attracted significant criticism 
from Latin American leaders and the experience motivated Vance and his department to 
consider a different course of action.125 Brzezinski however believed that the vacuum needed 
to be filled by the National Guard or an international peacekeeping force to prevent a 
Sandinista takeover. A stalemate ensued with neither able to agree but Vance and the State 
Department attempted to seize control of the issue by removing all references to the 
peacekeeping force and Soviet and Cuban activities in the region from the secretary’s speech 
to the OAS.126 
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When Carter read the speech, he immediately consulted with Brzezinski and queried 
why the speech made no mention of the peacekeeping force or Soviet and Cuban 
interference. The national security advisor immediately advised Pastor to insert both 
references into the speech without consulting either Vance or anyone from the State 
Department, much to their consternation.127 Addressing the OAS on 21 June, 1979, Vance 
called on Somoza to step aside and urged members to accept their recommendation of a 
ceasefire, an arms embargo and the formation of multilateral peacekeeping force. Against his 
better judgement, he also cited the ‘mounting evidence of involvement by Cuba and others’ 
as having a detrimental impact on Nicaragua’s future.128 
As he predicted, the OAS reacted negatively to the speech, condemning the 
peacekeeping force idea as well as their overt references to Cuban interference. In a 
humiliating blow for the administration, their proposal failed to attract any supporters when 
put to a vote. The OAS backed a counterproposal, which called on Somoza to leave 
immediately to facilitate the transition to authentic democracy with free and fair elections.129 
Disillusionment at Brzezinski’s actions within the State Department boiled over as the story 
about the drafting of the speech leaked to the press. Although both issued a firm denial, the 
story highlighted the growing antagonism felt by the department towards their rivals at the 
NSC.130  
Despite the OAS rejection, Brzezinski continued to explore ways and means of 
preventing the Sandinistas from taking power. Pastor recalled returning from the OAS 
meeting to find Brzezinski, ‘in a very different world, contemplating military 
intervention.’131 ‘Vance, at the time, got furious’ remembered Pezzullo, ‘he said, “I don’t 
want to hear that. That’s something the United States is not going to do. That situation does 
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not warrant it.’132 Despite the secretary’s objections, Brzezinski persevered and offered 
another suggestion. He proposed forming an executive committee of prominent but 
moderate Nicaraguans to form an interim government following Somoza’s departure and 
negotiate a ceasefire with the Sandinistas.133  
Like his previous idea, a reformed National Guard would support the executive 
committee, but additionally he recommended that the U.S. provide military assistance to 
maintain order and prevent a Sandinista takeover. Vance and his department unanimously 
opposed Brzezinski’s suggestion, noting that few moderates remained in Nicaragua to 
support the initiative. They also balked at the idea that a reconstituted National Guard could 
command the support of the people after forty years of bloodshed and oppression. To 
preserve American interests in Nicaragua and the region, the administration needed to 
negotiate with the Sandinistas as part of a provisional government, and provide economic 
assistance as a good will gesture to establish favourable relations. The NSC met the 
suggestion with scepticism as they sought to discredit the State Department’s approach on 
the eve of Somoza’s fall from power.134   
A dubious David Aaron relayed his thoughts to Brzezinski. ‘State believes we have 
a small window of a few days in which we might critically affect the future junta…a few 
generous gestures at the end of the game are not going fundamentally alter the hostility we 
must expect’ he wrote. ‘This is why it is important to maintain a military force that can come 
to the support of the moderates who continue to be favourable disposed towards the United 
States’ he concluded.135 Brzezinski then composed his thoughts to Carter. ‘Unless we 
establish an executive committee resting on the reconstituted National Guard, Somoza’s 
departure will create a vacuum which will be filled only by the Sandinistas’ he wrote. The 
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consequences of not doing so would be significant in respect to U.S.-Soviet relations as well 
American foreign policy more generally. He labelled Vance and his department’s idea of 
negotiating with the Sandinistas as based on a ‘fallacious premise’ that would attract 
considerable criticism similar to that directed at the administration following the fall of the 
Shah. ‘I am also concerned that the State Department strategy would have us embrace the 
FSLN junta so openly that we will become politically responsible for whatever course of 
action that revolution takes…and it is likely to be more bloody and radical than the 
revolution in Iran.’136  
When the principals met to discuss how to proceed, Brzezinski’s arguments failed to 
earn Carter’s support who became annoyed by the suggestion that the administration’s 
actions could lead to further Cuban and Soviet interventions in Central America. Brzezinski 
bitterly recalled in his diary, ‘the State Department types were absolutely delighted by this 
exchange. One of them even grinned openly.’137 The administration embraced the approach 
of the State Department to negotiate with the Sandinistas, as part of a wider strategy to 
moderate the FSLN, and facilitate the peaceful transition to a provisional government upon 
Somoza’s departure. Over the coming weeks, they implemented that approach. On 17 July, 
1979, Somoza left Nicaragua and two days later, the revolution was complete as Sandinista 
forces entered Managua and swept away the final remnants of the regime.138  
The revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua highlighted the potential for conflict between 
the president’s two key advisors, which increasingly influenced the administration’s inability 
to co-ordinate a clear and consistent strategy as the bureaucratic warfare continued. During 
both revolutions Carter struggled to find a consensus between the two, backing Brzezinski in 
some instances and Vance in others. Several days after the fall of Somoza, The Washington 
Post reporter Jack Anderson wrote that the president’s indecision had fuelled competition 
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within the administration. Warning that the situation was untenable and harmful to U.S. 
foreign policy, he concluded ‘it seems doubtful that Carter can succeed with a zigzag foreign 
policy – zigging with Ziggy one day and zagging with Cyrus the next.’139  
Vance and Carter 
Carter’s indecision was compounded by domestic problems throughout 1979 as the president 
increasingly resembled an ineffective and beleaguered leader. As Paul D. Hart wrote, ‘many 
professionals are writing the president’s political obituary.’140 His popularity ratings 
plummeted as the stagnated economy, unemployment and inflation rose while the on-going 
energy crisis saw oil prices increase further. In July 1979, Carter retreated to Camp David as 
he prepared for a major speech on the energy crisis placed within the wider context of a 
‘crisis of confidence.’141 Meanwhile, rumours of a challenge for the Democratic Party 
nomination for president from rival Senator Edward ‘Ted’ Kennedy circulated, as Carter 
faced a serious fight for his political future.142 
To rejuvenate his presidency, he concluded that he no longer trusted certain 
members of his cabinet and took the bizarre step of asking every member to submit a letter 
of resignation before he decided which ones to accept. Both Vance and Harold Brown 
believed it was a mistake and told the president ‘fire who you want, but asking for 
everybody’s resignation is more likely to be taken as a reflection on you rather than on them. 
It says you’re not sure that your judgement in picking people was right.’ Carter ignored their 
advice and five members of his cabinet left the administration.143 Vance meanwhile had 
already confirmed to the press in May that he intended to step down as secretary of state 
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after the 1980 presidential election. He dismissed the idea that he was essentially a lame 
duck unable to influence policy sufficiently as ‘poppycock.’144 But Carter’s decision to 
accept the resignations of five members of his cabinet adversely affected Vance’s position 
and enhanced Brzezinski’s. As The New York Times reported that the reshuffle brought ‘no 
tremors of Brzezinski.’ ‘After two years of public controversy and private jostling…the 
energetic and feisty Columbia University professor is said by his admirers and critics alike 
to have become the dominant force within the foreign policy apparatus’ the article noted.145    
Brzezinski’s role within the administration was aided by the narrowing of Carter’s 
inner circle of advisors, which included Press Secretary Jody Powell and newly appointed 
Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan, dubbed ‘the Georgia mafia’ by the press. Having initially 
resisted appointing a chief of staff, he handed the position to his close advisor Hamilton 
Jordan in July 1979. Jordan’s promotion reflected the growing centralisation of decision-
making within the White House and an abandonment of the ‘spokes of the wheel’ concept 
Carter adopted on becoming president. Moreover, it undoubtedly benefited Brzezinski given 
that Powell and Jordan emphasised with the national security advisor’s approach to foreign 
policy and they became important allies in the policy wars with Vance and the State 
Department.146 ‘Zbig initially was a little sceptical about my involvement in the foreign 
policy process’ Jordan remembered ‘but I think ultimately he saw me as someone that could 
sometimes help him with his point of view.’147 ‘The boys of course saw Brzezinski as a 
yapping dog but their dog’ recalled Hodding Carter III, ‘they saw Vance as Mr Vance, grey 
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and faithful but presiding over a bureaucracy that, as all president’s eventually decide, is 
unresponsive to the current policies of the inhabitants of the White House.’148 
In addition to the ‘Georgia mafia’ First Lady Rosalynn Carter took on a more 
assertive role within the administration. Initially, she embarked on diplomatic trips on her 
husband’s behalf to Latin America and Southeast Asia to promote various aspects of his 
foreign policy agenda but she also increased her presence within the administration 
attending cabinet meetings as well as Brzezinski’s daily brief.149 Considered somewhat of a 
hawk, she naturally gravitated to the national security advisor ideologically. She later 
remarked that she wished her husband had been more ‘demagogic’ and tougher in respect to 
foreign policy. She also bonded with the national security advisor during informal gatherings 
with his wife at the White House 150 ‘She liked me’ Brzezinski later remarked, adding that 
her support gave him extra confidence in policy disputes.151 Although the Carters socialised 
with Cyrus and Grace Vance, the first lady did not foster a similar relationship with the 
secretary of state. She considered him ‘staid’ as opposed to the ‘exciting’ national security 
advisor.152 She later wrote of Vance that although he was ‘sound in judgement’ he was also 
‘cautious, reluctant to “rock the boat”, jealous of bureaucratic prerogatives’ and as such the 
pair did not cultivate the same kind of relationship that the first lady and national security 
advisor shared.153  
The increased influence of the ‘Georgia mafia’ tilted the balance of power in the 
policy wars between Vance and Brzezinski in favour of the national security advisor as they 
encouraged the president to embrace a more forceful foreign policy. Moreover, viewed 
unfavourably by the president’s inner circle, Vance’s relationship with the president 
                                                          
148 Carter III, Interview with the author. 
149 Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 25. 
150 Scott Kaufman, Rosalynn Carter: Equal Partner in the White House (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 2007), 82. 
151 Brzezinski, “Jimmy Carter Presidential Oral History Project.” 
152 Carter, Keeping Faith, 51; Kaufman, Rosalynn Carter, 196. 
153 Rosalynn Carter, First Lady from Plains (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984), 327-328; In Vance, 
Hard Choices; Vance makes only a fleeting reference to Rosalyn Carter indicating a lack of a 
relationship between the pair. 
236 
 
declined throughout 1979. Tensions became frayed after the signing the Israel-Egypt peace 
treaty in March 1979, when Carter decided, with domestic political considerations in mind, 
to scale back the administration’s involvement in the peace process and he appointed U.S. 
Trade Representative Robert Strauss, as a special envoy to the region.154 The move 
displeased Vance, still keen to continue their efforts to achieve an accommodation regarding 
Palestine. He reluctantly acquiesced to the president’s wishes but added that if Strauss 
bypassed him in any way he would resign.155  
Vance’s relationship with Strauss quickly became fraught with disagreements, as the 
secretary’s unease at his appointment increased. In August, after Carter assigned full 
responsibility of Middle East issues to Strauss, Vance immediately expressed his 
disappointment and irritation at the decision. As Brzezinski recalled, Vance ‘raised his voice 
in speaking to the president…he then paused, lowered his voice, leaned back in his chair, 
and added, “Mr President, I am not going to be figurehead for you. If you don’t want me to 
do this, I am going to resign as secretary of state.’ Vance eventually relented after talks with 
Carter but his displeasure at the president’s decision-making was evident.156 
Ten days later, controversy arose when Newsweek reported that UN Ambassador 
Andrew Young had met with representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) in contradiction of the agreed upon policy with Israel that the U.S. not engage directly 
with the group. Young sought an agreement with the PLO to accept a delay in the 
publication of a report by the UN Committee on Palestinian Rights that called for diplomatic 
recognition of Israel’s right to exist in addition to the creation of a Palestinian state. Young 
believed the administration’s attention to other foreign policy and domestic issues at that 
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time would lead them to veto any resolution that arose from the report, something he found 
undesirable. The PLO agreed to the delay but the meeting leaked to the press.157 
Vance, furious at Young for bringing unnecessary controversy on the administration 
by scheduling an unauthorised meeting, demanded his sacking when he met with Carter. If 
he did not dismiss Young, he would resign. The president concurred with his secretary of 
state and fired the UN Ambassador.158 Although he sided with Vance, Carter later expressed 
regret at doing so. Politically, he and Young shared many of the same goals regarding 
human rights and democratic advancement in Africa and he enjoyed the ambassador’s 
presence in his administration. Reflecting on the episode, Carter criticised the reaction of 
Vance in forcing him to fire Young, ‘Cy Vance threw down his gauntlet…and said, in effect, 
it was Andy or him…I wish I had let Cy resign.’159 The two episodes demonstrated the 
irritation that both felt with each other as their relationship waned. Coupled with his 
declining authority within the administration, Vance’s distress with the president and the 
direction of the administration’s foreign policy agenda made his future as secretary of state 
increasingly untenable.  
SALT II and the Soviet Brigade in Cuba 
On 18 June, 1979, Jimmy Carter and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT II 
agreement in Vienna. The negotiations had suffered numerous setbacks since the ‘deep cuts’ 
proposal of March 1977 as talks were hampered by the Soviet intervention in the Horn of 
Africa and normalisation of relations with China. The agreement committed both sides to a 
maximum of 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles, lowered to 2,250 by the end of 1981. The 
MIRV ballistic missiles were limited to 1,320 to each side with a sub-ceiling of 1,200 to 
MIRVed ICBMs and SLBM launchers. The Soviets agreed to limit the strategic capability of 
its backfire missile, while the U.S. agreed not to deploy cruise missiles with a range of 
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600km.160 The conclusion of negotiations represented a personal triumph for Vance, who 
spent considerable time and energy resurrecting the negotiations after each delay and ironing 
out unresolved differences with the Soviets. Moreover, the final terms reflected the 
conservative position he took in March 1977, based on the limits negotiated at Vladivostok 
by the Ford administration in 1974, rather than the ‘deep cuts’ proposal Brzezinski 
advocated (see figure 4). 
Figure 4: Arms Control Negotiating Positions 
 Vladivostok 1974 Moscow 1977 Vienna 1979 
Strategic Delivery 
Vehicles 
2,400 1,800-2,000 
2,400 reducing to 
2,250 
MIRVs 1,320 1,100-1,200 1,320 
MIRVed ICBMs & 
SLBMS 
No limits 550 1,200 
Cruise Missile Range No agreement 2,500km 600km 
 
Public angst in the preceding years however, resulted in a rightward shift against 
SALT, détente and closer relations with the Soviets. Senate ratification became a difficult 
proposition as critics lined up to denounce the treaty and its significance.161 The ‘discovery’ 
of a brigade of troops in Cuba in August 1979 contributed to the public scepticism of Soviet 
intentions and threatened the SALT treaty. Moreover, it generated further bureaucratic 
tussles between Vance and Brzezinski as the latter used the issue to once again encourage 
Carter to embrace a more assertive foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Such an 
approach proved to be detrimental to SALT and U.S.-Soviet relations and further eroded 
Vance’s position within the administration.  
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Since the crisis in the Horn of Africa and the Shaba, Brzezinski had voiced his 
concerns about Cuban interference in the third world on behalf of the Soviet Union more 
vocally and argued that greater attention be placed on their collaboration. Intelligence 
gathered in 1978, which appeared to show a shipment of Soviet military equipment on route 
to Cuba fuelled his suspicions. On the advice of military assistant William Odom, in March 
1979, Brzezinski ordered the CIA to conduct an intelligence review and during a 
reconnaissance mission, evidence emerged of a Soviet unit headquarters based in Cuba. Its 
purpose and function remained unknown. DCIA Stansfield Turner denigrated its 
significance and allowed the report to be published in an internal intelligence report. Senator 
Richard Stone, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and SALT critic, learned of 
the report and the intelligence gathered prior to a closed hearing with Turner and Harold 
Brown on 17 July, 1979. Both attached little importance to the unit and stated that it more 
likely resembled a training regimen. Vance meanwhile wrote to Stone and told him the unit 
did not resemble ‘any substantial increase of the Soviet military presence in Cuba.’162  
Brzezinski refused to believe the interpretations of Vance, Brown and Turner and 
requested a further investigation. In August, additional intelligence revealed the unit was a 
brigade of 2,600 armed troops with tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers. The 
purpose of the brigade remained unknown but the administration failed to realise that it had 
been based in Cuba since 1962, or violated any prior agreements.163 The ‘discovery’ of the 
brigade evoked memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis and created a frenzied atmosphere of 
fear and suspicion within Congress and the wider public. It also set off a chain of events that 
pitted Vance, Brzezinski and their departments as both sides to attempted to enforce their 
desired approach to U.S.-Soviet relations, and the administration’s foreign policy. 
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At the end of August 1979, the intelligence on the brigade leaked to the magazine 
Aviation Week and Science Technology who immediately asked the administration for a 
comment. With Brzezinski out of town, a mini-SCC was convened to deal with the issue but 
Vance and the State Department recognised the report’s potential damage to SALT. As such, 
they used the national security advisor’s absence to implement their own strategy to mitigate 
any fallout from the brigade’s discovery.164 At a meeting on 29 August, Under Secretary of 
State David Newsom proposed the department send demarches to both the Soviets and the 
Cubans to warn them of the potential implications of the brigade. The NSC staffers present, 
as well as those represented by representatives from Defense, resisted the plan. They agreed 
to delay any further action until Vance telephoned Brzezinski to discuss the issue but the 
secretary of state never placed the call.165 
Instead, Vance and his department proceeded with the demarches despite the 
objections. Furthermore, to dampen the story, Vance instructed Newsom to call 
congressional leaders, in recess at the time, to make them aware of the story before 
publication and note that they had expressed their concerns to both the Soviets and the 
Cubans. Neither Vance nor Newsom feared the information being leaked to the press but 
Senator Frank Church, the chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, decided to call a press 
conference and announce the discovery of a brigade. Church faced a tough fight to retain his 
seat and the story gave him the opportunity to dispel the perception that he was ‘too soft’ on 
communism. He told reports the administration needed to act decisively to force the Soviets 
to remove the brigade from Cuba, otherwise SALT would not be considered on the floor of 
the Senate. Following Church’s revelation, other senators joined him to link the brigade 
issue to SALT ratification.166 
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In the frenetic environment generated by the brigade, Carter, Vance and Brzezinski 
handled the situation badly and ultimately stoked the fires of discontent. Firstly, Vance, on 5 
September, told the press, ‘the maintenance of the status quo’ would be unsatisfactory. ‘My 
reply was stronger than I intended’ he recalled.167 The press recorded the secretary as saying 
that the brigade was ‘unacceptable’ although he never uttered the word. Secondly, as Carter 
attempted to diffuse the situation several days later, he urged reporters to maintain ‘a sense 
of proportion’ but also reiterated Vance’s comment that the ‘status quo is not acceptable.’ 
He then linked the presence of the brigade to their wider relationship with the Soviet Union, 
suggesting that relations could be ‘adversely affected’ if a compromise was not found. 
Finally, Brzezinski made inflammatory comments of his own, referring to Cuba and Fidel 
Castro as a ‘puppet’ and paid ‘surrogate’ of the Soviet Union.168 
A bureaucratic struggle erupted as both the NSC and the State Department attempted 
to find a solution to the crisis and save SALT. Brzezinski, scathing of Vance’s handling of 
the affair, labelled the secretary’s decision to tell Church as ‘disastrous.’ Incensed at his 
decision to ignore the findings of the mini-SCC he concluded, by excluding himself and the 
NSC, the State Department wanted control of the issue to advance its own views. After he 
returned to Washington, Brzezinski attended a PRC meeting on the issue chaired by Vance. 
‘It was evident that State wished to assert itself on the subject, perhaps bearing mind the 
large space of publicity (generated by both China and by our tougher line on the Soviets) 
alleging that I was dominant in foreign policy’ he later wrote.169 Vance meanwhile believed 
the issue did not amount to a ‘crisis’ but admitted the flare up damaged SALT and U.S.-
Soviet relations. He sought to separate the two issues under the direction of his own 
department, not Brzezinski’s.170   
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After sending demarches to both the Soviets and the Cubans, Vance believed the 
Soviets could be persuaded, through private channels, to make a ‘face saving gesture.’ Either 
they removed the brigade completely or made alterations to its structure to placate SALT 
detractors in Congress.171 But Vance’s personal appeals to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly 
Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko failed. Both told Vance the brigade had 
been in Cuba since 1962 and neither violated any prior agreements or posed a military 
threat. As such, they held no obligation to remove the troops.172 In desperation, Vance 
pleaded with Dobrynin to make modest changes to the brigade. He asked the ambassador, 
‘can’t you get them to move some ships around – to move some troops a bit – so that we 
could say that it was now acceptable.’ The ambassador remained unmoved.173 
When the secretary met with Gromyko, he warned him the issue would adversely 
affect votes in the Senate if not handled effectively and ‘kill SALT.’ An adamant Gromyko 
told Vance, the deal ‘could not be held hostage’ and argued that U.S. ‘propaganda’ damaged 
the treaty rather than the brigade.174 Vance’s determination to find an accommodation with 
the Soviets, although unsuccessful, represented his growing anxiety as the situation 
developed. Not only did it harm SALT’s chances of ratification, his approach to foreign 
policy fell under siege as Brzezinski seized on the issue to forward his own views and 
encourage Carter to adopt a tougher approach towards the Soviets as well as foreign policy 
more generally.  
While Vance thought the link between the brigade and U.S.-Soviet relations needed 
untangling, Brzezinski viewed the issue as part of a wider campaign of Soviet and Cuban 
hostility toward the United States, which threatened national security. At a PRC meeting he 
declared that the administration should not ‘give the Soviets a clean bill of health’ on the 
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brigade, which posed a direct threat to U.S. credibility at home and abroad. Still portrayed as 
weak, the administration needed to stand up to the Soviet and Cuban threat, demonstrate 
their strength and deal with their Cold War adversaries thereby reinforcing the case for 
SALT.175 Throughout September 1979, Brzezinski attempted to influence the 
administration’s approach to the crisis and undercut Vance. When the PRC gathered on 4 
September, he invited Carter to attend, elevating its status to an NSC meeting. This excluded 
lower-level officials, or ‘dovish State Department associates’ as he dubbed them, and 
provided him with more allies in discussions. Furthermore, he also utilised his direct line to 
the president to persuade him to follow his course of action, rather than Vance’s.176  
On 13 September, Brzezinski penned a memo to Carter entitled ‘Acquiescence vs. 
Assertiveness.’ Similar to the one he sent Carter at the end of 1977, he demanded a tougher 
foreign policy particularly in relation toward the Soviet Union. He wrote, ‘I believe that both 
for international reasons as well as for domestic political reasons you ought to deliberately 
toughen both the tone and substance of our foreign policy.’ To save SALT, the president 
needed to introduce measures that relayed to the Soviets and the Cubans the consequences of 
their behaviour. A tough approach strengthened the administration’s case for the arms 
limitation treaty he argued, if they demonstrated their ability to stand up to the Soviets when 
they threatened U.S. national security. The French had a saying, he wrote, ‘‘c’est le ton qui 
fait la chanson (it’s the tone that makes the song).’ He continued, ‘I know that the above is 
going to trouble you, and perhaps he even irritate you…but failure to cope with it firmly can 
have the effect of vitiating your foreign accomplishments and conclusively stamping this 
administration as weak, and that is why I feel that in general the time has come to adopt a 
more assertive posture.’ At the top of the memo, Carter wrote ‘good.’177  
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Brzezinski then compiled a list of practical policies to adopt in the wake of the 
brigade crisis to ‘demonstrate toughness.’ They included increased surveillance of Cuba, 
reinforcement of the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay, and public condemnation of the island’s 
military ties to the Soviet Union. Key amongst them was the declaration of a ‘Carter 
doctrine’ for the Caribbean whereby the United States would take steps to oppose the 
deployment of Soviet and Cuban troops in the region by providing support to those who 
resisted their advances. The doctrine also committed the U.S. to expand its military presence 
in the Indian Ocean, increase the defence budget, ask Congress to reintroduce the military 
draft and approve new arms sales to China. Furthermore, Brzezinski advocated postponing a 
vote on SALT in the Senate.178 
‘In the next few days you will be under considerable pressure to adopt a cosmetic 
solution and consider the case closed’ Brzezinski told Carter, ‘in my judgement such an 
outcome would be domestically self-defeating, and it will undermine the only basis for 
getting SALT ratification, name public confidence in our firmness.’ Carter underlined the 
phrase ‘public confidence in our firmness.’179 Vance vehemently opposed such measures. At 
a foreign policy breakfast on 21 September 21 ‘a major blow up’ erupted between himself 
and Brzezinski with the two divergent schools of thought represented by the two principals. 
One committed to ‘saving SALT and preserving some semblance of ‘détente’’ against the 
other who believed ‘that a more rigorous U.S. competitive stance against the Soviet Union 
be mounted (with SALT if possible, but without if necessary).’180  
However, the national security advisor underestimated Carter’s commitment to 
SALT, which Vance capitalised on to sway the president’s mind.181 Firstly, he arranged a 
meeting between the president and Senate Leader Robert Byrd, a supporter of SALT. Byrd 
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told Carter, the administration had badly misjudged the situation, given the unit arrived in 
Cuba in the early 1960s and did not violate prior understandings. But the continued public 
hysteria surrounding the brigade damaged the treaty’s chances of ratification. Secondly, 
Vance, supported by White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, urged the president to convene a 
committee of ‘wise men’ to evaluate the situation and provide advice on how to proceed.182 
Brzezinski, who remembered George Ball’s advice during the revolution in Iran, recognised 
the consequences for his own approach and objected but to no avail.183  
The ‘wise men’ consisted of Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Clark Clifford, Henry 
Kissinger, Dean Rusk and other former officials who met at the White House to consider the 
evidence. Of the group, only Kissinger denied any prior knowledge of a brigade stationed in 
Cuba. They concluded that the administration had unnecessarily inflated the brigade with 
Brzezinski singled out for criticism for his role. Some of the group accused him of 
deliberately manufacturing the issue to advance his own strategies that returned the U.S. to 
the more competitive days of the Cold War.184 After the ‘wise men’ gave Carter their 
feedback, to limit the damage to SALT, Vance advised the president to draw a line under the 
fiasco and move on. Carter agreed and decided to address the nation on 1 October, 1979.185  
In a list ditch attempt to persuade the president to follow his advice, Brzezinski 
insisted the speech contain references to ‘Soviet adventurism’ in respect to their military 
presence in Cuba but Carter rejected his advice. Brzezinski wrote in his memoirs that he 
contemplated resigning as a result. ‘I made what probably were the most disagreeable 
comments I ever made to the president’ as he expressed his irritation. Carter ‘looked quite 
furious’ he remembered but given the closeness between them and his reliance on 
Brzezinski, the president respectfully disagreed. He recalled ‘I strongly believed that my 
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usefulness to him would come to an end at the moment at which I no longer spoke 
frankly…it is to the president’s great credit that never during the four years did he 
discourage me from doing so.’186  
Carter faced the nation but whilst he sympathised with Vance’s point of view, 
Brzezinski’s advice won favour with him too. The speech, like others he delivered during his 
time in office, split the difference between the hard and soft approaches advanced by both, 
adopting a conciliatory and confrontational tone. On the one hand, Carter noted that the 
brigade, stationed in Cuba for some time, neither violated any prior agreements nor posed a 
military threat to the U.S. However, he then confirmed the establishment of a joint 
Caribbean military task force at Key West, Florida and a Rapid Deployment Force, the 
expansion of military manoeuvres in the region and economic aid packages to combat 
communism expansion in Latin America.187 After he relayed the measures he wished to 
adopt, Carter retreated to a softer tone. ‘I have concluded that the brigade issue is certainly 
no reason for a return to the Cold War…the greatest danger to American security tonight is 
certainly not the two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba’ he noted, as he renewed his 
call for the U.S. Senate to ratify the SALT treaty. Echoing the advice given to him by 
Brzezinski, Carter observed that the measures taken, combined with their rhetoric, were to 
protect SALT II. ‘The purpose of the SALT II treaty’ he concluded, ‘and the purpose of my 
actions in dealing with Soviet and Cuban military relationship are exactly the same – to keep 
our nation secure and to maintain a world at peace.’188  
Although Brzezinski complained bitterly that the speech ignored his advice, it was 
more reflective of his way of thinking vis-à-vis the Soviet Union then Vance’s. Moreover, in 
the days that followed the speech, Presidential Directive/NSC-52 was unveiled. When the 
administration first entered office, the State Department proposed normalising relations with 
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Cuba but that effort broke down due to their activity in Africa. PD/NSC-52 represented a 
reversal of that policy. The directive defined Cuba as ‘a source of violent revolutionary 
change’ whose adventurism in the third world needed to be combated by the U.S.189 The 
directive outlined measures to restrict their influence such as preventing them from 
obtaining a seat on the UN Security Council by persuading the Non-Aligned Nations to 
resist giving its chair to Cuba, using the aid budget to encourage resistance to Cuban 
overtures and increasing the U.S. military presence in Latin America. The directive also 
instructed the State Department and Defense to make the Soviets aware that continued 
support for Cuba negatively affected U.S.-Soviet relations.190 Brzezinski proved unable to 
persuade the president to embrace ‘the Carter doctrine’ however the measures outlined in the 
speech and through PD/NSC-52 reflected a significant proportion of the advice he provided.  
Carter’s speech did not result in an upsurge in support for SALT as more senators 
came out against the treaty.191 While Vance remained confident Congress would ratify the 
treaty, others in his department did not share his optimism. His close aide and advisor Leslie 
Gelb believed the handling of the brigade crisis had adversely affect SALT’s passage 
through Congress. ‘We were pissing on our own project’ he recalled, noting that the treaty 
became an unattractive option for many senators facing re-election battles, ‘politically it was 
poison.’192 Not only was SALT damaged by events, U.S. relations with the Soviet Union 
suffered. Diplomat Georgy Korniyenko confided to ACDA negotiator Ralph Earle, his belief 
that the administration used the brigade issue to scupper SALT, which he believed, showed 
that Carter had not been serious about. When Earle told him the administration simply 
mishandled the issue, Korniyenko replied, ‘no government could be that stupid.’193 
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As the administration’s approach to the Soviets hardened and Vance’s authority 
gradually disappeared, some within the State Department wondered whether the national 
security advisor deliberately manipulated and exaggerated the incident to advance his own 
position and adversely affect SALT. ‘That’s what some people in the department thought 
and I may have entertained that explanation’ remembered Gelb, ‘but without proof. I never 
had any proof to that effect.’194 Although somewhat speculative, it nevertheless reflected the 
feelings of suspicion and hostility that emanated from the department towards Brzezinski 
and the NSC. The bureaucratic jostling between the president’s two key advisors over the 
brigade was, what Robert Gates called, ‘a chain reaction of blundering’ which harmed 
SALT, détente and the administration’s public image. Ultimately, ‘it was a self-inflicted 
wound.’195 
Conclusion 
Throughout the administration’s time in office, Brzezinski attempted to persuade Carter to 
embrace a tougher, more assertive foreign policy agenda. During 1977, the president sided 
with Vance following the March ‘deep cuts’ debacle, however, tussles erupted between the 
pair over how to respond to events in the Horn of Africa, Angola and Vietnam while the 
national security advisor succeeded in coaxing the president to pursue normalised relations 
with China. By 1979, the two men and their departments were permanently engaged in a 
battle to influence the president and the administration’s approach to foreign policy, as 
tensions between them intensified. 
Events in Iran and Nicaragua precipitated further conflicts between Vance and 
Brzezinski and brought the bitter bureaucratic wars to the fore as they both attempted to 
influence Carter. Their divergent strategies had a significant impact on the administration’s 
response, with the president unable to decisively chose between the policies of his national 
security advisor and secretary of state, which led to an inconsistent and contradictory 
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reaction to both revolutions. Subsequently, the administration lost two key allies in 
strategically important areas of the world. The bureaucratic wars, undoubtedly contributed to 
the United States’ inability to co-ordinate an effective response to both crises.  
Vance’s decision to leave the administration, in addition to his waning relationship 
with the president and his key advisors weakened his position. Moreover, his influence with 
respect to key foreign policy objectives of the administration diminished. A vocal advocate 
for increased co-operation with the Soviet Union, he worked tirelessly on a fresh arms 
control treaty. The SALT II agreement was a significant foreign policy victory for Vance but 
events in Cuba scuppered its chances of ratification. As a result, U.S. policy towards the 
Soviets hardened as Brzezinski’s attempts to persuade the president to toughen his stance 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union gradually succeeded. It also signalled the decline in Vance’s 
ability to influence the president and polices as Brzezinski consolidated his position as the 
key architect of the administration’s foreign policy agenda.  
By 1979, the conflicts between Vance, Brzezinski and their department had 
developed into open bureaucratic warfare with both seeking to undermine and outdo the 
other. However, while Vance had finally reacted to Brzezinski’s assertive influence within 
the administration, his own position had gradually weakened. Despite his best efforts, he 
became increasingly unable to adequately affect policy and counteract the national security 
advisor’s advances. Events towards the end of the year and early 1980 resulted in more 
hostility between Vance and Brzezinski and ultimately triggered the final policy battles of 
the Carter administration. 
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Chapter Six 
1980 
Vance’s Last Stand 
As 1979 drew to a close, two seismic events in the Middle East proved to be critical in the 
bureaucratic wars between Vance and Brzezinski and had a significant impact on the 
presidency of Jimmy Carter. The decision to allow the deposed Shah into the United States 
elicited a furious response from Iran. The U.S. embassy was invaded by angry Iranians, and 
hostages taken. The crisis divided Vance and Brzezinski once again, as they clashed over 
how to respond and secure the release of the hostages. But with the secretary of state’s 
influence evaporating, Vance faced a considerable battle to resist Brzezinski’s 
manoeuvrings. Meanwhile events in neighbouring Afghanistan confirmed Brzezinski’s 
suspicions surrounding Soviet involvement in the region. The national security advisor 
sought to, yet again, persuade Carter to embrace a hardened approach towards the Soviet 
Union. 
This chapter examines how the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan exacerbated the bureaucratic struggles between Vance and Brzezinski but also 
brought them to a close. Whereas previously, the secretary of state resisted Brzezinski’s 
overtures, his influence in the administration had gradually weakened as the president relied 
more on his national security advisor. This chapter reveals how Vance desperately attempted 
to deter the president from accepting Brzezinski’s advice and strategies for resolving the 
hostage crisis, which he believed endangered their lives. Furthermore, the chapter illustrates 
how Brzezinski successfully encouraged a tough response to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan at the expense of SALT and effectively ended détente. While his previous 
attempts had failed to convince the president to fully adopt his approach, he persuaded him 
to embrace a ‘Carter doctrine’ to tackle Soviet expansionism in the Persian Gulf and afar. 
Ultimately, it scuppered the policies and approaches that Vance had dedicated considerable 
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time and energy too during his time as secretary of state. In sum, the chapter reveals how the 
secretary of state was side-lined as the greatest foreign policy battles of the Carter 
administration reached a crescendo. 
The Iranian Hostage Crisis 
Although he engaged in a furious battle to control policy in the final days and weeks of the 
Shah’s regime, Brzezinski stepped back from Iranian issues after the revolution and the State 
Department assumed responsibility for dealing with the new government. Despite consistent 
warnings about the detrimental impact to U.S. interests in the region if the Shah fell, 
Brzezinski encouraged efforts to tap into the anti-communist sentiment of the revolution and 
court the provisional government.1 Under the direction of desk officer Henry Precht, the 
State Department attempted to normalise relations with the revolutionary government in Iran 
and for a time the bureaucratic wrangling, which plagued the administration’s response to 
the revolution, disappeared. ‘The situation in Washington…from my standpoint improved 
enormously. I no longer felt the tension with the White House’ Precht recalled, ‘no voice 
from Brzezinski or Gary Sick came down. I pretty much had my own way.’2 
Between February and November 1979, through Precht, the administration 
attempted to establish ties with Iran through moderate elements of the new government, 
chiefly Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ebrahim Yazdi.3 Precht 
believed the turmoil in post-revolutionary Iran strengthened the position of the moderates 
and would allow them to dominate the political scene. Despite their criticisms of the U.S., 
both Bazargan and Yazdi pragmatically believed that increased collaboration with the 
administration allowed both nations to put aside their differences and move forward.4 
However, Bazargan’s government played a secondary role to the revolutionary council that 
Khomeini established upon his return from exile, which wielded real political power in the 
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new Iranian state. The council, composed of radical clerics personally selected by Khomeini, 
became the central executive authority in Iran and, in essence, a ‘shadow government’ that 
controlled all the key institutions. They frequently interfered in the provisional government’s 
activities as they sought to create a ‘theocratic regime’ as opposed to the liberal, democratic 
system advocated by Bazargan and the moderates.5 
Coupled with the fragility of the Bazargan government, a potential rapprochement 
between the U.S. and Iran was undermined by the lingering presence of the Shah. Since his 
departure from Iran in January 1979, the deposed monarch travelled to Egypt, then Morocco 
and when the revolution’s success became apparent he decided to take up the Carter 
administration’s offer of asylum in the United States. However, when the request reached 
the president, he withdrew the invitation. Carter feared, in the tense post-revolutionary 
environment, violent reprisals against American citizens in Iran if they chose to admit the 
Shah, not to mention, the negative impact on the burgeoning relationship with Iran’s new 
government.6  
The administration placed the offer on hold until an appropriate time and offered to 
find Pahlavi temporary asylum elsewhere. The Shah sought various locations to settle before 
he travelled to the Bahamas and eventually based himself in Mexico.7 The decision by 
Carter not to allow the Shah into the U.S. attracted criticism. Throughout 1979, the president 
faced considerable pressure to admit Pahlavi into the U.S. from supporters and old friends. 
David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger lobbied the administration on the monarch’s behalf 
and their appeals found sympathy with Brzezinski and Vice- President Walter Mondale. All 
believed the president’s failure to provide sanctuary to the Shah, sent a negative message to 
other allies and weakened the United States’ credibility throughout the world.8 ‘Zbig bugged 
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me on it every day’ Carter recalled but his pleas found no favour with the president.9 ‘Fuck 
the Shah!’ Carter exclaimed, after he became exasperated with the constant appeals to grant 
him asylum, ‘he’s just as well off playing tennis in Acapulco as he is in California.’10 Vance 
supported the president’s resistance and his view was enforced by the cautions he received 
from the U.S. embassy in Iran.11 In July 1979, Bruce Laingen, the chargé d’affairs in Tehran 
who replaced Ambassador Sullivan in June, told Vance that due to the weakness of the 
Bazargan government, a potentially volatile situation awaited if they chose to admit the 
Shah. A backlash against the embassy and Americans citizens remained a possibility with 
the U.S. considered a ‘convenient scapegoat’ for hard-line elements of the regime.12  
By October the situation changed dramatically. Unbeknownst to the outside world 
and even those close to him, doctors diagnosed the Shah with cancer in 1974 but treated him 
throughout the final years of his reign. In the months after the revolution, the illness spread 
and his conditioned worsened. American doctors, who examined him in Mexico, informed 
Pahlavi that he required urgent treatment only available in the U.S.13 Aides to Rockefeller 
who assisted the Shah in exile informed the administration of his predicament. Several 
weeks later, on 18 October, 1979, Vance received a medical report, which confirmed his 
diagnosis and relayed the news to the president and his advisors.14 
‘We were faced squarely with a decision in which common decency and humanity 
had to be weighed against possible harm to our embassy personnel in Tehran’ Vance 
recalled. Although he previously resisted the overtures of Brzezinski and others to admit the 
Shah, he reluctantly reversed his decision and argued that they allow Pahlavi into the U.S. 
on humanitarian grounds. To mitigate against any backlash from the Iranians, he proposed 
that Laingen inform Bazargan of their decision in advance but stress the ‘humanitarian need 
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for his hospitalisation in the United States.’ If they received an overwhelmingly negative 
reaction, the decision would be reconsidered.15  
On 21 October, Laingen, accompanied by Precht, on a routine visit to Tehran, 
informed Bazargan and Yazdi of the administration’s decision and asked them to guarantee 
the security of the embassy. Both responded negatively and Yazdi warned them, ‘you are 
opening a Pandora’s box.’ When Laingen asked Bazargan about guarantees for the security 
of the embassy and its staff, the prime minister merely replied, ‘we will do our best.’16 The 
administration decided to proceed and allow the Shah into the U.S. but after the final 
discussion, a reluctant Carter, concerned about the safety of American citizens, prophetically 
asked his advisors, ‘what are you guys going to advise me to do if they overrun our embassy 
and take our own people hostage?’ Nobody replied and the room fell silent.17 
Pahlavi arrived in New York for treatment on 22 October. The news initially 
received a subdued response in Iran but hostility towards the U.S. gradually increased with 
large-scale anti-American demonstrations held in Tehran.18 The discontent in Iran intensified 
when, on 2 November, Brzezinski met with Bazargan and Yazdi in Algiers for the Algerian 
Independence Day celebrations. Although a ‘surprisingly friendly’ encounter, Brzezinski 
rejected their request for the Shah to be extradited for trial but assured both men that the 
U.S. harboured no ill intentions towards Iran and spoke of fresh military sales and co-
operation against a common threat, the Soviet Union.19 When a photograph appeared in the 
press of Brzezinski and Bazargan shaking hands, it suggested to many Iranians, coupled with 
the Shah’s presence in New York, that the U.S. planned to interfere in Iran’s affairs once 
again. The Iranian government knew of Brzezinski’s attempts to orchestrate a coup in the 
final days of the Bakhtiar government, which fanned their suspicions. Moreover, Barazgan 
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did not seek Khomeini’s permission to meet with Brzezinski, which enraged the hardliners. 
This led some who served in the U.S. embassy to suggest that the image of Bazargan and 
Brzezinski embracing one another infuriated Iranians just as much the decision to allow the 
Shah into the U.S.20 
A group of students, who believed the Shah’s presence in New York to be part of a 
plot by the United States to reverse the revolution, met in secret and laid plans to storm and 
occupy the U.S. embassy for several hours in a peaceful protest. Although meant as a 
symbolic gesture, the students believed their attempts would be thwarted by the marines on 
guard and expected to be killed as they prepared for their attack.21 On the morning of 4 
November, a demonstration on route to the University of Tehran passed the U.S. Embassy. 
Protesters stopped and chanted ‘death to the Shah!…death to America!’ During the 
demonstration, the students made their move and climbed over the walls of the embassy.22 
The protestors quickly poured into the compound and the American marines on guard, under 
orders not to fire on the protestors, retreated into the chancery building and awaited help. As 
the diplomatic personnel destroyed confidential files, help did not arrive. Over the course of 
several hours, the students broke into the building and took the staff captive.23  
With sixty-six American hostages, the student revolutionaries felt empowered to 
demand the extradition of the Shah. The administration, although initially alarmed by the 
attack, remained confident of the embassy staff’s swift release, unharmed. Several months 
earlier, on 14 February, 1979, armed militants overran the embassy and took American 
diplomats hostage, including Ambassador Sullivan. However, the provisional government 
reacted quickly and resolved the situation amicably. Khomeini even issued a personal 
apology to Sullivan for the incident.24 The administration hoped for a repeat of the February 
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seizure. Bruce Laignan, who happened to be on a visit to the Iranian foreign ministry when 
the students seized the embassy, protested furiously to Yazdi. The foreign minister, surprised 
by Laignan’s reaction given the events in February, promised to help resolve the situation.25  
When he spoke with Khomeini later that day, the Ayatollah told him to remove the 
students. However, after several hours he changed his mind. Khomeini sensed an 
opportunity to solidify the revolution by using the hostages to unite domestic forces around a 
common enemy and deter future American intervention in Iran.26 He duly endorsed and 
praised the seizure of the U.S. embassy and the diplomats. The Ayatollah called the embassy 
a ‘den of spies’ where the United States, whom he dubbed the ‘Great Satan’ hatched plots 
against Iran and the revolution. Bazargan and Yazdi both tendered their resignations in 
protest. With their departures, any hope of a speedy resolution to the hostage crisis faded.27 
The hostage crisis immediately divided Vance, Brzezinski and their departments and 
led to a furious tussle over the administration’s response to the crisis. Vance and the State 
Department believed the Ayatollah viewed the hostages as ‘political pawns’ to strengthen 
his grip on power in Iran and weaken the authority of the moderates. ‘Probably, it was not 
until Khomeini saw the hysterical mob reaction and sensed the hostages’ potential for 
uniting the warring factions against a hated enemy that he decided to use them as a rallying 
point for bringing about a new Iranian state’ Vance recalled. The administration needed to 
react cautiously and not endanger the hostages’ lives further by overreacting to events. 
Vance asserted that the hostages possessed more value alive to the regime then dead. The 
administration, he argued, needed to proceed patiently through diplomatic channels to 
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negotiate the hostages’ release.28 Brzezinski and the NSC however interpreted the situation 
as a deliberate and calculated opportunity to embarrass the U.S.29  
To the national security advisor, the hostage crisis threatened American honour and 
presented a real test for the Carter presidency. To resolve the crisis, the president needed to 
utilise American force to bring the hostages home and send a message to the Iranians and 
U.S. allies across the world. At a foreign policy breakfast on 9 November, he warned the 
president that if the crisis continued, it presented fatal ramifications for his presidency. ‘If 
they’re still in captivity at thanksgiving, what will that say about your presidency and 
America’s image in the world?’ he argued. Brzezinski urged Carter to take decisive action, 
which he acknowledged placed the hostages in potential danger, and bring the crisis to a 
swift conclusion. ‘Your greater responsibility is to protect the honour and dignity of our 
country and its foreign policy interests. At some point that great responsibility could become 
more important than the safety of our diplomats.’ Vance vehemently rejected Brzezinski’s 
interpretation of events, ‘the hostages have been held only five days. We’re dealing with a 
volatile, chaotic situation in Iran, and negotiation is the only way to free them. The president 
and this nation will ultimately be judged by our restraint in the face of provocation, and on 
the safe return of our hostages.’30 
After the foreign policy breakfast, Vance met with Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan 
and Press Secretary Jody Powell and urged them to encourage the president not to act rashly 
under pressure from Brzezinski with an election on the horizon. Minutes after Vance left 
Jordan’s office, Brzezinski entered and declared the hostage crisis an opportunity to 
demonstrate ‘American resolve.’ ‘Cy’s calm approach sounded good’ Jordan remembered 
‘but Zbig’s tough approach felt good.’31 
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The situation in Iran precipitated further bureaucratic tussles between himself and 
Brzezinski for control of the administration’s approach. In the days that followed the seizure 
of the embassy, Carter agreed to follow two tracks in their attempts to secure the release of 
the hostages. The first emphasised the diplomatic route, the strategy Vance endorsed. The 
second, as advocated by Brzezinski, considered the feasibility of military alternatives and a 
rescue mission if possible.32 But Carter’s inability to decisively decide between the two, 
triggered further struggles between his advisors. 
Throughout his time as secretary of state, Vance had been forced to resist the 
advances of Brzezinski and the NSC, and the hostage crisis presented a new challenge. As 
with other encounters, he was forced to defend his position as he struggled to influence the 
administration’s foreign policy and the president’s decision-making. Initially, he held the 
upper hand. Firstly, Carter felt a deep sense of personal commitment to the hostages and 
their families, whom he met with, and vowed to bring them all home alive. Brzezinski 
meanwhile refused to meet with the families, as he did not want emotion to cloud his 
judgement.33 Like Vance, he also recognised the hostages’ value to the regime and although 
he did not rule out the idea of a rescue mission, he did not want to adopt any measures that 
endangered their lives. ‘They have us by the balls’ he told his advisors.34 But the show of 
restraint demonstrated by the administration earned Carter a brief reprieve from the negative 
press that accompanied his floundering presidency. His approval ratings rose from 30% to 
61% as Americans rallied behind their president, which served him well against the 
challenge from Ted Kennedy for the Democratic presidential nomination.35  
Secondly, and perhaps crucially, while Brzezinski encouraged a tough response to 
the crisis, a show of force seemed impracticable. Vance evoked his own experiences during 
the Johnson administration when North Korea captured the USS Pueblo in January 1968. In 
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that instance, Vance dissuaded President Park of South Korea from ordering a retaliatory 
strike against the North and urged caution as any punitive action threatened the lives of the 
hostages and hindered a peaceful solution to the crisis. In the end, North Korea released the 
crew of the Pueblo after extensive diplomatic efforts by the Johnson administration.36 
Brzezinski scoffed at Vance’s comparison between the Pueblo and the hostage crisis. ‘That 
went on for a year!’ he exclaimed and reminded Vance and Carter that President Johnson 
‘wasn’t in the middle of a re-election campaign.’37 
He instead pointed to the case of the USS Mayaguez, a merchant ship seized off the 
coast of Cambodia, as a blueprint to launch a rescue mission. As Vance and General David 
Jones, Chair of the JCS, who opposed the mission at the time, pointed out, forty Americans 
died during the operation to free the crew of the Mayaguez. Vance even quipped during 
discussions ‘the last thing we need is another Mayaguez.’ Brzezinski also used an example 
from 1976 when Israeli rescue forces stormed a hijacked airplane at Entebbe Airport in 
Uganda but General Jones and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown rejected the comparison. 
They pointed out that the hostage takers at Entebbe held their captives on an open runway 
while the Iranians detained the American hostages in the middle of major urban city.38  
Brzezinski also proposed the mining of Iranian harbours as well as interrupting 
commerce, strikes on Iranian oil facilities and introducing economic sanctions. But when the 
president’s advisors discussed the options those who perhaps leaned toward military action 
recognised the potential for retaliation by Khomeini against the hostages.39 Administration 
officials ruled other displays of force meanwhile as inadequate. As Gary Sick recalled, ‘we 
could make shows of force, we could sail ships up and down right off their coast, we could 
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overfly them with aircraft but was that going to change their mind? It’s not obvious that it 
would.’40 
Despite the desire on the part of some within the administration to be tough on Iran, 
the president’s advisers considered all other options as either unworkable or likely to 
endanger the hostages. They turned to the diplomatic initiatives that Vance proposed but as 
Vice-President Mondale explained, ‘if someone had proposed a way of using military power 
in a responsible way to get our hostages home, I think most of us would have supported it. 
But we never found it. It came down to this: Would it free the hostages or only increase the 
risk to them?’ In the early days of the crisis, the mood of the principals tilted toward the 
latter, which gave Vance an advantage over Brzezinski.41 
However, the diplomatic avenues yielded little success. The resignations of 
Bazargan and Yazdi presented a problem for negotiations as their departures left the 
administration with no direct channel to Khomeini. As a result, Vance proposed sending 
former Attorney General Ramsay Clark and William Miller, the staff director for the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, to meet with Khomeini on the administration’s behalf.42 
The administration asked Miller and Clark, Farsi speakers and critics of the Shah’s regime, 
to pass on a message from Carter to Khomeini, which stressed Iran’s need to respect 
international law but also demonstrate compassion and release the hostages. However, when 
details of the mission leaked to the press, the Iranians refused to receive Miller and Clark.43 
The government of Iran meanwhile issued demands that included the extradition of 
the Shah to stand trial, his wealth to be transferred to the state, an American recognition of 
the harm to Iran in the past, and a commitment to non-interference in Iranian affairs.44 The 
United States refused to return the Shah, his wealth or offer an apology. Instead, the 
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administration initiated a series of sanctions against Iran for their actions, which included 
embargos on the transfer of spare parts and on oil imports. They also froze $6 billion in 
Iranians assets held in the U.S. and Iranian students with expired visas received deportation 
notices.45 Meanwhile, the administration negotiated the Shah’s departure from New York, 
which deprived the Iranian government of one of its chief demands.46 After the Mexican 
government refused to take him back, Hamilton Jordan persuaded General Omar Torrijos of 
Panama to grant the Shah asylum. On 4 December, Pahlavi left the U.S.47  
Another avenue for negotiation lay in the unlikely form of Yasser Arafat and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Arafat wanted to help the administration and 
believed that by utilising his ties with Khomeini, his intervention would boost the PLO’s 
position with the United States.48 Yet, when Arafat and the PLO attempted to mediate they 
encountered resistance from both the students, who refused to negotiate with anyone, and 
Khomeini, whose advisors told the PLO leader not to approach the subject when he met with 
the Ayatollah. Nevertheless, the PLO carefully persuaded the regime and successfully 
negotiated the release of thirteen female and African American hostages. The mediation 
however came at a price. Despite appreciation for Arafat’s efforts, the PLO’s status within 
the U.S. did not significantly improve. The PLO found negotiations with the Iranians even 
more protracted and frustrating then they imagined and after the release of the thirteen 
hostages, Arafat shied away from mediating the hostage crisis. Fifty-three hostages remained 
in captivity with no imminent sign of their release.49  
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The administration also turned to the United Nations. According to U.S. 
Ambassador Donald McHenry, ‘whatever had gone on between the United States and Iran, 
people separated that out from the way it was treating the diplomatic staff.’ The UN route 
gave the administration an opportunity to be ‘the reasonable ones’ McHenry recalled, ‘we 
didn’t get anything by lashing out in our language or threatening or any of that.’50 The 
administration became encouraged after the new Iranian Foreign Minister Abolhassan Bani-
Sadr requested an emergency meeting of the security council and made public comments 
that indicated the government’s willingness to negotiate the release of the hostages. Vance 
and the State Department believed Bani-Sadr to be genuine in his commitment to bring the 
hostage crisis to an end and this channel represented their best hope for their release. 
Through UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, the administration made their demands: 
upon the release of the hostages they agreed to set up a commission to examine the abuses 
and excesses of the Shah’s regime and allow the Iranian government to pursue his assets 
through American courts. Despite initial optimism of the plans chances of success, 
Khomeini refused and expressed his desire to put the hostages on trial on charges of 
espionage.51  
Bani-Sadr subsequently resigned, faced with accusations of ‘being soft on the 
Americans’ and his replacement Sadegh Ghotbzadeh declared there was ‘no room for 
negotiation at present.’52 Carter then accused Iran of acting against international law and 
pressed for a UN resolution that condemned their actions and the security council 
unanimously adopted resolution 457, even the Soviet Union spoke out against Iran. They 
also urged both sides to show restraint and exercise further diplomatic routes available to 
them to resolve the crisis peacefully.53 To Vance and the State Department, this proved their 
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approach to be the right one. As Anthony Lake surmised, ‘we have shown the right 
combination of firmness and discipline…threats and signs of impatience do not help.’54 
However, UN condemnation and pressure from allies, did not satisfy Brzezinski. 
While Vance continued to voice his view that diplomatic avenues be explored, the national 
security advisor remarked, ‘Cy, you always have another diplomatic channel.’55 Vance’s 
strategy had yielded little success, and on each occasion, Brzezinski attempted to refocus the 
administration’s approach. He challenged the secretary of state’s advice with the president as 
he sought a more direct response that demonstrated American resolve. The national security 
advisor persisted with the idea of a military solution as he outmanoeuvred Vance in an 
attempt to find a solution to the crisis. DCIA Stansfield Turner discovered that the national 
security advisor began chairing meetings with individuals involved in military planning in 
secret days after the hostage crisis began.56  
While the president sided with Vance initially, the failure to secure the release of the 
hostages through diplomatic initiatives allowed Brzezinski to argue more forcefully for a 
military response to the crisis. Unable to decided decisively between the advice of his 
advisors, the president turned to the possibility of a military response to resolve the crisis. 
He ordered the deployment of the USS Kitty Hawk to join the USS Midway in the Arabian 
Sea and authorised sending AWACS (early reconnaissance warning planes) to Egypt in the 
event of a military operation in Iran.57 Vance objected at a NSC meeting on 4 December and 
voiced his view that this action ‘would block negotiations’ but Brzezinski maintained that 
the military preparations ran concurrently with the diplomatic effort as part of the agreed 
upon ‘two-track strategy.’ Carter overruled his secretary of state and agreed to deploy the 
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AWACS but continued to side with Vance in his opposition to the mining of Iranian 
harbours.58 
In the initial period after the seizing of the embassy, both Vance and Brzezinski 
forwarded their own strategies to secure the release of the hostages. However, ‘the two-track 
strategy’ resembled the competing advice and strategies of his two advisors. Carter’s 
willingness to consider both diplomatic and military solutions heightened the sense of 
competition between Vance and Brzezinski, which led both to use various avenues to affect 
decision-making. This resulted in a series of hard and soft measures aimed at resolving the 
crisis however neither approach secured the release of the hostages. As Carter pivoted 
between his advisors, it created further bureaucratic divisions within his administration.  
Initially, Vance’s approach found favour but diplomatic initiatives failed to produce 
positive results and as the months passed, the hostages remained in captivity and the clamour 
for decisive action intensified. He labelled Brzezinski and those who urged Carter to react 
forcefully to the hostage crisis as ‘the crazies’ as his resolve for a diplomatic solution 
hardened.59 His concern for the hostages increased in late November and early December 
1979 when a wave of attacks on U.S. embassies by angry mobs in Pakistan, Libya and 
Kuwait left two Americans embassy personnel dead. The attacks occurred after Khomeini 
blamed the United States for inciting the anti-western Muslims who seized the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Shaken by the events, Vance confided to Assistant 
Secretary Harold Saunders, ‘I’m deeply concerned over what would happen to our people if 
the White House decided to take military action against Iran.’60 Moreover, as the diplomatic 
avenues failed to produce results, it encouraged Brzezinski to argue more vigorously for a 
forceful strategy to resolve the crisis. 
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Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 
In the midst of the hostage crisis, on 25 December, 1979, Soviet forces crossed the border 
into neighbouring Afghanistan with the intention of restoring order and to protect their 
strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. While the Politburo believed their intervention would 
only last several weeks, the furious response of the United States prolonged the internal 
conflict in Afghanistan. Soviet actions detrimentally affected the SALT II treaty, which was 
shelved by the administration, and effectively ended détente. Moreover, it became a key 
source of debate between Vance and Brzezinski, as they attempted to orchestrate the 
administration’s response to the invasion. Vance urged a cautious approach that safeguarded 
SALT but also preserved cordial relations with the Soviet Union. Brzezinski however sought 
a tough response to punish the Soviets and radically shift the administration’s foreign policy 
agenda. The policy wars duly escalated, however whereas previously Carter had sided with 
Vance on issues relating to the Soviet Union, he supported the policies and approaches of his 
national security advisor, as the secretary of state’s influence within the administration 
dissipated.  
In April 1978, the Afghan communist party deposed President Sardar Muhammed 
Daoud Kahn whose relationship with Moscow had declined rapidly in the previous years. 
Daoud’s overthrow presented an opportunity for the Soviets to regain their foothold in 
Afghanistan under new President Nur Muhammad Taraki and Prime Minister Hafizullah 
Amin.61 Despite the new government declaring itself a non-aligned nation, they improved 
relations with Moscow and the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship in December 
1978.62 But Taraki’s repressive regime inflamed tensions with Islamist factions in Afghan 
society and hostilities ensued between the mujahedeen fighters and government forces. As 
the country slid into a civil war, Taraki requested assistance from Moscow. Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gromyko argued vigorously in favour of sending military support to their 
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neighbours. ‘If we lose Afghanistan now, it will drift away from the Soviet Union, and that 
will deal a serious blow to our (foreign) policy’ he declared.63 
Tensions in Afghanistan did not go unnoticed in Washington. When Taraki deposed 
Daoud in April 1978, Brzezinski suspected Soviet involvement in the coup but with no 
evidence, the other principals dismissed the suggestion. Under Vance’s instruction, the 
administration attempted to fashion stable relations with new regime in Kabul. But when the 
U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs was kidnapped by Islamic militants and subsequently killed 
in a failed rescue mission ordered by Soviet forces on 14, February, 1979, the United States 
pointed the finger of blame directly at the Soviets.64 Inspired by Brzezinski, U.S. policy 
toward Afghanistan dramatically shifted following Dubs’ death. The national security 
advisor had argued for some time that the administration should look at covert action to 
destabilise the Afghan regime and ‘frustrate Soviet ambitions.’ His suggestions put him at 
odds with Vance and Dubs, who took the State Department view that they ought to harbour 
cordial relations with Taraki’s government. After the ambassador was killed, Brzezinski 
called it ‘a tragic event which involved either Soviet ineptitude or collusion’ and when Amin 
refused to apologise for Dubs’ death, he concluded that the prime minister ‘had revealed his 
anti-America, pro-Soviet colours.’65 
Coupled with the fall of the Shah in neighbouring Iran, Brzezinski, fearful of the 
waning influence of the U.S. in the region, took up the issue with the president. He argued 
that Soviet military intervention or an invasion looked a distinct possibility and the 
administration needed to take steps to counter their advances. Encouraged by the progress of 
Afghan insurgents, the CIA proposed support for the mujahedeen, primarily through 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The State Department however told Vance ‘the United States 
shouldn’t go beyond a modest effort to publicise Soviet actions and intentions.’ Despite their 
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resistance, on 3 July, 1979, only weeks after the signing the SALT II accords, Carter 
authorised the indirect funding of the mujahedeen and other resistance fighters in 
Afghanistan. Although initially set at only $500,000 Brzezinski nevertheless believed it 
provided the U.S. with a significant opportunity to affect events in Afghanistan and 
destabilise the Soviet influence there.66 ‘The secret operation was an excellent idea’ he later 
reflected, which offered the advantage of ‘drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap.’67 
Beyond the measures taken in July 1979, Vance and the State Department frustrated 
Brzezinski’s efforts to draw public attention to the increased Soviet presence in Afghanistan. 
The secretary of state and his subordinates viewed the events with dread but nonetheless 
considered it a local conflict rather than a wider geopolitical situation.68 Their position 
agitated Brzezinski who became more vocal and took actions against his ‘softer’ colleagues 
at the State Department. In August 1979, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
removed direct references to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan from a speech the national 
security advisor delivered. In retaliation, Brzezinski told The New York Times correspondent 
Hedrick Smith about the references to Afghanistan, who reported them in his article the next 
day quoting, ‘administration officials.’ He also took similar action against Under Secretary 
of State David Newsom after he vetoed Brzezinski’s attempts to publicly highlight Soviet 
activity in the press.69  
As the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, the Soviets acquiesced to a request 
from Taraki for military support and dispatched 5,000 to 10,000 advisers as well as financial 
aid to Kabul.70 However, the Soviet military presence failed to halt the internal disputes 
between Taraki and Prime Minister Amin, which caused consternation in Moscow. This led 
Brzhenev to advise Taraki to depose of Amin. However, the prime minister thwarted the 
president’s attempts to oust him and instead orchestrated his own coup and killed Taraki. 
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Despite his intervention, Amin failed to stabilise the situation with large swathes of the 
countryside falling into the hands of the mujahedeen while the army, beset by defections, 
fragmented.71  
The Politburo, dissatisfied by events and Amin’s overtures toward the west and the 
United States, met to consider a further escalation of their involvement in Afghanistan. In 
early December 1979, Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB, and Defence Minister Dimitry 
Ustinov argued in favour of a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to resolve the civil conflict and 
protect their strategic interests. They converted Brezhnev, whose health had deteriorated 
considerably, and Gromyko to their cause and on 12 December, authorised up to 80,000 
Soviet troops be readied to cross the border.72 When the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. 
Anatoly Dobrynin learnt of the plans to invade, he expressed his concerns about the potential 
impact on U.S.-Soviet relations, but Brezhnev dismissed his fears and said, ‘it will all be 
over in three to four weeks.’73 
On 22 December, 1979, U.S. intelligence officials reported the build-up of Soviets 
forces along their border with Afghanistan and warned of an imminent invasion. Three days 
later, the Soviets crossed the border into Afghanistan and advanced on Kabul. They captured 
and murdered Amin. Brzezinski now sought a strong response from the administration, 
convinced that previous responses to crises such as the Horn of Africa, Shaba II and the 
Cuba brigade fiasco translated into American ‘weakness’ and gave the Soviets the 
confidence to intervene.74 The national security advisor noted in his memoirs that the 
invasion ‘was a vindication’ of his concerns whilst also suggesting ‘had we been tougher 
sooner…maybe the Soviets would not have engaged in this act of miscalculation.’ But he 
also viewed the situation as an opportunity for Carter to ‘demonstrate his genuine 
toughness.’75 While the president had resisted fully embracing Brzezinski’s approach 
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towards U.S.-Soviet relations, the invasion of Afghanistan represented a direct threat to U.S. 
strategic interests in the Persian Gulf Region and a serious challenge for the administration’s 
credibility.76 
Previously, Brzezinski’s calls for tougher action against the Soviets faced resistance 
from Vance. Overall, the secretary of state’s strategy towards U.S.-Soviet relations was the 
administration’s position. But the gradual interference of Brzezinski had produced a gradual 
tilt and when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, he felt increasingly confident of having his 
approach implemented. The national security advisor began to exert his authority to 
persuade Carter to accept his ideas and initiatives at the expense of the policies and 
approaches advocated by Vance and the State Department. He used the Soviet invasion to 
strengthen his position within the administration, undermining Vance in the process, and 
confirm his status as the main architect of U.S. foreign policy and the president’s chief 
advisor. 
Brzezinski wrote to Carter on 26 December and said, ‘we are now facing a regional 
crisis…If the Soviets succeed in Afghanistan…the age-long dream of Moscow to have direct 
access to the Indian ocean will have been fulfilled.’ He also cautioned, ‘the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both internationally 
and domestically’, however, it also represented an opportunity to for them to act against the 
Soviets. He called for increased reinforcements of the Afghan rebels, both militarily and 
economically, and enlist the backing of Pakistan and China in their support for the 
insurgents. The U.S., Brzezinski believed, would also need to warn the Soviets that their 
actions placed SALT in jeopardy and risked a formal UN condemnation.77 
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Carter appeared on television and told reports ‘such gross interference in the internal 
affairs of Afghanistan is in blatant violation of accepted international rules of behaviour.’78 
When Carter addressed the NSC on 28 December, he fully embraced the advice and policies 
of his national security advisor and told them he considered the invasion a watershed 
moment.79 During the course of their meeting they agreed to send Brezhnev a strongly 
worded message that condemned the invasion and warned the Soviet leadership of the 
potential consequences to U.S.-Soviet relations if they did not withdraw their troops from 
Afghanistan. When he replied to the message, Brezhnev dismissed U.S. concerns, which 
only served to agitate Carter.80  
In a memo the next day, Brzezinski told the president that tough rhetoric needed to 
be backed up by strong measures. He wrote to Carter, ‘we have frequently protested Soviet 
actions (bases in Vietnam, Cubans abroad, etc.). Since we have not always followed these 
verbal protests up with tangible responses, the Soviets may be getting into the habit of 
disregarding our concern.’81 This meant adopting measures to punish Moscow and 
demonstrate their concern over the impact of the invasion on U.S.-Soviet relations. One of 
those proposals included a considerable sacrifice, the SALT treaty, which Vance had 
devoted considerable time, effort and energy too during his time as secretary of state.82 
On 2 January, 1980, the NSC met to discuss possible actions against the Soviets, 
which included removing SALT from the Senate calendar. They agreed to recall the U.S. 
Ambassador Thomas J. Watson from Moscow and reduce Soviet diplomatic staff in the U.S. 
The administration would also discuss the merits of an Olympic boycott with European 
allies. Boycotting the games, due to be held in Moscow, was viewed as a risk-free act of 
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public diplomacy, but Carter also planned an embargo on the export of grain and strategic 
technology. The NSC also agreed to provide military and humanitarian aid to Pakistan after 
seeking an amendment to the foreign assistance bill and give China favourable trade status 
ahead of the Soviets.83 Two days later, on 4 January, 1980, Carter addressed the nation and 
provided some detail of the proposals. He called the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ‘an 
extremely serious threat to peace…neither the United States nor any other nation which is 
committed to world peace and stability can continue to do business as usual with the Soviet 
Union.’ Détente and the approach advocated by Vance had collapsed.84  
On SALT, Vance and Warren Christopher found themselves the lone voices in 
support. They suggested it remain on the Senate calendar, but Carter, Brzezinski, Brown and 
White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler insisted the treaty be placed on hiatus and removed from 
consideration until further notice.85 A dispirited Vance nevertheless, continued to fight for 
the SALT treaty. ‘Cy was still hoping to save SALT’ Marshall Schulman, Vance’s advisor 
on Soviet affairs, remarked ‘it was part of his indomitable optimism.’86 Although the NSC 
agreed to restrict communication between diplomats in Washington and Moscow, the State 
Department noted that such action had not even been taken when the Soviets invaded 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the 1950s and 1960s respectively.87 Vance believed 
maintaining dialogue was essential to salvage SALT and improve relations and so he 
attempted to initiate a meeting with his Soviet counterpart Andrei Gromyko. Carter and 
Brzezinski however, rejected his request as it became clear that Afghanistan had ended their 
                                                          
83 “Memo, Brzezinski to Brown, Mondale & Vance: ‘Results of the NSC Meeting,’” January 2, 1980, 
Volume VI, Soviet Union, January - May 1980, Document 252, FRUS, 1977-1980. 
84 Jimmy Carter, “Address to the Nation on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,” 4 January, 1980, The 
American Presidency Project. 
85 “Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting,” 2 January, 1980, Documents Prepared for 
Carter-Brezhnev Project Conference “The Intervention in Afghanistan and the fall of Détente.”  
86 Marshall Schulman remarks at  “Global Competition and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet 
Relations, 1977-1980” Carter-Brezhnev Project Conference, Fort Lauderdale, FL., 23-26 March 1995, 
The National Security Archive. 
87 Aronoff, “In Like a Lamb, Out Like a Lion,” 446. 
272 
 
desire for co-operation. Brzezinski also vetoed a later attempt to send Schulman to Moscow 
and meet with Brezhnev.88 
In respect to the other measures announced by Carter, the secretary of state 
expressed doubts about the effectiveness of an Olympic boycott. Considerable enthusiasm 
from Brzezinski and Mondale saw the idea prevail, but in their discussions the secretary of 
state traded ‘heated’ words with the national security advisor.89 Vance reluctantly supported 
the boycott after he recalled his belief that the U.S. should have boycotted the 1936 games 
held in Nazi Germany.90 He also supported the embargo on grain sales to the Soviet Union 
as well as a ban on the transfer of technology to the Soviets.91  
The administration tilted towards China even further with the announcement of 
more favourable trade status. In light of this declaration, Secretary of Defense Harold 
Brown’s trip to China took on extra significance. Vance opposed Brown’s visit even before 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which he believed increased tensions between 
themselves and Moscow. The president overruled him. ‘I was alone in my desire to maintain 
our longstanding policy of even handedness between the USSR and the PRC’ he reflected. 
Carter authorised Brown to offer non-lethal military equipment and high technology 
transfers to the Chinese despite Vance’s objections. Not only did such a move worsen U.S.-
Soviet relations but the secretary of state warned ‘the Chinese leaders were wary of being 
used as a counterweight in the U.S.-Soviet geopolitical rivalry.’92 In his discussions with the 
Chinese, Brown found the PRC receptive to the idea of technology transfers and the sale of 
non-lethal military equipment as well as sharing the administration’s condemnation of the 
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Soviet invasion but on more substantive issues they went no further. ‘I was not surprised’ 
Vance recalled.93 
After seeking an amendment to the foreign assistance bill, the administration offered 
President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq $400million in military assistance to Pakistan despite the 
United States withdrawing its aid programme the year before for its human rights abuses and 
lack of adherence to nuclear non-proliferation agreements.94 While Vance did not object to 
the administration’s overtures he believed if they neutralised Pakistan and did not introduce 
U.S. bases, the Soviets may be amenable to an early withdrawal from neighbouring 
Afghanistan. Brzezinski dismissed the idea, describing it as ‘making the Soviet Union in 
effect the co-guarantor of neutrality in the Persian Gulf region.’95 The national security 
advisor sought to cement further ties with Pakistan in their support for the Afghan rebels. 
When he visited Pakistan with Warren Christopher in February 1980, they travelled to an 
army outpost at Khyber Pass near the Afghan border. As they toured the base, Brzezinski 
was invited to inspect an AK-47 Kalashnikov. He declined to fire it but instead asked for a 
group photo and waved the rifle above his head.96 According to his press secretary, Jerrold 
Schecter it was as ‘a symbol of defiance.’ ‘News cameras caught the moment’ he recalled, 
‘and the next day his gesture of American opposition to the Soviet invasion appeared on 
front pages of newspapers around the world.’97 
While the administration adopted punitive measures against the Soviets, Brzezinski 
believed the U.S. needed to go further. He attempted to persuade Carter to initiate a 
‘doctrine’ for the Caribbean after discovering a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba, although 
the president did not fully embrace his advice. He did, however, approve a considerable 
military build-up in the region to counter Soviet and Cuban interference.98 Now Brzezinski 
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sought the president’s approval to initiate a wide-ranging series of measures to deter Soviet 
intervention in the Persian Gulf region and support those who wished to oppose them. The 
invasion of Afghanistan, he argued, threatened the security of the Persian Gulf and the U.S. 
needed to protect Western interests and other nations from potential Soviet incursions.99 
He wrote to Carter and called on him to adopt a doctrine for the Persian Gulf region. 
He drew a parallel between the situation in Afghanistan and the issues faced by President 
Harry S. Truman during his time in office and told Carter, ‘before you are a President 
Wilson you have to be for a few years a President Truman.’ Brzezinski reminded him that 
Soviet intimations towards Greece and Turkey inspired the president to first unveil the 
‘Truman Doctrine’ in a speech in 1947, which pledged American support for countries to 
ward off the threat of communism. As he noted, ‘this speech marked the beginning of one of 
the most creative periods of U.S. diplomacy. Most importantly, it signalled the intention of 
the U.S. to abandon its past hesitancy and to assume a more activist role internationally.’ 
Whereas previously he criticised the administration’s passivity or acquiescence with respect 
to the Soviet Union, Brzezinski told the president that, in his view, the United States had a 
duty to act in defiance of the communist threat. Moreover, it offered the opportunity for the 
U.S. to assert itself on the world stage as Truman had done in 1947.100  
The Persian Gulf, he argued, was particularly vulnerable to Soviet incursions and the 
U.S. needed to guarantee the security of the area. Truman assigned considerable funding to 
the Middle East to help them combat the Soviet threat but also preserve American strategic, 
military and economic interests in the region, through which the United States gained a 
significant foothold in the region.101 Faced with a similar situation, the administration 
needed to take actions to preserve their interests and prevent their status from evaporating. 
‘As in 1947, the West looks to us because only we can provide the necessary leadership and 
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resources to turn back the Soviet threat to our interests in the region and beyond’ he told 
Carter.102 
He wrote to the president again several days later and outlined a range of measures 
to expand the U.S. military presence and activities in the region. They included, in addition 
to covert assistance, increased defence spending and the implementation of a rapid 
deployment force. In a blow to Vance’s attempts to reinstitute good relations with the Soviet 
Union, Brzezinski noted, ‘there is no need to freeze the U.S.-Soviet relationship any further, 
but by the same token we should have no illusions about an early improvement—nor should 
we strive for one.’ Near the end the memo, he wrote ‘our response has to be a sustained one 
and a regional one. Success or failure will depend on what we do in terms of the longer run 
in Southwest Asia. You might want to think of a ‘Carter doctrine.’’ The president underlined 
‘Carter doctrine.’ Much of the contents of the memo became incorporated in the president’s 
state of the union address before Congress.103 
On 23 January, 1980, Carter declared that in order to protect the Persian Gulf the 
United States would take certain measures to counter Soviet interference, and safeguard 
Western interests. To do so, Carter indicated the administration’s willingness to use force. 
‘Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States 
of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military 
force.’104 The president’s address signalled a dramatic increase in the U.S. military presence 
in the region as well as the reintroduction of selective service (the draft) and a 5% increase 
in the defence budget. Although not explicitly outlined in the speech, the doctrine paved the 
way for the creation of a rapid deployment force and confirmed the introduction of new 
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NATO missile systems in Europe. They also increased the U.S. naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean and flew B-52 bombers over Soviet positions.105  
Coupled with the punitive measures adopted prior to the address, the Carter doctrine 
represented the end of the policies and approaches Vance had advocated throughout his time 
as secretary of state. ‘The tenuous balance between visceral anti-Sovietism and an attempt to 
regulate dangerous competition could no longer be maintained. The scales tipped toward 
those favouring confrontation’ he concluded.106 Some in the State Department, derided the 
speech and the president’s approach. Anthony Lake, upon receiving a draft copy of Carter’s 
address, wrote on it ‘this is a piece of unadulterated shit...it is filled with non-arguments 
(‘Soviet aggression cannot go undeterred’) and other insane formulations.’107 To Brzezinski, 
however, the speech vindicated his warnings about the Soviet Union but also embraced his 
approach to U.S. foreign policy. He referred to it in his memoirs as a ‘particularly gratifying 
moment.’108 
The speech and the actions taken against the Soviet Union consolidated his position 
and detrimentally weakened Vance and the State Department. The Soviets meanwhile, knew 
Brzezinski had influenced the speech and many of the polices that followed. ‘Brzezinski had 
his hour of triumph’ Ambassador Dobrynin recalled. Moreover, they realised his impact on 
the administration had resulted in Vance being side-lined and thwarted any hopes for better 
relations. On 21 March, the secretary of state held a particularly sombre meeting with 
Dobrynin and alluded to the substantial shift within the administration. ‘Vance told me 
Carter seemed to be obsessed with the vengeful idea of ‘punishing the Soviet Union for 
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Afghanistan’’ the ambassador remembered, ‘that conversation showed that the Carter-
Brzezinski team had substantially clipped Vance’s wings.’109 
Carter’s decision to punish the Soviets so forcefully surprised some within his 
administration, particularly given that he once declared the U.S. to be ‘free of that inordinate 
fear of communism.’110 In the days following the invasion, Carter went on television and 
told interviewer Frank Reynolds, ‘this action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic 
change in my opinion of what the Soviets’ goals are than anything they have ever done in 
the previous time that I have been in office.’111 The comment led to charges of naivety, even 
from those within his own administration. ‘Is it your understanding that the Soviet Union 
uniquely invaded Afghanistan? Had they been absent from the territory and suddenly came 
across with great waves of tanks, is that your understanding of what happened?’ reflected 
State Department spokesperson Hodding Carter.112 Robert Gates, who previously served as 
Brzezinski’s special assistant, remembering the reports on Soviet activity his boss sent to the 
president, noted ‘clearly Carter had been reading what Brzezinski was writing but not taking 
it on board… that statement basically meant that he had been reading all these short essays 
from Brzezinski all these years, for three years, and it had had very little impact on him.’113  
Carter had sided with Vance’s assessment of the Soviets for most his presidency. 
Even when Brzezinski had attempted to harshen the administration’s rhetoric following 
Soviet and Cuban intervention in Africa and after the brigade crisis, the president resisted 
fully embracing his approach. However, the national security advisor’s bombardment of 
memos and strategy papers over the years, convinced Carter that the Soviets held a ‘grand 
design’ on the Persian Gulf and sought to exploit the situation in Afghanistan and 
neighbouring Iran. Despite his desire to be ‘the decider’ in the administration, he had no 
central outlook on foreign policy and required on the job tuition in international affairs. This 
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led Brzezinski to constantly inform the president and shift the administration’s foreign 
policy agenda, despite Vance’s opposition. As he had agreed with Vance on numerous 
occasions and attempted to harness U.S.-Soviet relations, he felt betrayed by their 
aggression. The president sided with his national security advisor while his secretary of state 
became an increasingly marginalised figure within the administration and his position, 
according to some, became untenable. ‘Brzezinski had won the argument when the Soviets 
went into Afghanistan’ remembered Leslie Gelb, ‘at that point, I don’t think he (Vance) was 
in a position to disagree with Carter and Brzezinski’s line and didn’t make it an issue. He 
didn’t like it though.’114 
Moreover, the president’s trust in Vance’s strategies and ideas ultimately faded and 
he embraced Brzezinski’s approach more generally. Throughout the administration’s time in 
office, Brzezinski had sought to advance his own policies and approaches at the expense of 
those of Vance and the State Department. Using a range of bureaucratic tools available to 
him, the national security advisor undermined and outmanoeuvred the secretary of state 
during the policy wars. Vance resisted those challenges with mixed success but the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan detrimentally affected his position. He no longer had the favour of 
the president, and his ability to influence the administration’s approach to world affairs 
evaporated. According to NSC staffer Gary Sick, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
‘marked the end of the battle between Cy Vance and the State Department on the one hand, 
and Zbig Brzezinski and the NSC on the other. Cy lost the battle, and Brzezinski was very 
much the dominant figure.’115  
Sick also noted that Vance’s demeanour changed and he became more withdrawn. 
‘He was sort of backing away from the thing and I think that had to do very much with the 
differences on Afghan policy…from that point on Vance began drifting away and I think he 
knew that he had really lost the policy game’ he recalled.116 In his final meeting with Soviet 
                                                          
114 Gelb, Interview with the author. 
115 Gary Sick remarks at “The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Détente.”  
116 Sick, Interview with the author. 
279 
 
Ambassador Dobrynin on 20 April, 1980, Vance admitted that prospects for better U.S.-
Soviet relations were bleak. ‘For the first time’ the ambassador later wrote ‘he frankly 
admitted that other forces were gaining the upper hand. He was uncharacteristically sad, as if 
absorbed in painful reflect.’ Unbeknownst to Dobrynin, the administration had drafted plans 
for an ambitious military operation to free the American hostages held in Tehran while 
Vance arrived at a decision on his future as secretary of state.117 
Operation Eagle Claw 
Between January and April 1980, White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan, Assistant 
Secretary of State Harold Saunders and desk officer Henry Precht engaged in talks with 
Christian Bourget, a French lawyer, and Hector Villalon, an Argentine businessman with 
links to the newly elected Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and Foreign Minister 
Sadegh Ghotbzadeh.118 Both parties worked on the formation of a UN commission to 
investigate Iranian grievances, in exchange for the hostages’ release, but to no avail. This 
latest failure led Carter to break diplomatic relations and announce additional sanctions on 
Iran. Vance argued against the president’s decision, but reflected that ‘within the White 
House there was growing impatience with the diplomatic approach. Increasingly, I heard 
calls for ‘doing something’ to restore our national honour. Carter himself was losing 
faith.’119 Saunders noted on the morning of 7 April, the day the U.S. broke relations with 
Iran, the ‘momentum for a negotiated settlement seemed to have run out.’120  
Previously, military options and rescue attempts discussed by the administration, fell 
by the waste side as diplomatic initiatives took precedence. Brzezinski continually argued in 
favour of military action or a rescue mission and after the latest diplomatic failure, the 
national security advisor judged it apt to proceed with such a measure. Carter resisted 
Brzezinski’s advice in the early days of the crisis but he became frustrated by the lack of 
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progress.121 Moreover, political pressures added to Carter’s woes. He faced an uphill 
struggle to win the presidential nomination of his own party and while opinion poll ratings 
initially soared in his favour after the seizure of the embassy, they gradually declined to 32% 
and his decision to initiate further sanctions on Iran received negative feedback.122 The 
media added additional pressure with a third of the televised news dedicated to the hostage 
crisis. Programmes such as The Crisis in Iran: America Held Hostage aired nightly to 
captivated audience while Walter Cronkite signed off his broadcasts with a painful reminder 
of the number of days the diplomats had spent in captivity.123 
The first serious consideration of a rescue mission occurred at Camp David on 22 
March, 1980, when Brzezinski reignited discussions around a possible operation and briefed 
key advisors on the alternatives available. Carter remained unconvinced but agreed to 
investigate all options and gave his approval to a reconnaissance flight over Iran to gather 
further information. Vance also agreed but rejected the idea of a rescue mission.124 By the first 
week of April, as diplomatic efforts collapsed, calls for military action or a rescue operation 
strengthened. ‘The hawks are flying’ Gary Sick later wrote, ‘I had two unsolicited suggestions 
(from White House staff members) for a blockade of Iran before breakfast this morning.’125 
Although restricted to the principal advisors, Vance began asking some members of his own 
staff questions that alerted them to the possibility of a planned operation. On Easter weekend, 
he spoke with Henry Precht and asked for his views on a rescue mission. ‘I sort of unloaded 
on him, telling him all the dire things that would happen’ Precht recalled, ‘and at the end he 
said “I think so too.”’126 But Brzezinski and the NSC were determined to press ahead with the 
idea and outmanoeuvre Vance and the State Department.   
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On 8 April, Sick, who also advocated some form of action to release the hostages, 
penned a memo to Brzezinski entitled ‘Getting the Hostages Free’, which outlined the two 
options that remained for the administration: gradual application of force against Iran or a 
rescue mission. Brzezinski redrafted the memo and forwarded it to the president on 10 
April.127 He wrote, ‘it is now clear the diplomatic option is closed’ and they needed to 
address the two options. The application of force, Brzezinski noted, carried the risk of 
endangering the hostage’s lives if Iran decided to retaliate. A rescue mission was a more 
desirable option and if successfully implemented ‘would be understood – and perhaps 
applauded – by regional states and allies alike…it would embarrass the Ayatollah and show 
him and his regime to be inept.’ The element of surprise made the operation desirable 
although he acknowledged the risks, ‘in my view, a carefully planned and boldly executed 
rescue operation represents the only realistic prospect that the hostages – any of them – will 
be freed in the foreseeable future’ he explained. ‘Our policy of restraint has won us well 
deserved understanding throughout the world, but it has run out. This is the painful 
conclusion we must now face.’ Returning to the theme of national honour, he recognised the 
enormity of the decision for Carter to undertake but he also wrote ‘we have to think beyond 
the fate of the fifty Americans (and also some Iranians) and consider the deleterious effects 
of a protracted stalemate, growing public frustration, and international humiliation of the 
United States.’128 Carter read the memo and told Brzezinski ‘the time had come to act’ and 
ordered him to convene an NSC meeting the next day.129  
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Vance stepped back from policy making 
and stopped attending meetings. ‘As things got nastier and nastier during the hostage taking 
and all of that, Vance began to take himself out of the decision-making process. When we 
came to meetings it would be Warren Christopher who would represent the State 
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Department’ Gary Sick recalled.130 The situation took its toll on Vance and he departed for a 
weekend break in Florida with his wife Grace just as Brzezinski’s scheduled a crucial NSC 
meeting on 11 April. Due to the secrecy that surrounded the rescue mission, Christopher had 
neither conferred with Vance nor held any prior knowledge of any potential operation. 
Taken aback by the discussion, he reiterated the diplomatic options still available but the 
mood of those in attendance leaned in favour of assertive action.131 Carter then announced 
his decision to proceed with the rescue mission. He noted that Vance provided his objections 
to any military action prior to his departure but if a choice existed between a blockade and a 
rescue mission, he preferred the latter.132 Christopher however doubted this. During the 
meeting, he turned to Hamilton Jordan and asked, ‘does Cy know about this?’ Although 
Jordan assured him he did, Christopher replied ‘no, no – does he realise how far long the 
president’s is in his thinking about this?’133  
When Vance returned to Washington on 14 April, Christopher briefed the secretary 
on the meeting and described his reaction as ‘volcanic…the angriest I’d ever seen him.’134 A 
stunned Vance immediately confronted the president the next morning, ‘angry that such a 
momentous decision had been made’ in his absence.135 He argued, as he had done 
consistently throughout the hostage crisis, that any rescue effort placed the hostages lives in 
danger, ‘I said to him [Carter], I feel very strongly about this because I’m deeply concerned 
that taking any action by force may very well jeopardise the lives of a lot of our people.’ He 
considered the rescue mission premature, a reactionary response that endangered the 
hostages. Recalling past experiences, he noted, ‘I had seen real mess-ups, by people going 
and trying to do things that hadn’t really been thought through…I’ve seen too many people 
screw up on things, because they’re carried away by the situation of the moment and how it 
affects them.’ Moreover, he indicated that diplomatic efforts placed considerable pressure on 
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the Iranians to release the hostages and offered hope for their safe release. After he listened 
to Vance’s objections to the mission, Carter granted him permission to present them at a 
hastily arranged NSC meeting.136  
At the meeting, he repeated his argument; an ambitious rescue mission placed the 
hostages in considerable danger, at a time when the Red Cross provided optimistic reports 
on their health. Even if the operation succeeded in extracting the hostages from the embassy, 
he believed it would result in casualties. He also warned about a potential backlash, not just 
in Iran against American citizens, but in the Arab world against the United States and its 
allies. He had spent a considerable amount of time and effort providing assurances to allies 
who supported their efforts and taking military action without warning would undoubtedly 
agitate and annoy them.137 After he expressed his concerns, he continued to argue the case 
for diplomatic efforts but most of the attendees believed those initiatives had failed and 
remained unconvinced by the secretary’s advice. ‘There was an awkward silence as Vance 
scanned the room’ looking for support, Jordan remembered. ‘I fidgeted, feeling sorry for Cy, 
who sat there all alone.’ The principals, impatient with diplomatic efforts and unmoved by 
Vance’s pleas, supported the rescue operation.138  
This mission consisted of eight helicopters flying from the USS Nimitz, through the 
Iranian desert before they rendezvoused with six C-130 transport planes carrying a rescue 
team of Delta troops to a point known as ‘desert one’ in South Iran. The helicopters would 
transport the rescue team to a site on the outskirts of Tehran before an assault on the 
embassy the next evening.139 As the administration worked on the details, Vance continued 
to voice grave doubts about its chances of success. Speaking with Hamilton Jordan, he said 
‘generals rarely tell you they can’t do something. This a complex damn operation, and I 
haven’t forgotten the old saying from my Pentagon days that in the military anything that 
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can go wrong will go wrong.’ Brzezinski dismissed Vance’s doubts. ‘Cy is the ultimate 
example of a good man who has been traumatised by his Vietnam experience’ he 
remarked.140 
In the days that followed Vance felt it appropriate to consider his position as 
secretary of state. He consulted with friends, and concluded that his reservations made it 
untenable for him to publicly support the mission during the public scrutiny that would 
follow. ‘Even if the mission worked perfectly, and I did not believe it would,’ he recorded in 
his memoirs, ‘I would have to say afterward I had opposed it, give my reasons for opposing 
it, and publicly criticise the president.’ By 17 April, he arrived at the conclusion that he 
should resign.141 In his formal letter of resignation he told Carter, ‘I wish I could support 
you…but for the reasons we have discussed I cannot. You would not be well served in the 
coming weeks and months by a secretary of state who could not offer you the public backing 
you need.’142 Carter accepted his letter of resignation with his departure to be confirmed 
after the rescue mission. Displeased with his decision to quit, the president later called 
Vance’s resignation ‘a knife in my back.’143 
The operation took place on 24 April, 1980, but immediately faced difficulties. As 
the helicopters travelled across the desert to the rendezvous point, one was abandoned due to 
a mechanical failure while another, damaged by dust storms, returned the USS Nimitz. Upon 
arrival at ‘desert one’ where the C-130s landed successfully, another helicopter turned out to 
be irreparably damaged. Five helicopters remained useable but with a minimum of six 
needed to transport the hostages out of Tehran, Delta Force unit leader Colonel Charlie 
Beckwith recommended that the mission be aborted. Carter reluctantly agreed, relieved that 
there were no casualties. However, disaster struck as the rescue team prepared to leave when 
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one of the helicopters collided with a C-130 plane. The subsequent explosion killed eight 
U.S. servicemen.144 When Carter learned of the accident and of the fatalities, his face turned 
white. Vance broke the subsequent silence by saying ‘Mr President, I’m very, very sorry.’145  
In the aftermath of the disaster, Carter faced the unenviable task of informing 
members of Congress and the nation. He went on television that day to explain the events 
and the decision he took. Brzezinski meanwhile attempted to organise another military 
rescue mission, codenamed operation ‘honey badger’ but within the administration, few 
favoured another ambitious operation.146 When Gary Sick gave a pessimistic report on the 
feasibility of a second rescue mission, the national security advisor did not acknowledge his 
assessment. ‘I knew this was not the answer Brzezinski was looking for’ Sick recalled and 
the idea of a second operation quickly faded.147 Moreover, when the Iranians learned of the 
mission, they took the hostages out of the embassy and dispersed them to various locations 
in Tehran, which made a rescue operation of any kind almost impossible.148  
The hostage crisis continued until 20 January, 1981, entirely along the diplomatic 
tracks Vance and the State Department advocated with his deputy Warren Christopher 
taking the lead. After 444 days in captivity, the hostages were eventually freed seconds after 
power passed from Carter to newly elected President Ronald Reagan.149 The hostage crisis 
and the rivalry with Brzezinski took its toll on Vance. When Assistant Secretary of State 
Richard Holbrooke visited Vance to persuade him to change his mind about his resignation, 
he found the secretary afflicted by a sudden attack of gout.150 As Vance left the White House 
for the final time, he departed with the aid of a cane, which led advisor Gerald Rafshoon to 
quip to Hamilton Jordan,‘Zbig bit him on the foot.’151 
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Conclusion 
‘We fought like hell to keep him (Vance) from quitting’ remembered Hodding Cater as other 
State Department staffers discussed resigning en masse in support of their boss.152 ‘You 
mustn’t’ Vance told them, backing his deputy Warren Christopher to succeed him.153 No 
mass resignations followed from the State Department but many praised Vance for his 
conduct as secretary, especially during his high-profile tussles with Brzezinski. Anthony 
Lake told Vance, ‘it is not the professional satisfaction of working with such a wise and 
competent man that I will most cherish. It will be the many times in my memory of an 
extraordinarily decent person, where decency was tested in so many ways, and always was 
true.’154 
Carter did not accept Vance’s departure graciously. Although he recognised the 
personal agony Vance felt, his failure to support him and leave at a critical moment for the 
administration annoyed the president.155 Brzezinski later reflected that ‘the key point about 
Vance’s attitude, and this is what angered Carter, is that he was against (the rescue mission) 
irrespective of whether we succeed or fail.’156 Instead of appointing Warren Christopher as 
Vance recommended, Carter selected Senator Edmund Muskie to replace him. Carter said of 
his new secretary of state, ‘he will play a somewhat different role than the one Secretary 
Vance played, because of a difference in background and temperament and attitude. I see Ed 
Muskie as being a much stronger and more statesmanlike senior-citizen figure who will be a 
more evocative spokesman for our nation's policy.’157  
Many considered the praise of Muskie as a ‘more statesmanlike’ figure a stinging 
rebuke, and it led journalist Curtis Wilkie to label the comment ‘a graceless show by the 
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president.’158 It also prompted Vance loyalist, Hodding Carter to resign from his position as 
State Department press spokesperson. ‘I said “you know what, you don’t need be pissing on 
that guy. He served you forever.” So, I wrote a letter of resignation right on the spot and that 
was the end of it.’159 Hodding Carter also reserved heavy criticism for Brzezinski, as the 
administration prepared to leave office. He wrote a piece for Playboy magazine that took 
aim at both the president and the national security advisor, referring to the latter as a ‘second 
rate thinker’ and ‘a rat terrier, he would shake himself off after a losing encounter and begin 
nipping at Vance’s ankles.’160 Meanwhile, Vance’s friend, UN Ambassador Donald 
McHenry, publicly criticised the national security advisor’s predominant and assertive role 
as detrimental to the administration’s foreign policy objectives. ‘You can only have one 
secretary of state’ he remarked.161 Leslie Gelb wrote that Brzezinski had constantly undercut 
the secretary of state and undermined his position; ‘while Mr. Vance played by Marquis of 
Queensbury rules, it might be said Mr. Brzezinski was more of a streetfighter.’162  
As this chapter illustrates, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan coupled with the 
Iranian hostage crisis brought the bureaucratic struggles between Vance, Brzezinski and 
their respective departments to a close. The national security advisor outmanoeuvred the 
secretary of state as the president’s chief foreign policy advisor as the two seismic events in 
the Persian Gulf solidified his position. Vance unsuccessfully lobbied against a tough 
response to both crises, as his influence with the administration declined and his position 
became untenable. The national security advisor succeeded in shifting the focus of the 
administration’s foreign policy agenda.  
The reaction of Vance’s staff and colleagues to his resignation demonstrated their 
frustration and disappointment at the gradual erosion of his authority within the 
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administration. Several were not surprised by his decision to quit and believed he may have 
welcomed the opportunity to leave because of his struggles with Brzezinski. ‘I think that he 
did not regret that the opportunity to leave over principal arose’ remembered Hodding 
Carter, ‘he was exhausted; he was tired of getting beat in the bureaucratic wars.’163 Others 
believed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan left Vance isolated and unable to affect policy. 
‘He didn’t have as much to lose by the time we got to the rescue mission as he did before’ 
Gary Sick noted, ‘he was no longer as close to Carter and Carter wasn’t looking to him first 
for advice. So, in a sense this was really sort of his last stand.’164  
Throughout his time as secretary of state, Vance attempted to persuade Carter to 
follow his advice and strategies with mixed success. The president had sought to balance the 
advice between his two key advisors, despite their differing perspectives and conceptions of 
their roles. He consistently proved himself unable to manage the pair or articulate their 
strategies into a clear and consistent foreign policy agenda. The lack of leadership from the 
president, ultimately precipitated the bureaucratic struggles between Vance and Brzezinski. 
Carter later said that he was ‘sore’ about Vance’s resignation and as he reflected on the 
failed rescue mission, the president said that he should have ordered another helicopter. 
When the former secretary of state was told of Carter’s comments, he ‘replied with a wry 
smile’ and said, ‘or a different national security advisor.’165 
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Conclusion 
The Presidency of Jimmy Carter became engulfed by a series of foreign policy crises. 
Revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, proxy wars in Africa, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and latterly the hostage crisis disrupted the administration’s attempts to promote human 
rights, negotiate an arms control treaty and shift the focus of U.S. foreign policy away from 
the superpower conflict with the Soviet Union. Each instance was hampered by the 
bureaucratic wars between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski and their respective departments. Their debates, and internal 
manoeuvrings had a significant impact on the administration’s foreign policy. While Carter 
entered the White House with the intention of having a collegial, team based style of 
decision-making that provided him with a range of options to choose from, it ultimately 
precipitated an ideological and bureaucratic struggle between the president’s principal 
advisors and their departments.  
In terms of policy and approach, they differed substantially, with Brzezinski’s 
emphasis on a tough, assertive foreign policy as opposed to Vance’s patient, soft, diplomatic 
style. As chapter one illustrates, the ideological roots of their dispute evolved from their 
upbringing and their experiences in government. Their knowledge and expertise attracted the 
attention of Jimmy Carter and he recruited them as advisors to his campaign for the White 
House however it was the Polish academic who cultivated a close personal and professional 
relationship with the future president. Whereas Vance’s contribution to the campaign was 
relatively minor, Brzezinski supported Carter throughout and played a vital role in 
formulating policy and prepping him for the crucial foreign policy debate with Ford, a 
significant moment in the race for the White House. 
Carter relied heavily on Brzezinski’s advice and above all trusted him whereas 
Vance never fostered the same intimacy with the president. This, as well as his lack of 
experience and desire for on the job tutoring, led Carter to give the Pole a pre-eminent role 
within his administration. The formalised NSC structure, outlined in chapter two, benefited 
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Brzezinski and his department’s ability to develop and implement policies but left Vance 
and the State Department with less opportunity to dramatically shape the administration’s 
agenda. The president favoured the national security advisor and immediately gave him a 
significant role in the administration to affect the foreign policy agenda. As a result, the 
bureaucratic rivalry between themselves and their departments developed from day one.1  
The first year saw elements of their struggles fester below the surface as Vance 
attempted to assert his and his department’s influence on policy. As noted in chapter three, 
the SALT II negotiations with the Soviet Union highlighted their divergent ideological 
outlooks regarding the superpower relationship and led to a conflict over the American 
position in the arms control talks. But the bureaucratic disadvantages afforded to Vance, 
contributed towards Carter’s decision to endorse the ‘deep cuts’ approach of Brzezinski. The 
Soviets sharply rebuked the proposal, already stung by the administration’s human rights 
agenda. Vance argued against publicly highlighting Soviet human rights abuses for fear it 
would detrimentally affect SALT, while the Cold War hawk Brzezinski claimed otherwise, 
appealing to Carter’s concern for human suffrage. In other areas, the pair worked collegially 
on democratic advancement in Africa, the Panama Canal treaties and a Middle East peace 
deal between Israel and Egypt. The latter case highlighted the potential for co-operation 
between the president’s advisors and their departments.  
Chapter four shows how Brzezinski urged Carter to adopt a tougher and more 
assertive approach to world affairs. As the administration entered its second year in office, 
an opportunity presented itself, as hostilities erupted between Ethiopia and Somalia in the 
Horn of Africa and Zaire and Angola in the Shaba region. Divergent interpretations of the 
conflicts and the role of the Soviet Union and Cuba led to a furious and bitter row over the 
administration’s approach to resolve the disputes. While Vance favoured peaceful, 
diplomatic mediation, Brzezinski called for a tough response that utilised U.S. military and 
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economic support for Somalia, the Angolan rebels and Zaire to contain the communist 
threat. Carter however seemed unable to choose between his advisors and adopted elements 
of the strategies of both his national security advisor and secretary of state. His policy 
speeches at the time reflected the deviating advice he received, contributing to a perception 
that the administration’s foreign policy was inconsistent and incoherent.  
Meanwhile, the administration’s attempts to restore diplomatic relations with the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) provoked further agitation. Brzezinski and NSC staffer 
Michel Oksenberg outmanoeuvred and undermined Vance and the State Department to 
initiate talks with the PRC. Furthermore, normalisation indicated a distinct shift in the 
administration’s approach vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It also illustrated the importance of 
Brzezinski’s role within the administration. While his position had been defined as ‘the 
thinker’ he became ‘the doer’ by travelling to China, with the president’s blessing, to 
commence talks.  
The following year triggered further disputes as Vance and Brzezinski attempted to 
orchestrate the administration’s reaction to unrest in Iran and Nicaragua. With Carter 
inactive and unable to decide between the two, both competed to influence events. Chapter 
five also details how Vance’s influence began to evaporate. Coupled with his decision to 
step down after the 1980 presidential election, his relationship with the president sharply 
declined. This limited his input on policy development and implementation even further, 
while it enhanced Brzezinski’s position as he attempted to persuade Carter to embrace a 
tougher stance towards the Soviet Union. The ‘discovery’ of a brigade of Soviet troops in 
Cuba was a clear indication of the rightward shift in Carter’s thinking from the co-operative, 
diplomatic approach espoused by Vance toward the hard-line strategy of Brzezinski. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, outlined in chapter six, gave 
him the opportunity to successfully persuade Carter to embrace his approach. The foreign 
policy objectives of Vance, particularly the successful ratification of the SALT II treaty, 
were discarded in favour of a ‘Carter Doctrine’ to tackle Soviet expansionism across the 
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world. Finally, the Iranian hostage crisis and the president’s decision to order an audacious 
rescue mission prompted Vance’s resignation. Throughout the crisis, he defended his 
diplomatic approach against assaults by Brzezinski and the NSC but the president’s reluctant 
decision to order Operation Eagle Claw left Vance in no doubt that his position had become 
untenable.  
This thesis placed the Vance-Brzezinski relationship within the wider theoretical 
framework of the bureaucratic politics model to illustrate how presidential decision-making, 
with respect to foreign policy, can be influenced by competing forces, either by individuals 
or government departments. It sought to address the role of the president, the secretary of 
state and national security advisor as well as their respective departments and understand 
how their contributions during the Carter years affected policy development and 
implementation. 
Given Jimmy Carter’s lack of experience and expertise with respect to foreign 
policy, coupled with his desire to be ‘the decider’ in the administration, he gravitated 
towards a system that provided him with a range of options, which allowed him to come to a 
fully informed decision. However, his inability to manage the differences between his 
advisors resulted in an incoherent and inconsistent agenda. Increasingly his decisions 
mirrored the divergent policies of his two key advisors. His responses to the crises in Africa 
and speeches in 1978 highlighted his failure to effectively combine the advice and policies 
of Vance and Brzezinski into a clear approach. The press, his advisors and their departments 
recognised the contradictions, as confidence in the president’s ability to co-ordinate U.S. 
foreign policy faded. 
At other times, paralysed by indecision, he failed to pick a clear course of action. 
The revolution in Iran, highlighted his indecisiveness. At various stages of the crisis, he 
sided with Vance, at other times Brzezinski, unwilling to authoritatively choose between 
their approaches. The situation fuelled the tensions between his advisors but also intensified 
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the departmental competition as they vied to influence the administration’s approach to the 
revolution and court the president’s favour.  
While bureaucratic politics scholars differ on the role of the president, the example 
of the Carter administration illustrates how presidential authority can be weakened by the 
influence of advisors and their departments. Although Carter believed the decision-making 
structure made him ‘the decider’ in the administration, it ultimately laid the foundations of 
the bureaucratic conflict between Vance, Brzezinski and their departments. His 
indecisiveness and inability to effectively manage their views led both to actively compete 
with one another to influence his decision. As various crises arose, the outcome of 
deliberations became increasingly influenced by the policy differences between Vance and 
Brzezinski, with Carter unable to decisively choose between the two. In sum, this case 
demonstrates that presidential authority within the bureaucratic politics framework can be 
seriously reduced and have serious ramification for policy development and implementation. 
The bureaucratic model emphasises that ideological differences coupled with 
divergent interpretations of roles can exacerbate competition at the executive level. Vance 
and Brzezinski’s contrasting worldviews, backgrounds and personalities produced clashes 
on key aspects of the administration’s agenda, particularly their positions on U.S.-Soviet 
relations. This was reflected in their positions on arms control, proxy wars in Africa and 
normalisation of relations with China. Their styles and approaches to U.S. foreign policy 
also set them apart. Vance, the patient diplomat urged caution and moderation on key issues, 
as opposed to Brzezinski’s pleas for an assertive hard-line agenda.  
Moreover, their varied understanding of their roles within the administration further 
elevated the sense of competition between them. While Jordan identified Brzezinski as ‘the 
thinker’ and Vance as ‘the doer’ within the administration, neither felt comfortable with 
their roles. Vance considered the position of the secretary of state as the key architect of U.S. 
foreign policy and viewed his department as the historical vehicle of policy development. 
Therefore, upon entering the administration he sought to re-establish their authority. 
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Although he did not object to the position of national security advisor, he viewed Brzezinski 
as a co-ordinator, not an intellectual driver or implementer of their agenda. The national 
security advisor meanwhile sought to combine the two roles over time. He established his 
and his department’s supremacy with respect to policy development early on but as time 
progressed, he became increasingly assertive. He briefed the press, met frequently with 
foreign ambassadors and travelled abroad as a presidential emissary, replacing Vance as the 
president’s chief diplomat.  
His trip to China in 1978 emphasised his increasing status within the administration, 
while his attempts to manage the administration’s response to revolutions in Iran and 
Nicaragua illustrated his growing dominance over foreign policy. Combined with Carter’s 
inability to decisively choose between his two advisors, the policy wars between Vance and 
Brzezinski became a consistent feature of his presidency. Both sought to exert their 
influence over the policy process but the national security advisor eventually came out on 
top. With respect to the bureaucratic politics paradigm, the Carter administration is a 
pertinent example of how overbearing, ambitious and determined individuals can seek to 
manipulate the bureaucratic process to influence presidential decision-making. 
Furthermore, both used their departments to develop policies and approaches. As 
chapter two illustrates, the formalised decision-making structure within the administration 
handed a significant bureaucratic advantage to Brzezinski and his department to develop and 
implement policies. Conversely, the system disadvantaged Vance and the State Department, 
who resented the elevated status of the national security advisor and the NSC. This 
contributed to a growing sense of distrust between the two departments as both attempted to 
manage foreign policy development. As this thesis demonstrates however, Carter favoured 
Brzezinski and the NSC. The president and the national security advisor enjoyed a close 
personal and working relationship and his department proved itself more efficient at 
providing the president with policy options in comparison to their rivals at the State 
Department. Subsequently, a sense of competition developed, leading to bureaucratic 
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warfare between the two departments. As Jim Hoagland reflected, ‘their staffs frequently 
clashed, and when that happened, neither Brzezinski nor Vance did much to rein them in.’2 
While bureaucratic politics scholars have neglected the effect of the NSC-State 
rivalry, this thesis demonstrates how both departments influenced decision-making. The two 
agencies, both loyal and subservient to their bosses, used a variety of bureaucratic tools to 
affect policy as they sought to advance their strategies and approaches. The administration’s 
attempts to normalise diplomatic relations with China was a prime example of both an NSC 
staffer and assistant secretary of state, competing with one another to affect policy. 
Similarly, the Iranian revolution produced two contrasting responses from the key 
individuals involved, desk officer Henry Precht and NSC staffer Gary Sick. As Precht 
himself reflected, those individuals responsible for co-ordinating policy did not work in 
conjunction with one another. In this and other areas, the administration’s policies, 
approaches and responses were adversely affected by the policy wars between the State 
Department and the NSC. As this study reveals, bureaucratic rivalries, at a lower-level, can 
influence decisions within the executive branch. 
The findings of this study highlight the value of the bureaucratic politics paradigm. 
Its exclusion from the more recent version of Explaining the History of American Foreign 
Relations, amalgamated into a general chapter on theories of international relations, neglects 
the importance of bureaucratic institutions and inter-departmental rivalries and their impact 
on policy. While other chapters in the collection and other studies focus their examination of 
American foreign relations on memory, ideology and personality to ascertain the rationale 
behind foreign policy agendas, bureaucratic politics’ emphasis on the competing influence 
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of advisors, organisations and lower-level officials provides an alternative framework to 
analyse the development of strategies and the mechanics of presidential decision-making.3 
It shows how conflict between advisors, organisations and lower-level officials can 
develop within an administration and influence foreign policy priorities, approaches and 
reactions to events in the international arena. Furthermore, as the case of the Carter 
administration illustrates, it can also lead to a reduction in presidential authority and affect 
the commander-in-chief’s ability to manage the course and nature of an administration’s 
foreign policy agenda. It emboldens officials, at the executive level and those below, to 
assert their authority more vigorously in attempt to influence priorities and approaches. 
In addition to powerful and assertive advisors, the growth of contemporary 
government institutions and their increasing influence over the development and 
implementation of policy, gives the bureaucratic politics model extra relevance to scholars. 
With greater access to primary materials and witness testimony, the power of advisors and 
bureaucracies can be more accurately analysed. Overall, the framework can help determine 
the president’s motivations, the influences on their judgement, how policy is established and 
who executes strategies. By scrutinising these elements through the spectre of the 
bureaucratic politics framework, policy development and implementation can be better 
understood. Above all, the model helps illuminate why presidents make certain decisions or 
act in certain ways and offers an alternative approach to appreciate the complexities of 
presidential decision-making as well as American foreign policy, past, present and future.  
This thesis also challenges some of the narratives that exist within the 
historiography on the Carter administration. While some historians argue that the president 
gradually shifted towards the policies and approaches of Brzezinski, this thesis demonstrates 
                                                          
3 See, Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U. S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2009); Penny M. Von Eschen, “Memory and the Study of U.S. Foreign Relations,” in Explaining the 
History of American Foreign Relations, ed. Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan; Richard H. 
Immerman and Lori Helene Gronich, “Psychology,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign 
Relations, ed. Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan. 
297 
 
that Carter, because of his close relationship with the national security advisor, granted him 
a pre-eminent role within his administration to develop the foreign policy agenda. Indeed, 
the relationship between Carter and Brzezinski lacks a critical analysis. As this study 
demonstrated, they enjoyed a close personal relationship and trusted one another, which 
certainly benefited Brzezinski in the policy wars with Vance, who did not enjoy the same 
level of familiarity with the president. 
Moreover, aside from human rights, Carter lacked a clear and defined ideological 
outlook, which left him open to the ideas and concepts advanced by Brzezinski. While 
events, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan radically shifted Carter’s position towards 
the strategies of Brzezinski, as evidenced by SALT, normalisation of relations with China 
and proxy wars in Africa, he had already demonstrated an inclination to move towards a 
more assertive foreign policy vis-à-vis their Cold War adversary. As this thesis establishes, 
although Brzezinski manipulated his position to outmanoeuvre Vance and advance his own 
philosophies, his close personal and working relationship with the president granted him a 
significant amount of autonomy to do so. 
A number of works on the administration also ignore the bureaucratic arrangements 
within the administration. Jerel A. Rosati, Yael S. Aronoff and Itai Nartzizenfield Sneh for 
example, assessed the ideological roots of the conflict whereas Gaddis Smith and Burton I. 
Kaufman analysed key events as triggers for their disputes.4 Certainly, their differing 
perspectives motivated their struggles however both desired to be the president’s chief 
foreign policy advisor. As this thesis has shown, the construction of the administration’s 
decision-making apparatus, created the sense of competition between them as they both 
attempted to outdo one another. Additionally, Carter’s inability to decide between them 
heightened the conflict between them. While scholars are divided on the president’s ability 
to manage his administration, this thesis clearly illustrates that Carter was unable to 
                                                          
4 Rosati, The Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community; Aronoff, “In Like a Lamb, Out 
Like a Lion.”; Sneh, The Future Almost Arrived; Smith, Morality, Reason and Power; Kaufman, The 
Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr. 
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successfully incorporate the views of his advisors, resolve their differences, and effectively 
lead his administration. Numerous case studies analysed in this study, exemplify Carter’s 
lack of leadership and authority with respect to foreign policy decision-making.  
Additionally, while a number of studies have focused on the developing role of the 
NSC, little attention has been given to the role of the State Department.5 They played a 
significant role in the policy wars of the Carter administration and the testimonies of various 
individuals from this period, identify the level of antagonism between the two departments. 
The disputes between the two agencies were just as hostile as the struggles between Vance 
and Brzezinski and their effect on policy is evident. In the wider historiography on U.S. 
foreign policy, the NSC-State relationship lacks a critical study, this thesis reveals how the 
historical rivalry between the two departments can impact on the development and 
implementation of policy. Moreover, it provides a new avenue to historians of the Carter 
administration and others, to understand their impact on American foreign policy. 
In conclusion, this thesis demonstrates how foreign policy decision-making can be 
influenced by the competing attitudes of key advisors and their departments. Ideological and 
bureaucratic differences heightened the sense of competition between Vance, Brzezinski and 
their departments as they sought to exert their authority over key aspects of the 
administration’s foreign policy agenda. However, the inability of President Carter to 
effectively manage their divergent views and control the warring factions within his 
administration, ultimately contributed to an inconsistent and contradictory foreign policy 
agenda. The rivalry also extended to lower-level officials in the State Department and the 
NSC, as both sought to protect their status and advance their ideas, which led to bureaucratic 
warfare between the agencies. President Carter’s desire for a collegial system that provided 
him with a range of advice and policies, ultimately gave way to an increasingly hostile 
                                                          
5 See, Mulcahy, “Foreign Policy Making in the Carter and Reagan Administrations,” in Decisions of 
the Highest Order, ed. Inderfurth and Johnson; Prados, Keepers of the Keys; Shoemaker, The NSC 
Staff; Garrison, Games Advisors Play; Rothkopf, Running The World; Burke, Honest Broker?; 
Daadler and Destler, In the Shadow of the Oval Office. 
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environment between Vance, Brzezinski and their respective departments. Consequently, 
American foreign policy during this period reflected the divisions within the Carter 
administration. While events and crises across the world affected the administration’s 
strategy in the international arena, ultimately the conflict between Vance and Brzezinski 
consistently informed their approach. As, Leslie Gelb, reflected, ‘the main battle of the 
Carter years was that between the Columbia professor and the Wall Street lawyer.’6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Gelb, Power Rules, 57. 
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